852 3411 5753 chris@hkbu.edu.hk

Research philosophy

My field of expertise includes: security studies (traditional and non-traditional threats), foreign and security policy of Poland, foreign and security policy of Great Britain, European Politics and the European Union. I continue my research in these four major areas which is shown by my recent publications. At the same time, I remain open to new challenges in the academic field and recently delivered presentations regarding politics and religion in Europe, national identity, cyber security, security in South and South-East Asia or environment and politics. Recently I have been recognized internationally for my work in a form of an invitation to contribute to EUROPP European Politics and Policy blog maintained by the London School of Economics and Political Science. One of my papers “Moving beyond EU weakness as a cyber security agent” has also been acclaimed internationally and consequently reprinted as part of “European Security: Critical Concepts” series by Routledge.

Publications

Refereed works

Śliwiński, K. F. (2016). ‘A-securitization’ of immigration policy – the case of European Union, Asia-Pacific Journal of EU Studies, 14:1, 25-56.

Abstract

This paper draws on the ‘securitization’ thesis with regard to immigration policy of the European Union and its members. Contrary to existing literature, it is claimed that the current immigration crisis that the European Union faces is driven by an opposite dynamic, which produces ‘a-securitization’ – a phenomenon defined, in this paper, as a condition where important social phenomena are declared security irrelevant and consequently treated as such (both explicitly or implicitly). The analysis of the ongoing debate leads the author to identify major actors (drivers) on the pro-immigration side, their institutional forms and principles to which they adhere. These actors include: national political elites, the EU and its institutions, multinational companies and mass media. The thesis of ‘a-securitization’ is proposed as a theoretical explanation that allows us to account for a number of seemingly illogical phenomena taking place at the EU level and at national levels regarding both national and human security of European societies as well as a majority of immigrants.

Link to published article:

http://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=gis_ja

 

Krzysztof Feliks Silwinski, (2016) ‘Moving Beyond the European Union’s Weakness as a Cyber-security Agent’, Contemporary Security Policy, 2014, 35, 3, In Smith, M. A. (ed.) European Security. Critical Concepts in Military, Strategic and Security Studies, (468–86). Routledge.

Abstract

Policy and research on European cyber-security remains formative compared to leaders in the field like China and the United States. This article evaluates the European Union (EU) as a cyber-security actor, asking fundamental questions concerning the EU’s combination of prominence and obscurity, especially its limitations and prospects. Who and what is going to dominate the European response to cyber-security in the future? These questions are examined within the larger framework of liberal intergovernmentalism. The EU also is compared to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a point of reference to further understand the limitations and challenges ahead for the EU. Two major factors limit the EU as a cyber-security actor: its intergovernmental character, and the lack of collective vision on cyber-security with the EU and between member states. To play an important role in shaping cyberspace and cyber-security, the EU cannot treat the internet as simply a communication tool or trading platform. Cooperation and capacity-building measures are needed to allow EU member states to surpass mere coordination of their respective national cyber-security strategies. To succeed as a cyber-power, the EU should adapt new and different forms of cyber-power, from the compulsory through the institutional, to the structural and productive. Otherwise, coordination of national strategies for cyber-security of EU member states is the most the EU as an actor can aim for.

Link to published article:

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13523260.2014.959261

 

Śliwiński, K. (2015). Securitization of Hong Kong Politics: the debate on electoral reform and civil disobedience of 2014. Społeczeństwo i Polityka. 4:45, 15-36. (English).

Link to published article:

http://www.pismosip.ah.edu.pl/downloads.php?download_id=41

Śliwiński, K. and Rakowska, A. (2015). Security Threats and Risk Management: European and Chinese responses to climate disruption. Przegląd Europejski. 4:38, 142-163. (English).

Abstract

Most academics and policy makers agree upon irreversible phenomena affecting planet Earth’s climate – we have finally faced a climate disruption. As triggered by humans, environmental degradation ultimately threatens not only the security but even the survival of individuals, communities, states and perhaps even the international system as a whole.

This paper addresses differences with regards to risk assessment of climate disruption in Europe and in China. Its departure point is that the divergence between European and Chinese approaches is based on structural and institutional distinctions. Specifically, it tries to assess those distinctions (importance of sovereignty and non-interference) with regards to methods (assessment of vulnerability) and principles (transparency and inclusiveness) of risk assessment.

Initial analysis leads to a tentative conclusion, which confirms the importance of political culture in national responses to security threats (be it traditional or non-traditional). In this respect EU-China strategic partnership is suggested as one of the possibly effective platforms for future cooperation.

Link to published article:

http://en.przegladeuropejski.wdinp.uw.edu.pl/zasoby/pliki/38/8-Sliwinski.pdf

 

Śliwiński, K. (2014). The Fifth Domain – national security in private hands? Civilianization of security in United Kingdom. Społeczeństwo i Polityka 3:40, 135-156. (English).

Link to published article:

http://gis.hkbu.edu.hk/files/K%20Sliwinski_The%20Fifth%20Domain_national%20security%20in%20private%20hands.pdf

Śliwiński, K. (2014). Accounting for Pre-conditions for a Harmonious Community of States: Democratization and the Security Complex in East and Southeast Asia. Journal of Asian Public Policy, 7:3, 214-230, DOI: 10.1080/17516234.2014.922149

Abstract

This article addresses the relationship between the character of political regimes and security in East and Southeast Asia. In doing so, it draws on the insights of both regional security complex and liberal peace theories. The analysis of democratization processes is therefore juxtaposed with the general underdevelopment of democracy in the region. It is ascertained that the security paradox that features prominently in East and Southeast Asian international relations can be transcended. Democratization and modernization alone, however, do not suffice, in which case another normative basis is needed. The main conclusion takes the author to accept the importance of culture in political community building. In that respect, a common denominator is sought in building a genuine Asian identity based on human values, to which major political philosophies and religions in the region subscribe. Consequently, the convergence among social norms, political norms and peace is theorized.

Link to published article:

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17516234.2014.922149

 

Śliwiński, K. (2014). European Union – cyber power in the making. The Asia-Pacific Journal of EU Studies, 12:1, pp. 1-22.

Abstract

This article investigates the challenges and limitations of an emerging European cyber security posture. The departure point for the analysis is embedded within the framework that rests on identifying four distinct forms of cyber power: compulsory, institutional, structural and productive.

Tentative conclusions suggest that to be effective, the EU’s strategic approach must strike the right balance between all four forms. Additionally, a major challenge for the designers of EU cyber security posture will be accommodating the technology, which due to its characteristics challenges the established balance of power between and within states. Finally, international cooperation regarding two basic categories of cyber threats, whereby states are much more likely to succeed in tackling cyber crime than cyber espionage, must also be addressed.

Link to published article:

http://www.keusa.or.kr/korean/kor_publication/APJournal/2014_No12_1/Eu-12-1-01%20Sliwinski.pdf

 

Śliwiński, K. (2012). Polish National Security Dilemmas. Missile defense complex and its role in Foreign Policy. Democracy and Security, 8:2, 191-212.

Abstract

This article examines fundamental dilemmas concerning contemporary Polish Security Policy. Firstly, it addresses the question of US missile defense complex and its place in Polish politics. Secondly, it employs Foreign Policy Analysis tools with special attention to the agency-structure nexus. Specifically, it analyses three distinct dimensions: intentional, dispositional and structural. The author claims that Polish attitudes towards US missile defense are a result of Polish-US and Polish-Russian relations. Although evidence suggests that public attitudes towards US missile defense complex in Poland are affected by the threat of international terrorism, the issue should be seen within a broader geopolitical perspective.

Link to published article:

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17419166.2012.681602

 

Śliwiński, K. (2012). Counter-terrorism – a comprehensive approach. Social mobilization and ‘civilianization’ of security: the Case of the United Kingdom. European Security 2012, 22:3, pp. 288-306.

Abstract

The global war on terror and 9/11 have brought to our attention the perpetual problem of freedom versus security. The more governments strive to provide security, the more they tend to curb the freedoms of their citizens. ‘Stop and search’ procedures, 28-day detentions of terrorist suspects without charge or new body scanners at the airports are just the ‘tip of the iceberg’ in a long list of the state’s encroachments into our private lives. This paper departs from such a seemingly inescapable predicament. It analyses the rote of the public in preventing, protecting and preparing for terrorist attacks under the British government’s counter-terrorism strategy known as CONTEST. It explores two social phenomena that are being increasingly promoted by official authorities in the United Kingdo, namely, mobilisation of society and what the author terms ‘civilianisation of security. The latter is defined as a notion relating to non-military, voluntary organisations and the business/private sector. engaged by government but acting in its own right against terrorism threats. ‘Civilianisation’ of security is also conceived of as a potential tool to bridge the gap between two incompatible worlds of state security and personal freedoms.

Link to published article:

http://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=gis_ja

 

Śliwiński, K. (2010). British Nuclear Strategy at the Threshold of 21st Century. European Security, 18: 1, pp.81-97.

Abstract

This paper emphasizes the pertinence of the British government’s claim that nuclear deterrent threats are still relevant in the four broad areas to which it addresses: deterrence against aggression towards British/NATO vital interests or nuclear coercion/ blackmail by major powers with large nuclear arsenals; deterrence against nuclear coercion or blackmail with other WMD by regional ‘‘rogue’’ states; deterrence against state-sponsored acts of nuclear terrorism; and as a general residual deterrent function to preserve peace and stability in an uncertain world.

British nuclear weapons are still important and very much relevant in all the four areas discussed. First of all, they play a role of a significant tool of political leverage as they continue to serve as an authentication of British military capabilities. In that regard, they still function much the same way they did during the ‘Cold War’. WMDs were, after all, a guarantee of their non-use, which does not mean that they were not useful. Secondly, it also authenticates the UK among its allies. Even though generally democracies do not wage wars with one another, they still have to face the challenges posed by non-democracies. In doing so, they need to support each other with the use of ‘ultima ratio’ arguments in order to safeguard international peace and stability. The British nuclear deterrent should, therefore, be perceived as a general deterrent with a positive influence on international community and international security, overall.

Link to published article:

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09662830903432680

 

Śliwiński, K. (2009). European Supranationalism. The battle of spirit of Jean Monnet and vision of General de Gaulle. POLITIKA Annual Journal, 34, 31-34.

Abstract

August 3 this year marked the 60th anniversary of the statute of the Council of Europe entering into force. During the first session, held on 8 th -10th of September 1949, of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, federalist members of parliament requested the institution of a European political authority. As a result, a mere year later, in a speech inspired by Jean Monnet, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed integrating the coal and steel industries of Western Europe. ‘Europe Day’ celebrated later annually came to symbolize European integration processes that brought peace and prosperity to, initially western part of the European continent after ages of devastating conflicts. The Shuman Declaration decisively envisaged that ‘the contribution which an organized and living Europe can bring to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations’.1The reason behind initial integration was to make ‘war not only unthinkable but materially impossible’. From today’s perspective, initial goals of European integration seem obvious and not so much thought is usually given to the great founder of European federalism Jean Monnet and his seminal plans.

Link to published article:

http://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=gis_ja

 

Śliwiński, K. (2007). British National Security Strategy (1945-2005). Studia Międzynarodowe, 1-4:3, 71-92.

Abstract

This paper emphasizes the pertinence of the British government’s claim that nuclear deterrent threats are still relevant in the four broad areas to which it addresses: deterrence against aggression towards British/NATO vital interests or nuclear coercion/ blackmail by major powers with large nuclear arsenals; deterrence against nuclear coercion or blackmail with other WMD by regional ‘‘rogue’’ states; deterrence against state-sponsored acts of nuclear terrorism; and as a general residual deterrent function to preserve peace and stability in an uncertain world.

British nuclear weapons are still important and very much relevant in all the four areas discussed. First of all, they play a role of a significant tool of political leverage as they continue to serve as an authentication of British military capabilities. In that regard, they still function much the same way they did during the ‘Cold War’. WMDs were, after all, a guarantee of their non-use, which does not mean that they were not useful. Secondly, it also authenticates the UK among its allies. Even though generally democracies do not wage wars with one another, they still have to face the challenges posed by non-democracies. In doing so, they need to support each other with the use of ‘ultima ratio’ arguments in order to safeguard international peace and stability. The British nuclear deterrent should, therefore, be perceived as a general deterrent with a positive influence on international community and international security, overall.

Link to published article:

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09662830903432680

 

Śliwiński, K. (2005). Evolution of British Strategy of Deterrent. Stosunki Międzynarodowe, 3-4:32, 143 – 162.

 

Śliwiński, K. (2005) Review of: John Dickie, The New Mandarins: How British Foreign Policy Works, I. B. Tauris, London 2004, p. 254, Stosunki Międzynarodowe, 1-2:31, 213-215.

 

Śliwiński, K., & Pronińska, K. (2004). Report from Scientific Conference: „Institutionalisation of International Multilateral Co-operation in Europe in the Context of New Challenges”, Stosunki Międzynarodowe, 1-2:29, 185-190.

 

Śliwiński, K. (2003). Report from Scientific Conference of the Institute of International Relations: „Globalisation in International Relations”, Stosunki Międzynarodowe, 1-2: 27, 201-214.

 

Śliwiński, K. (2002). Evolution of Security Strategy in International Relations, Świat i Polityka, 3-4, 53-72.

 

Published Book Chapters

 

Bieleń, St. and Śliwiński, K. (2017). Comparing Polish-German and Polish-Russian reconciliation efforts. In. A. Frieberg and C. K. Martin Chung (eds.) Reconciling with the Past: Resources and Obstacles in a Global Perspective (148-160). Routledge.

 

Śliwiński, K. (2014). Poland: A Nation of the In-Between. In R. Vogt, W. Cristaudo, A. Leutzsch (eds.) European National Identities. Elements. Transitions. Conflicts, (155 – 171). New Brunswick: Transaction.

 

Śliwiński, K. (2006). Economical Aspects of British Security Strategy. In Haliżak, E. (Ed.). International Relations in the 21st Century, (pp. 112 – 131). Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.

 

Śliwiński, K., & Wróbel, (2004). A. Uniform Services Market of UE – Consequences for Poland. In Haliżak, E. (Ed.). Foreign and Internal Policy in the Process of European Integration, (pp. 272 – 293). Bydgoszcz-Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza Branta.

 

Non-refereed works

Śliwiński, K. (July 9, 2016). “Brexit and European Security”. Hong Kong Economic Journal. http://www1.hkej.com/dailynews/international/article/1341024/%E5%BE%8C%E8%84%AB%E6%AD%90%E5%8B%A2%E5%8A%9B%E5%86%8D%E5%B9%B3%E8%A1%A1+%E5%BE%B7%E4%B8%8A%E8%8B%B1%E8%90%BD%E5%A0%AA%E6%86%82

Śliwiński, K. (January 19, 2016). “The European Commission’s rule of law review in Poland risks fuelling Euroscepticism. EUROPP – European Politics and Policy. The London School of Economics and Political Science.

Śliwiński, K. “Poland’s bugging scandal highlights the need for a more pragmatic Polish foreign policy over Ukraine and Russia”. EUROPP – European Politics and Policy. The London School of Economics and Political Science at: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/06/30/polands-bugging-scandal-highlights-the-need-for-a-more-pragmatic-polish-foreign-policy-over-ukraine-and-russia/ (June 30, 2014).

Śliwiński, K, “Donald Tusk’s Presidency of the European Council will present as many challenges for Poland as opportunities“. EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, the London School of Economics and Political Science. (October 17, 2014).

Śliwiński, K. (March 7, 2015). “Ukrainian Crisis – clashing interests, visions and values”, Hong Kong Economic Journal. (English version) (Chinese version)

 

Under Review/Revised/Submitted

 

 

 

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