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My field of expertise includes: Security Studies (traditional and non-traditional threats), Foreign and Security Policy of Poland, Foreign and Security Policy of Great Britain, European Politics and the European Union, Theories of European Integration and last but not least Teaching and Learning.<\/p>\n
I continue my research in these areas which is shown by my recent publications. At the same time, I remain open to new challenges in the academic field and have delivered presentations regarding politics and religion in Europe, national identity, cyber security, security in South and South-East Asia or environment and politics.<\/p>\n
I have been recognized internationally for my work in a form of an invitation to contribute to EUROPP European Politics and Policy blog maintained by the London School of Economics and Political Science. One of my papers \u201cMoving beyond EU weakness as a cyber security agent\u201d has also been acclaimed internationally and consequently reprinted as part of \u201cEuropean Security: Critical Concepts\u201d series by Routledge.<\/p>\n
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Stivas, D. & \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K. (2020). Securitizing Coronavirus: Global Risks, Responses, and Consequences,\u00a0global-e, September 8, 2020.<\/p>\n
Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n We argue that useful frameworks to analyze governments\u2019 responses to the ongoing coronavirus crisis are the securitization sub-theories of\u00a0a-securitization<\/em>,\u00a0hyper-securitization<\/em>,\u00a0and\u00a0preemptive securitization<\/em>. The first occurs when political actors declare critical social phenomena as security-irrelevant and consequently treat them as such. Hyper-securitization takes place when the emergency actions taken by governments are super-extraordinary and linger even after the containment of the declared threats. Finally, preemptive securitization occurs when states proceed with enacting extraordinary measures even when the perceived threats appear to be distant and\/or avoidable. In the context of the ongoing COVID-19 outbreak, most governments across the world moved along the a-securitization to hyper-securitization gamut. Interestingly, those states that account for fewer casualties as a result of the epidemic are those that embraced preemptive securitization.<\/p>\n Link to published article:<\/strong>\u00a0<\/span>https:\/\/www.21global.ucsb.edu\/global-e\/september-2020\/securitizing-coronavirus-global-risks-responses-and-consequences\u00a0<\/span><\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K. (2020).\u00a0Crisis Politics and the Instrumentalization of Principles, global-e 13:48, July 24, 2020.<\/p>\n Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n Over the past ten years or so, various common EU principles have been invoked on numerous occasions to criticize, stigmatize, or legitimize the policies of national governments. By \u201cinstrumentalization\u201d we mean to denote this phenomenon whereby\u00a0common principles such as the \u2018rule of law\u2019 or \u2018solidarity\u2019 are invoked by a range of actors\u2014national governments, major European institutions, NGOs, even the European Commission\u2014to the greatest benefit of the most powerful governments, and thus to the advantage of the strongest economies, in the EU. In other words, European\u00a0national governments pursue national interests in classic \u2018compete-and-cooperate\u2019 mode in intra-European affairs when compelling interests are seen to be at stake.<\/p>\n Link to published article:<\/strong>\u00a0https:\/\/www.21global.ucsb.edu\/global-e\/july-2020\/crisis-politics-and-instrumentalization-principles<\/a><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Holland, M., Sliwinski, K. & Thomas, N. (2020). “Is Affective Effective? Measuring Affective Learning in Simulations.”\u00a0International Studies Perspectives<\/em>, ekaa005<\/p>\n Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n Simulations have become a regular component of teaching toolkits. They provide teachers with a platform to take students\u2019 knowledge and understanding of subject materials beyond the classroom. In doing so, simulations fulfill a critical pedagogical purpose in that they need to construct a learning space; one more efficacious in delivering learning opportunities than traditional modes of instruction. In order for simulations to be effective, students need to be able to place themselves in role. The more closely the students identify with their topic (the greater their affection for the subject), the closer the alignment between the exercise and the intended learning outcomes. This article considers how an affective learning environment can be created with simulations. The lens for this analysis is an international model European Union simulation that has been running in Hong Kong and New Zealand. Our argument is that the more affective the simulated environment, the more realistic it will be perceived to be by the participants. However, contrary to the prevailing literature, our findings suggest that affection does not necessarily have to be positively constructed in order for simulations to be effective pedagogical tools.<\/p>\n Link to published article:\u00a0https:\/\/academic.oup.com\/isp\/advance-article-abstract\/doi\/10.1093\/isp\/ekaa005\/5846111?redirectedFrom=fulltext<\/a><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n Sliwinski, K. (2020). The Securitization of Hong Kong Politics: Global Implications, global-e, 13:30, May 19, 2020.<\/p>\n Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n The recent wave of civil unrest in Hong Kong that commenced in June 2019 needs to be analyzed in light of a host of national security issues raised by the central government in Beijing. These concerns highlight ongoing tensions between the People\u2019s Republic of China and the United States, while at the same time directing attention to continuities between recent unrest and another wave of protests only five years earlier.<\/p>\n Link to published article:\u00a0https:\/\/www.21global.ucsb.edu\/global-e\/may-2020\/securitization-hong-kong-politics-global-implications\u00a0<\/a><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n Simulations have become a regular component of teaching toolkits. They provide teachers with a platform to take students\u2019 knowledge and understanding of subject materials beyond the classroom. In doing so, simulations fulfil a critical pedagogical purpose in that they need to construct a learning space; one more efficacious in delivering learning opportunities than traditional modes of instruction. In order for simulations to be effective, students need to be able to place themselves in the role. The more closely the students identify with their topic (the greater their affection for the subject), the closer the alignment between the exercise and the intended learning outcomes.<\/p>\n This article considers how an affective learning environment can be created with simulations. The lens for this analysis is an international model European Union simulation that has been running in Hong Kong and New Zealand. Our argument is that the more affective the simulated environment, the more realistic it will be perceived to be by the participants. However, contrary to the prevailing literature, our findings suggest that affection does not necessarily have to be positively constructed in order for simulations to be effective pedagogical tools.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Sliwinski, K. (2020). Securitization of Hong Kong Politics: debate on electoral reform and civil disobedience of 2014, POLITIKA – Annual Journal Session 2018-2019, 6-19.<\/p>\n Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n Hong Kong society has long been known as an outstanding example of a law-abiding community, proud of its rule of law and generally displaying considerable lack of interest in politics. How is it possible then that first time in the history of HKSAR major streets were blocked for so long by so many ordinary citizens? How could this usually benign and politically apathetic society be galvanized to such an extent around abstract political ideas that do not exactly correspond with traditional Confucius values? How should we account for the reaction of the HKSAR government and the Central Government in Beijing?<\/p>\n This paper attempts to address the above questions by invoking the social constructivist paradigm of securitisation of politics. It is the hypothesis of the author that the major issues concerning public policymaking in Hong Kong, and especially its political reform and the opposition of large part of citizenry towards it known as \u2018Occupy Central\u2019, have been framed by central government in Beijing as a \u2018national security issue\u2019. It is also claimed that Hong Kong politics have effectively fallen a victim to \u2018China Dream\u2019 as a litmus test of President Xi Jinping\u2019s effectiveness as a state leader.<\/p>\n Link to published article:\u00a0https:\/\/www.dropbox.com\/s\/b6qfu5udftbh75i\/POLITIKA%28fin.%29.pdf?dl=0<\/a><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Pouzitakis, S & Sliwinski, K. (2018). \u201eA Study of Foreign Policy Analysis Framework in Germany\u2019s Energy Policy of the Post-Cold War Era.\u201d EURAMERICA 48: 4, 1-32.<\/p>\n Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n This paper re-examines the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) with regards to the security of energy relations between Germany and Russia, understood as specific foreign policy actions\u2014that is, \u201cproducts\u201d of foreign policy decisions. It attempts to explain why Germany consistently sought better relations with Russia, partially with the aim of securing energy supplies. Drawing on Walter Carlsnaes\u2019s identified lack of integrative and dynamic models that convincingly include both types of variables\u2014structures and actors in a dynamic fashion\u2014this study offers a link between the FPA and energy policy. Link to published article:\u00a0https:\/\/www.dropbox.com\/s\/tugmjdx0g9qbuow\/Pourzitakis%20and%20Sliwinski%20%28final%29.docx?dl=0<\/a>\u00a0<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K. (2018). \u201cEuropean Politics and the Neoliberal Paradigm\u201d. Australian & New Zealand Journal of European Studies<\/em>, 1:10, 92-111.<\/p>\n Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n This paper looks at the European integration project in its current iteration drawing on Karl Polanyi\u2019s assertion that markets are inseparable from the socio-cultural context. In this regard, all attempts to liberalise the economy (not excluding European integration, which is based on the principle of the single market) have practical and indeed tangible political ramifications. The main hypothesis of the paper lies in the recognition of the fact that the neoliberal agenda is one of the defining features of European integration. It is after all, the project of the single market, with its free movement of goods, services, capital, and labour that underpins European Union integrative practice. Link to published article:<\/strong><\/p>\n https:\/\/cesaa.org.au\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/07\/European-Politics.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Paper featured for 2018 ISA Conference:<\/strong> The Power of Rules and Rule of Power, \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K. (2014). \u201cMoving beyond the European Union’s Weakness as a Cyber-Security Agent\u201d. Contemporary Security Policy<\/em>, 35:3, 468-486, DOI: 10.1080\/13523260.2014.959261 featured in a virtual issue: see more: http:\/\/contemporarysecuritypolicy.org\/<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K. & Pourzitakis S. (2017). \u201cEuropean Energy Security through Foreign Policy Analysis: Nord Stream 1 and its Consequences.\u201d Asia-Pacific Journal of EU Studies<\/em>, 2:85, 41-65.<\/p>\n Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n This paper reexamines the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) with regard to recent developments concerning Nord Stream 1 (NS1) and Nord Stream 2 (NS2). Both of these projects are understood as specific foreign policy actions \u2013 \u201cproducts\u201d of foreign policy decisions. <\/em><\/p>\n Drawing on Walter Carlsnaes\u2019s identified lack of integrative and dynamic models that would convincingly include both types of variables \u2013 structures and actors in a dynamic fashion \u2013 this study proposes a \u201creinforced model\u201d of foreign policy analysis. <\/em><\/p>\n Our model accounts convincingly for the correlation between NS1 and NS2, understood as foreign policy actions. Our research indicates that the linear sequence, as proposed by Carlsnaes himself (structure \u2013 disposition \u2013 intention \u2013 action), can and indeed should be re-conceptualized in a \u201ccircular\u201d manner. This being the case, it is claimed that the outcome of the original action (NS1) has reinforced the structural dimension that has led to reinforced dispositional dimension, which in turn has led to reinforced intentional dimension that ultimately underpins NS2.<\/em><\/p>\n Link to published article:<\/strong><\/p>\n https:\/\/www.dropbox.com\/home\/teaching%20readings%20research\/My%20articles\/Nord%20Stream%20II\/Asia%20Pacific%20Journal%20of%20EU%20Studies?preview=Eu-15-2-3+Krzysztof+Stratos_1.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n Krzysztof Feliks Silwinski, (2016) \u2018Moving Beyond the European Union\u2019s Weakness as a Cyber-security Agent\u2019,\u00a0Contemporary Security Policy<\/em>, 2014, 35, 3, In Smith, M. A. (ed.) European Security. Critical Concepts in Military, Strategic and Security Studies, (468\u201386). Routledge.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K. F. (2016). ‘A-securitization’ of immigration policy \u2013 the case of European Union,\u00a0Asia-Pacific Journal of EU Studies<\/em>, 14:1, 25-56.<\/em><\/p>\n Abstract <\/strong><\/p>\n This paper draws on the \u2018securitization\u2019 thesis with regard to immigration policy of the European Union and its members. Contrary to existing literature, it is claimed that the current immigration crisis that the European Union faces is driven by an opposite dynamic, which produces \u2018a-securitization\u2019 \u2013 a phenomenon defined, in this paper, as a condition where important social phenomena are declared security irrelevant and consequently treated as such (both explicitly or implicitly). The analysis of the ongoing debate leads the author to identify major actors (drivers) on the pro-immigration side, their institutional forms and principles to which they adhere. These actors include: national political elites, the EU and its institutions, multinational companies and mass media. The thesis of \u2018a-securitization\u2019 is proposed as a theoretical explanation that allows us to account for a number of seemingly illogical phenomena taking place at the EU level and at national levels regarding both national and human security of European societies as well as a majority of immigrants.<\/p>\n Link to published article: <\/strong><\/p>\n http:\/\/repository.hkbu.edu.hk\/cgi\/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=gis_ja<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K. F. (2016). ‘A-securitization’ of immigration policy \u2013 the case of European Union,\u00a0Asia-Pacific Journal of EU Studies<\/em>, 14:1, 25-56.<\/em><\/p>\n Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n Policy and research on European cyber-security remains formative compared to leaders in the field like China and the United States. This article evaluates the European Union (EU) as a cyber-security actor, asking fundamental questions concerning the EU’s combination of prominence and obscurity, especially its limitations and prospects. Who and what is going to dominate the European response to cyber-security in the future? These questions are examined within the larger framework of liberal intergovernmentalism. The EU also is compared to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a point of reference to further understand the limitations and challenges ahead for the EU. Two major factors limit the EU as a cyber-security actor: its intergovernmental character, and the lack of collective vision on cyber-security with the EU and between member states. To play an important role in shaping cyberspace and cyber-security, the EU cannot treat the internet as simply a communication tool or trading platform. Cooperation and capacity-building measures are needed to allow EU member states to surpass mere coordination of their respective national cyber-security strategies. To succeed as a cyber-power, the EU should adapt new and different forms of cyber-power, from the compulsory through the institutional, to the structural and productive. Otherwise, coordination of national strategies for cyber-security of EU member states is the most the EU as an actor can aim for.<\/p>\n Link to published article: <\/strong><\/p>\n http:\/\/www.tandfonline.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1080\/13523260.2014.959261<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K. (2015).\u00a0Securitization\u00a0of Hong Kong Politics: the debate on electoral reform and civil disobedience of 2014. Spo\u0142ecze\u0144stwo i Polityka<\/em>. 4:45, 15-36. (English).<\/p>\n Link to published article:<\/strong><\/p>\n http:\/\/www.pismosip.ah.edu.pl\/downloads.php?download_id=41<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K. and Rakowska, A. (2015). Security Threats and Risk Management: European and Chinese responses to climate disruption. Przegl\u0105d Europejski<\/em>. 4:38, 142-163. (English).<\/p>\n Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n Most academics and policy makers agree upon irreversible phenomena affecting planet Earth\u2019s climate \u2013 we have finally faced a climate disruption. As triggered by humans, environmental degradation ultimately threatens not only the security but even the survival of individuals, communities, states and perhaps even the international system as a whole.<\/p>\n This paper addresses differences with regards to risk assessment of climate disruption in Europe and in China. Its departure point is that the divergence between European and Chinese approaches is based on structural and institutional distinctions. Specifically, it tries to assess those distinctions (importance of sovereignty and non-interference) with regards to methods (assessment of vulnerability) and principles (transparency and inclusiveness) of risk assessment.<\/p>\n Initial analysis leads to a tentative conclusion, which confirms the importance of political culture in national responses to security threats (be it traditional or non-traditional). In this respect EU-China strategic partnership is suggested as one of the possibly effective platforms for future cooperation.<\/p>\n Link to published article: <\/strong><\/p>\n http:\/\/en.przegladeuropejski.wdinp.uw.edu.pl\/zasoby\/pliki\/38\/8-Sliwinski.pdf<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K. (2014). The Fifth Domain – national security in private hands? Civilianization of security in United Kingdom. Spo\u0142ecze\u0144stwo i Polityka <\/em> 3:40, 135-156. (English).<\/p>\n Link to published article:<\/strong><\/p>\n http:\/\/gis.hkbu.edu.hk\/files\/K%20Sliwinski_The%20Fifth%20Domain_national%20security%20in%20private%20hands.pdf<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K. (2014). Accounting for Pre-conditions for a Harmonious Community of States: Democratization and the Security Complex in East and Southeast Asia. Journal of Asian Public Policy<\/em>, 7:3, 214-230, DOI: 10.1080\/17516234.2014.922149<\/p>\n Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n This article addresses the relationship between the character of political regimes and security in East and Southeast Asia. In doing so, it draws on the insights of both regional security complex and liberal peace theories. The analysis of democratization processes is therefore juxtaposed with the general underdevelopment of democracy in the region. It is ascertained that the security paradox that features prominently in East and Southeast Asian international relations can be transcended. Democratization and modernization alone, however, do not suffice, in which case another normative basis is needed. The main conclusion takes the author to accept the importance of culture in political community building. In that respect, a common denominator is sought in building a genuine Asian identity based on human values, to which major political philosophies and religions in the region subscribe. Consequently, the convergence among social norms, political norms and peace is theorized.<\/p>\n Link to published article:<\/strong><\/p>\n http:\/\/www.tandfonline.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1080\/17516234.2014.922149<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K. (2014). European Union \u2013 cyber power in the making.\u00a0The Asia-Pacific Journal of EU Studies<\/em>, 12:1, pp. 1-22.<\/p>\n Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n This article investigates the challenges and limitations of an emerging European cyber security posture. The departure point for the analysis is embedded within the framework that rests on identifying four distinct forms of cyber power: compulsory, institutional, structural and productive.<\/p>\n Tentative conclusions suggest that to be effective, the EU\u2019s strategic approach must strike the right balance between all four forms. Additionally, a major challenge for the designers of EU cyber security posture will be accommodating the technology, which due to its characteristics challenges the established balance of power between and within states. Finally, international cooperation regarding two basic categories of cyber threats, whereby states are much more likely to succeed in tackling cyber crime than cyber espionage, must also be addressed.<\/p>\n Link to published article:<\/strong><\/p>\n http:\/\/www.keusa.or.kr\/korean\/kor_publication\/APJournal\/2014_No12_1\/Eu-12-1-01%20Sliwinski.pdf<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K. (2012). Polish National Security Dilemmas. Missile defense complex and its role in Foreign Policy. Democracy and Security, 8:2<\/em>, 191-212.<\/p>\n Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n This article examines fundamental dilemmas concerning contemporary Polish Security Policy. Firstly, it addresses the question of US missile defense complex and its place in Polish politics. Secondly, it employs Foreign Policy Analysis tools with special attention to the agency-structure nexus. Specifically, it analyses three distinct dimensions: intentional, dispositional and structural. The author claims that Polish attitudes towards US missile defense are a result of Polish-US and Polish-Russian relations. Although evidence suggests that public attitudes towards US missile defense complex in Poland are affected by the threat of international terrorism, the issue should be seen within a broader geopolitical perspective.<\/p>\n Link to published article:<\/strong><\/p>\n http:\/\/www.tandfonline.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1080\/17419166.2012.681602<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K. (2012). Counter-terrorism \u2013 a comprehensive approach. Social mobilization and \u2018civilianization\u2019 of security: the Case of the United Kingdom. European Security<\/em> 2012, 22:3, pp. 288-306.<\/p>\n Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n The global war on terror and 9\/11 have brought to our attention the perpetual problem of freedom versus security. The more governments strive to provide security, the more they tend to curb the freedoms of their citizens. \u2018Stop and search\u2019 procedures, 28-day detentions of terrorist suspects without charge or new body scanners at the airports are just the \u2018tip of the iceberg\u2019 in a long list of the state\u2019s encroachments into our private lives. This paper departs from such a seemingly inescapable predicament. It analyses the rote of the public in preventing, protecting and preparing for terrorist attacks under the British government\u2019s counter-terrorism strategy known as CONTEST. It explores two social phenomena that are being increasingly promoted by official authorities in the United Kingdo, namely, mobilisation of society and what the author terms \u2018civilianisation of security. The latter is defined as a notion relating to non-military, voluntary organisations and the business\/private sector. engaged by government but acting in its own right against terrorism threats. \u2018Civilianisation\u2019 of security is also conceived of as a potential tool to bridge the gap between two incompatible worlds of state security and personal freedoms.<\/p>\n Link to published article:<\/strong><\/p>\n http:\/\/repository.hkbu.edu.hk\/cgi\/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=gis_ja<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K. (2010). British Nuclear Strategy at the Threshold of 21st Century.\u00a0European Security<\/em>, 18: 1, pp.81-97.<\/p>\n Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n This paper emphasizes the pertinence of the British government’s claim that nuclear deterrent threats are still relevant in the four broad areas to which it addresses: deterrence against aggression towards British\/NATO vital interests or nuclear coercion\/ blackmail by major powers with large nuclear arsenals; deterrence against nuclear coercion or blackmail with other WMD by regional \u2018\u2018rogue\u2019\u2019 states; deterrence against state-sponsored acts of nuclear terrorism; and as a general residual deterrent function to preserve peace and stability in an uncertain world.<\/p>\n British nuclear weapons are still important and very much relevant in all the four areas discussed. First of all, they play a role of a significant tool of political leverage as they continue to serve as an authentication of British military capabilities. In that regard, they still function much the same way they did during the \u2018Cold War\u2019. WMDs were, after all, a guarantee of their non-use, which does not mean that they were not useful. Secondly, it also authenticates the UK among its allies. Even though generally democracies do not wage wars with one another, they still have to face the challenges posed by non-democracies. In doing so, they need to support each other with the use of\u00a0\u2018ultima ratio\u2019<\/em>\u00a0arguments in order to safeguard international peace and stability. The British nuclear deterrent should, therefore, be perceived as a general deterrent with a positive influence on international community and international security, overall.<\/p>\n Link to published article:<\/strong><\/p>\n http:\/\/www.tandfonline.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1080\/09662830903432680<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K. (2009). European Supranationalism. The battle of spirit of Jean Monnet and vision of General de Gaulle. POLITIKA Annual Journal<\/em>, 34<\/em>, 31-34.<\/p>\n Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n August 3 this year marked the 60th anniversary of the statute of the Council of Europe entering into force. During the first session, held on 8 th -10th of September 1949, of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, federalist members of parliament requested the institution of a European political authority. As a result, a mere year later, in a speech inspired by Jean Monnet, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed integrating the coal and steel industries of Western Europe. \u2018Europe Day\u2019 celebrated later annually came to symbolize European integration processes that brought peace and prosperity to, initially western part of the European continent after ages of devastating conflicts. The Shuman Declaration decisively envisaged that \u2018the contribution which an organized and living Europe can bring to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations\u2019.1The reason behind initial integration was to make \u2018war not only unthinkable but materially impossible\u2019. From today\u2019s perspective, initial goals of European integration seem obvious and not so much thought is usually given to the great founder of European federalism Jean Monnet and his seminal plans.<\/p>\n Link to published article:<\/strong><\/p>\n http:\/\/repository.hkbu.edu.hk\/cgi\/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=gis_ja<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K. (2007). British National Security Strategy (1945-2005). Studia Mi\u0119dzynarodowe<\/em>, 1-4<\/em>:3, 71-92.<\/p>\n Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n This paper emphasizes the pertinence of the British government’s claim that nuclear deterrent threats are still relevant in the four broad areas to which it addresses: deterrence against aggression towards British\/NATO vital interests or nuclear coercion\/ blackmail by major powers with large nuclear arsenals; deterrence against nuclear coercion or blackmail with other WMD by regional \u2018\u2018rogue\u2019\u2019 states; deterrence against state-sponsored acts of nuclear terrorism; and as a general residual deterrent function to preserve peace and stability in an uncertain world.<\/p>\n British nuclear weapons are still important and very much relevant in all the four areas discussed. First of all, they play a role of a significant tool of political leverage as they continue to serve as an authentication of British military capabilities. In that regard, they still function much the same way they did during the \u2018Cold War\u2019. WMDs were, after all, a guarantee of their non-use, which does not mean that they were not useful. Secondly, it also authenticates the UK among its allies. Even though generally democracies do not wage wars with one another, they still have to face the challenges posed by non-democracies. In doing so, they need to support each other with the use of\u00a0\u2018ultima ratio\u2019<\/em>\u00a0arguments in order to safeguard international peace and stability. The British nuclear deterrent should, therefore, be perceived as a general deterrent with a positive influence on international community and international security, overall.<\/p>\n Link to published article:<\/strong><\/p>\n http:\/\/www.tandfonline.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1080\/09662830903432680<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K. (2005). Evolution of British Strategy of Deterrent. Stosunki Mi\u0119dzynarodowe<\/em>, 3-4<\/em>:32, 143 \u2013 162.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K. (2005) Review of: John Dickie, The New Mandarins: How British Foreign Policy Works,<\/em> I. B. Tauris, London 2004, p. 254, Stosunki Mi\u0119dzynarodowe<\/em>, 1-2<\/em>:31, 213-215.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K., & Proni\u0144ska, K. (2004). Report from Scientific Conference: \u201eInstitutionalisation of International Multilateral Co-operation in Europe in the Context of New Challenges\u201d, Stosunki Mi\u0119dzynarodowe<\/em>, 1-2<\/em>:29, 185-190.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K. (2003). Report from Scientific Conference of the Institute of International Relations: \u201eGlobalisation in International Relations\u201d, Stosunki Mi\u0119dzynarodowe<\/em>, 1-2<\/em>: 27, 201-214.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K. (2002). Evolution of Security Strategy in International Relations, \u015awiat i Polityka<\/em>, 3-4<\/em>, 53-72.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n Biele\u0144, St. and \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K. (2017). Comparing Polish-German and Polish-Russian reconciliation efforts. In. A. Frieberg and C. K. Martin Chung (eds.) Reconciling with the Past: Resources and Obstacles in a Global Perspective<\/em><\/a><\/span> (148-160). Routledge.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K. (2014). Poland: A Nation of the In-Between. In R. Vogt, W. Cristaudo, A. Leutzsch (eds.) European National Identities. Elements. Transitions. Conflicts<\/em>, (155 \u2013 171). New Brunswick: Transaction.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K. (2006). Economical Aspects of British Security Strategy. In Hali\u017cak, E. (Ed.). International Relations in the 21st<\/sup> Century<\/em>, (pp. 112 \u2013 131). Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K., & Wr\u00f3bel, (2004). A. Uniform Services Market of UE \u2013 Consequences for Poland. In Hali\u017cak, E. (Ed.). Foreign and Internal Policy in the Process of European Integration<\/em>, (pp. 272 \u2013 293). Bydgoszcz-Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza Branta.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Sliwinski, K. (2019). \u201cBrexit – between intergovernmentalism and ‘Europeanism’.\u201d Public Jurist special issue, 12-18.https:\/\/www.dropbox.com\/s\/fkys3ww0985b410\/Public%20Jurist%20Special%20Issue%20Brexit%20Symposium.pdf?dl=0<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K. (July 9, 2016). \u201cBrexit and European Security\u201d. Hong Kong Economic Journal. http:\/\/www1.hkej.com\/dailynews\/international\/article\/1341024\/%E5%BE%8C%E8%84%AB%E6%AD%90%E5%8B%A2%E5%8A%9B%E5%86%8D%E5%B9%B3%E8%A1%A1+%E5%BE%B7%E4%B8%8A%E8%8B%B1%E8%90%BD%E5%A0%AA%E6%86%82<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K. (January 19, 2016). \u201cThe European Commission\u2019s rule of law review in Poland risks fuelling Euroscepticism<\/a>.<\/span> EUROPP – European Politics and Policy. The London School of Economics and Political Science.<\/p>\n \u015aliwi\u0144ski, K. \u201cPoland\u2019s bugging scandal highlights the need for a more pragmatic Polish foreign policy over Ukraine and Russia”. EUROPP \u2013 European Politics and Policy. The London School of Economics and Political Science at:\u00a0http:\/\/blogs.lse.ac.uk\/europpblog\/2014\/06\/30\/polands-bugging-scandal-highlights-the-need-for-a-more-pragmatic-polish-foreign-policy-over-ukraine-and-russia\/<\/a><\/span> (June 30, 2014).<\/p>\n
\nThe paper focuses on the years from the 1990s through to the present, across various segments of the German government, and explores major values and objectives of German energy policy. German energy policy is intrinsic to German-Russian relations and places particular emphasis on the Nord Stream 1 pipeline. Our research indicates that the linear sequence, as proposed by Carlsnaes himself (structure\u2014disposition\u2014intention\u2014action), can be conducive in bringing about favourable conditions for further actions following the same path.<\/p>\n
\nSecondly, it is the presupposition of this paper, that there is a certain degree of congruence between the economic elites, operating within the neoliberal framework, and the centre-left political elites. The argument here is that the logic of neoliberalism has been fundamentally accepted across the mainstream of the political spectrum. This consequently means that even left-wing parties have had to reposition themselves both ideologically and practically, which brings the conclusion that the market has lost its role as the basic ideological differentiator between the traditional right and left. The axis of political debate has consequently shifted to moral issues such as the relationship between the state and the church, immigration, and gender.<\/p>\nPublished Book Chapters<\/h3>\n
Non-refereed works<\/h3>\n