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Editor-in-chief

Meredith H. M. YIP

Aiming to facilitate intellectual exchange between students and academics both locally and internationally, the POLITIKA Annual Journal welcomes students from all over the world to contribute. Manuscripts can be submitted to editorial.ppaa@gmail.com

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CONTENTS

FOREWORD	4
<hr/>	
MAIN THEME: SOCIAL MOBILISATION	
<hr/>	
<i>Securitization of Hong Kong Politics: Debate on electoral reform and civil disobedience of 2014</i>	6
Dr. Krzysztof Sliwinski	
<i>Political Opportunities and Alliance-Making: A Case of Environmental Mobilization in China</i>	20
Dr. Setsuko Matsuzawa	
<i>The State as the Mobilizer and De-mobilizer in China's Nationalist Protests</i>	28
Professor Suisheng Zhao	
COMMENTARY	
<hr/>	
「評一 監警會的權利與認可」	46
余曉晴 社會科學學士 二年級	
<i>The Impact of Education on Social Mobility of Young People in Hong Kong</i>	48
Ng Tsun On, BSocSc II	
PAST ARTICLES	
<hr/>	
<i>Seeds of a Global Conflict? The Russian-Ukrainian Naval Clash: A Compact Analysis</i>	54
Tam So Yin, BSocSc (Govt&Laws) II	
<i>Que Sera, Sera, What May be, Maybe: The Implications of the Brexit vote on Britain and Beyond</i>	56
Tam So Yin, BSocSc (Govt&Laws) II	
<i>Understanding Britain's Westminster System through Brexit</i>	58
Tam So Yin, BSocSc (Govt&Laws) II	
<i>Understanding the Presidential System of the United States through the Federal Government Shutdown 2018-2019</i>	62
Tam So Yin, BSocSc (Govt&Laws) II	
FUNCTIONS REVIEW	66
<hr/>	
EXECUTIVE REMARKS	72
<hr/>	
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	77
<hr/>	

FOREWORD

Founded in 1976 at The University of Hong Kong (HKU), **POLITIKA** is the first and leading academic journal in Hong Kong of its kind edited by university students. **POLITIKA** is committed to providing a stronger understanding of cutting-edge issues that lie at the nexus of various contemporary political science and international relations debates.

In recent decades, the notion of social mobilisation has spanned from civil society to state-initiated attempts, and from liberal democracies to authoritarian states. Whether as a free expression of thought, or a strategy to stabilise a toppling regime, the notion has manifested in a wide spectrum of phenomena. In light of this, we have set the theme on 'Social Mobilisation' to explore this rich topic and the implications it holds for the future. We are honoured to invite Dr. Krzysztof Sliwinski, Dr. Setsuko Matsuzawa and Professor Suisheng Zhao as our contributors this year.

In **Securitization of Hong Kong Politics: Debate on electoral reform and civil disobedience of 2014**, Occupying Central, or Umbrella Movement in 2014, is discussed by taking the Chinese factor in full consideration. In **Political Opportunities and Alliance-Making: A Case of Environmental Mobilization in China**, the more wide-spread social mobilisation due to environmental activism is considered, especially in the case of China, having Nu River anti-dam activism as a case study. Last but not least, in **The State as the Mobilizer and De-mobilizer in China's Nationalist Protests**, the nationalist dilemma in China has been analysed by looking into the changing state's choice of attitude in different events.

In the second part, two commentaries on recent and significant issues is discussed. **The Impact of Education on Social Mobility of Young People in Hong Kong** considered the relationship between education mobility and occupational mobility, which attempts to explain the challenge of social mobility faced by young people in Hong Kong. 「評一監警會的權利與認可」, on the other hand, shed light on the IPCC, by comparing and distinguishing it

from other similar agencies worldwide.

In the third part, past articles written by our session would be reviewed. The articles comprise many different topics. **Seeds of a Global Conflict? The Russian-Ukrainian Naval Clash: A Compact Analysis**, first published in late 2018, analyse the tension between Ukraine and Russia. **Que Sera, Sera, What May be, Maybe: The Implications of the Brexit vote on Britain and Beyond**, so as **Understanding Britain's Westminster System through Brexit**, were written in early 2019, both concerning the Brexit dilemma, but understanding the issue via different perspectives. **Understanding the Presidential System of the United States through the Federal Government Shutdown 2018-2019**, also written in 2019, discuss the US Presidential System using a Question and Answering method.

Apart from the featured articles, a functional review of our session's past events would be made, along with the truthful words of all our Executive Committee members in the session.

It is hoped that the Annual Journal can stimulate your interest in the covered topics and enable you to know more about our Association. It would be our biggest pleasure for you to find it an enjoyable read.

Editor-in-Chief
Meredith H. M. YIP
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MAIN THEME:

SOCIAL MOBILISATION

Securitization of Hong Kong Politics: Debate on electoral reform and civil disobedience of 2014

Political Opportunities and Alliance-Making: A Case of Environmental Mobilization in China

The State as the Mobilizer and De-mobilizer in China's Nationalist Protests



Securitization of Hong Kong Politics:

Debate on electoral reform and civil disobedience of 2014

Dr. Krzysztof Feliks Sliwinski

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Abstract

Hong Kong society has long been known as an outstanding example of a law abiding community, proud of its rule of law and generally displaying considerable lack of interest in politics. How is it possible then that first time in the history of HKSAR major streets were blocked for so long by so many ordinary citizens? How could this usually benign and politically apathetic society be galvanized to such an extent around abstract political ideas that do not exactly correspond with traditional Confucius values? How should we account for the reaction of HKSAR government and central government?

This paper attempts to address the above questions by invoking the social constructivist paradigm of securitisation of politics. It is the hypothesis of the author that the major issues concerning public policy

making in Hong Kong, and especially its political reform and the opposition of large part of citizenry towards it known as ‘Occupy Central’, have been framed by central government in Beijing as a ‘national security issue’. It is also claimed that Hong Kong politics have effectively fallen a victim to ‘China Dream’ as a litmus test of the President Xi Jinping’s effectiveness as a state leader.

Introduction

This paper was originally, written shortly after the so-called ‘umbrella revolution’ back in 2014. It has been so far published and presented at international conferences all around the world. The author would like to thank the POLITIKA editorial team for the invitation to republish this piece, which seems more relevant than ever. Before the reader proceeds to

¹ As this paper is submitted to POLITIKA, it is 5 th August 2019. Accidentally, this is the day which has seen the first ‘general strike’ in the city, including all major MTR (Mass Transit Railway) lines as well as Cathay Pacific ground crew at the HK International Airport (causing 230 cancellations) and 7 (!) major rallies in the city blocking main communication arteries.

digest the analysis presented below, a few words of update are in order. Since 2014 events it has been almost 5 years.¹ There is a strong case to be made in terms of continuity. The political demands put forward by the protesters are in principle the same: the introduction of universal suffrage and a genuine representative democratic system. The local government on the other hand seems to be unable or/and unwilling to fully acknowledge let alone address the causes of political discontent. The socio-economic realities continue to worsen for the great majority of Hong Kong population. The generation chasm continues to widen tearing communities and families apart.

What seems to be new however is the level of violence both organized and performed by the local government (administered by Hong Kong Police Force, which understandably continues to lose trust and respect among the local population) and ad hoc (performed by local mafia – Hong Kong triads) which seems to play in the hands of the opponents of the political status quo. Importantly, the pressure of central government in Beijing appears to be heavier with the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) releasing videos on preparation to stifle political resistance in Hong Kong.

The same old and familiar tune of ‘national security relevance’ can be heard from both HK and central governments. Yet, the Hong Kong people en masse still have not accepted the argument that HK politics should be the subject to securitization phenomenon, of which the latest wave of public resistance is the best evidence.

On 26 th September 2014 Hong Kong Federation of Students² and members of Scholarism³ commenced a sit-in protest outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Government headquarters. The protest took seventy nine days and eventually centered in three different locations around the city.⁴

2 As of June 2015 The Hong Kong Federation of Students is formed by the student unions of 4 institutions: Chinese University Students’ Union, Lingnan University Students’ Union, Hong Kong Shue Yan University Students’ Union and Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Students’ Union. Recently Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong Baptist University and City University Students’ Unions left the Federation due to internal conflicts over the participation in the Umbrella Movement 2014. See more at: <https://www.hkfs.org.hk/about-hkfs/> accessed 11 June 2015.

3 Originally formed as “Scholarism – The Alliance Against Moral & National Education”, Scholarism was the first student pressure group to protest against the pro-Communist “Moral and National Education” school curriculum put forward by the Hong Kong Government in 2012. See more at: <http://scholarism.com/> accessed 11 June 2015.

4 After initially focusing on the HKSAR Government headquarters site in Admiralty, more and more protesters decided to join in Central and Causeway Bay of HK Island. Kowloon peninsula also had its share with protesters occupying streets in the commercial areas of Mong Kok.

5 See more at: <http://0-www.scmp.com.hkbulib.hkbu.edu.hk/topics/occupy-central> accessed 10 June 2015.

It was unprecedented in its scale and involvement of people from all walks of life. At its peak, media reported one hundred thousand protesters occupying the major streets of the city. Local mainstream, English newspaper South China Morning Post reported every thirty to sixty minutes on major developments of the protest swiftly calling it an umbrella movement or even an umbrella revolution and dedicating a special section (occupy central) on its homepage⁵.

Hong Kong society has long been known as an outstanding example of a law abiding community, proud of its rule of law and generally displaying considerable lack of interest in politics. As long as taxes were low and most citizens had a chance of prospering through hard work, Hong Kong Chinese seemed to be indifferent to peculiarities of political system in the city. How is it possible then that first time in the history of HKSAR major streets were blocked for so long by so many ordinary citizens? How could this usually benign and politically apathetic society be galvanized to such an extent around abstract political ideas that do not exactly correspond with traditional Confucius values? Consequently, what is the outlook for Hong Kong political future under “one country, two systems principle”?

This paper attempts to address the above questions by invoking the social constructivist paradigm of securitization of politics. It is the hypothesis of the author that major issues concerning public policy making in Hong Kong, and especially its political reform and the opposition of large part of citizenry towards it known as Occupy Central, have been framed by central government in Beijing as national security issue. It is also claimed that Hong Kong politics have effectively fallen a victim to ‘China Dream’ as a litmus test of the President Xi Jinping’s effectiveness as a state leader. Thirdly, we cannot but notice the relevance of Hong Kong future to the Taiwan issue.

The paper starts with a brief account of peculiarity of Hong Kong political system which sets background

for the explanation of the electoral reform. The second part looks at the civil disobedience movement in terms of process, actors and objectives. The third part of the paper applies the notion of securitization of politics to Hong Kong case. Specifically, it looks at facilitating conditions and securitization moves as prepared and carried out by central government in Beijing and HKSAR government.

The paper ends with a conclusion that securitization of HK politics should be seen as a process that has neither finished, nor has it been particularly successful so far. It is also claimed that probably in the final analysis Hong Kong politics have effectively fallen a victim to ‘Chinese Dream’ as a litmus test of the President Xi Jinping’s effectiveness as a state leader.

Peculiarities of Hong Kong Political System

It is a cliché to open this paragraph with a statement that HK (Hong Kong) political system is a remnant of British colonial empire. Nonetheless, it were the British that ultimately shaped the Hong Kong political environment before the handover in 1997. Consequently, as scholars who specialize in HK affairs admit, these are the British who are co-responsible for contemporary crisis.

Before 1997 British governor, appointed by the British crown and representing it, practically ruled over the territory without much input from the local population. The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration stipulated that by 1 July 1997 Hong Kong would return to the People’s Republic of China.⁶ Most importantly for HK citizens and the rest of the capitalist world, it was guaranteed in the Declaration that the after 1997, HK would remain autonomous except for its foreign and defense affairs and continue to enjoy the status of an international financial hub and a free port for a period of fifty years from the date of han-



a) The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be composed of local inhabitants. The chief executive will be appointed by the Central People’s Government on the basis of the results of elections or consultations to be held locally. Principal officials will be nominated by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for appointment by the Central People’s Government;

b) (...) basic policies of the People’s Republic of China regarding Hong Kong (...) will be stipulated, in a Basic Law [underlined by K.S] of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, by the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, and they will remain unchanged for 50 years.⁷

Consequently Basic Law (HK constitutional framework) remains to this day the primary source of law in HK regarding political matters of the city. Without much description and citing of yet another document, full of legal vernacular, one should pay special attention to Chapter IV of Basic Law that lays the institutional framework.

As for the legislature, all registered voters (residents

6 From now on the official name of the territory would be Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). See more at: Joint Declaration of The Government of The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and The Government of The People’s Republic of China on The Question Of Hong Kong, HK-GOV, [http://www.legislation.gov.hk/blis_pdf.nsf/6799165D2FEE3FA94825755E0033E532/84A057ECA380F51D482575EF00291C2F/\\$FILE/CAP_2301_e_b5.pdf](http://www.legislation.gov.hk/blis_pdf.nsf/6799165D2FEE3FA94825755E0033E532/84A057ECA380F51D482575EF00291C2F/$FILE/CAP_2301_e_b5.pdf) accessed 17 June 2015.

7 Ibid.

8 Instrument 4, Amendment to Annex II to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Method for the Formation of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Its Voting Procedures http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/images/basiclawtext_doc3&4.pdf accessed 18 June 2015.

9 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, Chapter IV: Political Structure http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_4.html accessed 18 June 2015.

10 Article 75 of the Basic Law stipulates that the quorum for the meeting of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be not less than one half of all its members. Source: Ibidem.

above 18 years of age) can vote for their representatives in the territory's Legislative Council (Legco). The elected members of Legco (which is unicameral) then serve their geographical constituencies and can be re-elected at subsequent elections. Separately, but still sitting within the legislative council, and matching the numbers of representatives of the geographical constituencies at 35:35 (regards fifth term for 2012-2016) are the "functional" constituencies' representatives⁸. These are elected by interest groups in the business community⁹. Business community in HK is mostly interested in stability of the city and therefore logically any real or perceived challenge to political status quo that lets them prosper is automatically comprehended in terms of threats. "The devil lies in details" as the saying goes and so is the case as regards the passage of laws through the legislature. Bills introduced by the government require a simple majority vote of the members of the Legislative Council present.¹⁰ The passage of motions, bills or amendments to government bills introduced by individual members requires however a simple majority vote of each of the two groups of members present: members returned by functional constituencies and those returned by geographical constituencies.¹¹

As for the Executive, above the Legislative Council sits the Executive Council (Exco) – made up of members invited or 'appointed' by the Chief Executive.¹² The Chief Executive (CE) himself is elected by the Election Committee of 1,200 electors from a shortlist of candidates they themselves have selected.¹³ The 1,200 electors are recruited across four broad sectors.¹⁴ Here too one notices a strong representation of establishment.

This system leaves lots of room for improvement in terms of democratization process. The existing framework favours interests of big business over the interests of society at large. In fact one could venture an opinion that HK 'froze in time' and roughly emulates Lockean ideas of government that protects the rich (rational) from the poor (irrational). The Chief Executive actually recently admitted it in his interview with foreign media.¹⁵ This is in fact the core of the problem which will be elaborated later on in this paper.



Article 45 of the Basic Law explicitly states that: "The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures".¹⁶ The decision of the National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) (which is vested with final interpretation of HK Basic Law) opened the possibility of selecting the Chief Executive via universal suffrage in the 2017 Chief Executive election.¹⁷ At the same time it turned out that NPCSC imposed some conditions that practically, according to many HK

11 Annex II: Method for the Formation of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Its Voting Procedures, The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region... http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_4.html accessed 18 June 2015.

12 The Basic Law allows Chief executive considerable formal and discretionary power effectively establishing presidential system within HK autonomy as regards operation of the government and passage of bills as well as appointment of the members of the Exco. See Section 1, articles 43 – 58, Chapter IV : Political Structure, The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ... http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_4.html accessed 18 June 2015

13 Instrument 2, Amendment to Annex I to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China Concerning the Method for the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/images/basiclawtext_doc2.pdf accessed 18 June 2015.

14 From industrial, commercial and financial sectors through professions, through labour, social services and religious sectors to members of Legco, representatives of district-based organizations and representatives of Hong Kong members of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Ibidem.

15 "If it's entirely a numbers game – numeric representation – then obviously you'd be talking to half the people in Hong Kong [that] earn less than US\$1,800 a month (...) you would end up with that kind of politics and policies". See more at: J. Noble and J. Zhu, Hong Kong 'lucky' China has not stopped protests, says CY Leung, "ft.com, 20 October 2014 <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3f6f1c74-584b-11e4-a31b-00144feab7de.html#ixzz3dUiTxXZB> accessed 19 June 2015. Also: <http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1621103/cy-leung-democracy-would-see-poor-people-dominate-hong-kong-vote?page=all> and http://mobile.nytimes.com/2014/10/21/world/asia/leung-chun-ying-hong-kong-china-protests.html?ref=asia&_r=2&referrer

16 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region... article 45, Section 1, Chapter IV: Political Structure. http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_4.html accessed 19 June 2015.

17 Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Issues Relating to the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by Universal Suffrage and on the Method for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2016, Instrument 23. http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/images/basiclawtext_doc23.pdf accessed 19 June 2015.

citizens, renders the universal suffrage principle meaningless. Namely, the NPCSC marshalled that ‘the Chief Executive shall be a person who loves the country [the refers to People’s Republic of China –K.S.] and loves Hong Kong.’ It further stipulates that ‘the method for selecting the Chief Executive by universal suffrage must provide corresponding institutional safeguards for this purpose’; which in practice translated into a nominating committee, mirroring the present 1200-member Election Committee. Moreover the Election Committee will be supposed to nominate only two to three candidates, each of whom must receive the support of more than half of the members of the nominating committee.¹⁸

The electoral reform regarding the 2017 Chief Executive election and 2016 Legislative Council election as proposed by the Exco was rejected on 18 June 2015. This means in practice that the next elections, according to Basic Law, will be carried out according to existing rules.¹⁹ Consequently, the pan-democrats and pro-democracy activists have achieved nothing in terms of democratization of Hong Kong political system, at least for the time being. Let us then, turn our attention to the civil disobedience movement and analyse it in terms of its goals, major actors, and their achievements.



18 Ibidem.

19 Method for Selecting the Chief Executive by Universal Suffrage. See more at: <http://www.2017.gov.hk/en/home/> accessed 22 June 2015.

20 It is worth noting that umbrellas were just one of the symbols of the grassroots protests against HKSAR Government during the seventy nine days of the upheaval. Other symbols included: yellow ribbons (an emblem of suffrage movements internationally), a song titled: “Do you hear the people sing” from Les Misérables musical based on Victor Hugo’s novel, and a number of Chinese characters referring to various aspects of political reality. Among them the most visible one was number ‘689’, which represents the number of votes C.Y. Leung received from the Election Committee back in 2012. See More at: T. Hume and M. Park, Understanding the symbols of Hong Kong’s ‘Umbrella Revolution’, CNN, <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/30/world/asia/objects-hong-kong-protest/> accessed 22 June 2015.

21 J. W. HSU and C. Yeung, Hong Kong Pro-Democracy Protest Leader: ‘We Want to Get Arrested’, The Wall Street Journal, China, <http://blogs.wsj.com/china-realtime/2014/09/09/hong-kong-pro-democracy-protest-leader-we-want-to-get-arrested/> accessed 22 June 2015. Also refer to B. Tai’s original article in Hong Kong Economic Journal at: B. Tai, The Largest civil disobedience. Weapons of mass destruction, The Hong Kong Economic Journal, <http://www1.hkej.com//dailynews/article/id/654855/%E5%85%AC%E6%B0%91%E6%8A%97%E5%91%BD%E7%9A%84%E6%9C%80%E5%A4%A7%E6%AE%BA%E5%82%B7%E5%8A%9B%E6%AD%A6%E5%99%A8> accessed 22 June 2015.

22 Refer to conclusion.

23 Article 23 of Basic Law is otherwise referred to as ‘anti-subversion law’. It reads: “The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies”. Given the practice in PRC, many in HK are concerned that the implementation of this article will be tantamount to the end of political and civil freedoms in the city. See more: articles 23, Chapter II : Relationship between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ... , http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_2.html accessed 24 June 2015.

Civil disobedience – ‘umbrella revolution’

An umbrella quickly became the symbol of opposition against the HKSAR government after the Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF), on request of the government, decided to use tear gas against thousands of demonstrators. As it happens, due to weather conditions (both rain and sun) HK citizens usually carry umbrellas with them for protection. No one imagined however that umbrellas could also be used as very effective protection against tear gas and pepper spray.²⁰

Goal

The philosophical grounds of the movement, which has not expired to this day, are rooted in the principles of non-violent civil disobedience and the willingness to face legal consequences arising from such. Scholar Benny Tai (Tai Yiu-ting), an associate professor of Law at the University of Hong Kong, one of the co-founders of Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP), defined the goal behind Occupy Central as (...) “to get arrested. We want to cause disorder to the extent that we will be arrested after the police has exerted violence. Now that’s civil disobedience. We are not just organizing something that is nonviolent, we are organizing civil disobedience which is to create social-order disturbance in order to generate sympathy so as to awaken more people to a just cause”.²¹

It is fair to say that that the initial, short-term goal behind Occupy Central seems to have been fulfilled. The political awakening of the HK citizenry is an undisputed fact, admittedly not always exactly according to the wishes of the founders of OCLP.²² Nonetheless, since July 2003, when many HK citi-

zens protested against the implementation of article 23 of Basic Law, Hong Kong hasn't seen grater political fervour.²³ At its peak, the streets of HK saw above one hundred thousand protesters at any given time, many of whom actually lived on the streets in improvised tent towns. Traffic was blocked for most of the time in three different locations: Admiralty, Causeway Bay on HK Island and Mong Kong on Kowloon peninsula. People from all walks of life participated, but especially visible were college and university students.²⁴ The young, usually much less compromising, dared to declare much bolder goals. Students generally put forward two basic demands: 1) for the Chief Executive C.Y. Leung to step down and 2) for the NPCSC to revoke its interpretation of the method for the Selection of the Chief Executive.²⁵ The leaders of the movement also demanded the HKSAR Government to start a dialog with the representatives of the students. Ideas regarding reforms of the Legco functional constituencies were also put forward by various groups within the umbrella camp.²⁶

It is worth noting that the organizers of OCLP (Beny Tse, Reverend Chu Yiu-ming and Mr. Chan Kin-man) had similar goals in mind, their approach was however more realistic. Focusing on the more imminent goal of rising political awareness of the HK citizenry, they did in fact make it clear that the long term, strategic goal was to exert pressure on Beijing to allow HK citizens to elect their Chief Executives based on internationally established standards of universal suffrage, meaning both active and passive election rights.²⁷



Actors

Umbrella movement was not in fact uniform. This was to some extent used by both HKSAR Government and central government against various actors engaged in the sit-in protests. Occupy Central with Love and Peace (initially just Occupy Central) was preceded by three deliberations that took place from June 2013 to May 2014 and a civic referendum on the voting system to be used for the election of the Chief Executive.²⁸ The commencement of Occupy Central (drawing on the Occupy Wall Street in 2011) was planned on 1 October 2014 (National Day of the PRC) and designed to take only three days. As it happened, much to the surprise of many commentators, younger people spontaneously took to the streets themselves and snatched the initiative from OCLP.

Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS) and Scholarism started their own actions on 28 September with what was initially to be a week-long class boycott. HKFS is an organisation that back in 2014 included students from seven tertiary education institutions in HK.²⁹ Dating back to 1958, HKFS was one of the most important actors in the Umbrella Movement by the virtue of its representation. Initially pro-communist, the Organisation took a U-turn and became pro-democratic after 1984 and even more so after Tiananmen Massacre 1989.

24 This in particular took the author of this paper by surprise. When I came to HK and started teaching political science I had a sense that youth is rather disinterested in politics. Most students tended to focus more on facebook, shopping and eating out, treating political science just as another tedious academic discipline that does not bare much relevance to their everyday lives. How surprised I was in the autumn of 2014 when after seven years of living here I could see with my own eyes the superficiality of my primary impression.

25 OCCUPY CENTRAL - NIGHT FIVE: Full coverage of the night's events, "South China Morning Post", 2 October 2014, <http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1608000/live-police-arm-government-hq-protesters-deadline-cy-leung-quit-looms?page=all> accessed 24 June 2015.

26 A. Lo, Reform Legco's functional constituencies, "South China Morning Post", 16 July 2014, <http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1555003/reform-legcos-functional-constituencies> accessed 24 June 2015.

27 See more: What is the ultimate goal of "Occupied Central" action? http://oclp.hk/index.php?route=occupy/faq_detail&faq_id=1 accessed 24 June 2015.

28 Basic Law does not allow any referenda to be organized in the city, therefore the civic referendum organized by OCLP was tantamount to public opinion poll.

29 Recently representatives of three of those institutions withdrew from HKFS over the outcome of the engagement in Umbrella Movement. See more: <http://www.hkfs.org.hk/about-hkfs/> accessed 25 June 2015.

Scholarism is much younger, as it started in 2011. It was originally built around the protest against Moral and National education (MNE). Initially its full name was therefore: Scholarism – The Alliance Against Moral & National Education).³⁰ MNE, one should note, was a school curriculum proposed by the Education Bureau of HK. The controversy surrounding MNE, according to its critics, stands from praising communist and nationalist ideology of PRC government. In effect, as the critics claim, if implemented, new curriculum would brain-wash pupils and further minimise prospects for democratization of HK politics.³¹

Admittedly, HK pan-democratic political parties that are represented in Legco, seemed to have lost the momentum. Their internal divisions did not help the spontaneous social movement. Ultimately, the protesters in the streets lost their confidence in pan-democrats, whose major mode of operation turned out to be filibustering in the Legislative Council (by which they have also lost support of the part of the citizenry. Especially these members of the middle class who work as civil servants and whose salary adjustments and various other benefits could not be delivered due to blocking financial proposals of the government).³² Numerous media outlets, especially pro-Beijing ones, played this card heavily against pan-democrats during the sit-in protests and in the months followed Occupy Central.

To address questions posed in the introduction of this paper one must also look at the state of economic affairs in Hong Kong.

Social inequality – human security problem

Hong Kong government likes to boast about the macroeconomic indexes that supposedly support its governance philosophy, based on public-private partnership. Indeed, when one looks at GDP per capita (55,200 USD – 2014), its GDP purchasing power parity (400.6 billion USD – 2014), its GDP growth (3 per cent – 2014), its unemployment (3,1 per cent – 2014) and its inflation rate of 3,7 per cent, one would be entitled to jealousy, especially from the perspective of crises-ridden Eurozone or American economy.³³ But that is not all, for 2013/2014 the budget stands at around 1.94 billion USD surplus. Public debt was estimated at reasonable 37 per cent of GDP for 2014 and importantly has been diminishing. Finally, Human Development Index for 2014 was 15 th highest in the world.³⁴

This admittedly impressive economic performance is just a surface and it tells only a small part of the story. Socio-economic realities in HK have another, much uglier face. A quick look at microeconomic indexes reveals a different picture altogether. To start with, social inequalities (income inequalities) in Hong Kong are one of the biggest in the world. Widely accepted Gini Coefficient (overall) for 2011 according to Census and Statistics Department of HKSAR, reached a staggering value of 0.537.³⁵ Newly created crony-capitalism index places HK on top of the world and way ahead of the next contender in that category, a country that is notoriously criticised for its political and economic ills – Russia.³⁶ In terms of relative poverty only in 2012 HK government finally defined HK poverty line as 50 per cent of median monthly household income before tax and welfare transfers.³⁷ It appears that 1.3 million of Hong Kong residents (out of 7, 112,688) actually live under pov-

30 See more at: <http://scholarism.com/> accessed 25 June 2015.

31 See more at: Moral and National Education Curriculum Guide (Primary 1 to Secondary 6), Prepared by The Curriculum Development Council April 2012, [http://www.edb.gov.hk/attachment/en/curriculum-development/moral-national-edu/MNE%20Guide%20\(ENG\)%20Final_remark_09102012.pdf](http://www.edb.gov.hk/attachment/en/curriculum-development/moral-national-edu/MNE%20Guide%20(ENG)%20Final_remark_09102012.pdf) accessed 25 June 2015.

32 Hong Kong pan-democrats is a name that refers to those political parties in HK, who oppose Central Government and its interpretation of „one country, two systems” principle. They include among others: Democratic Party, Civic Party, Labour Party, People Power, Professional Commons, League of Social Democrats, Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihoods, Neighbourhood and Worker’s Service Centre and Neo Democrats. See more at: CIA World Factbook, Hong Kong at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/hk.html> accessed 26 June 2015.

33 See more at: CIA World Factbook, Hong Kong at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/hk.html> accessed 26 June 2015.

34 Human Development Report 2014, Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience, Explanatory note on the 2014 Human Development Report composite indices. Hong Kong, China (SAR), p. 2. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/HKG.pdf accessed 29 June 2015.

35 Census and Statistics Department Hong Kong Special Administrative Region People’s Republic of China, 2011 Population Census, Thematic Report : Household Income Distribution in HK, Appendix D, p. 220, <http://www.statistics.gov.hk/pub/B11200572012XXXXB0100.pdf> accessed 29 June 2015.

36 Our crony-capitalism index, Planet Plutocrat, The countries where politically connected businessmen are most likely to prosper, “The Economist”, 15 March 2015, <http://www.economist.com/news/international/21599041-countries-where-politically-connected-businessmen-are-most-likely-prosper-planet> accessed 29 June 2015.

37 News.gov.hk, Poverty line set for HK, 28 September 2013, http://www.news.gov.hk/en/categories/health/html/2013/09/20130927_191059.shtml accessed 25 June 2015.

erty line (that is almost 20 per cent). The situation is exceptionally challenging for the young. The median salary in the age group of 25 to 34 is 15,500 HK dollars (around 2,000 US dollars).³⁸ That might seem a lot converted to US dollars, nonetheless the prices of properties have been rising so sharply in the past years that most people now have to wait till late thirties or even early forties to get their first flat.³⁹ If that is not bad enough, their first flat is likely to be miniature of less than 40 square meters.⁴⁰ This obviously places a heavy financial burden on families who therefore tend to postpone their decision regarding first and often only child. Speaking of which, HK has one of the lowest birth rates in the world of only 1.235 which is well below the reproduction ratio.⁴¹

This is just a proverbial tip of an iceberg. To understand a drop of life satisfaction of HK residents one would also have to take into consideration: poor

air-quality,⁴² poor standard of public education,⁴³ increasingly expensive education offered by international schools,⁴⁴ tertiary education in general crisis,⁴⁵ competitive mode of education which forces many parents to start the education of their children at the age of 18 months (sic!), constant lack of qualified doctors, low quality of public health care, under-supply of public housing, long working hours⁴⁶ and practically non-existing public retirement schemes.⁴⁷ These and many others, according to Chinese University of Hong Kong study of 2013 have caused a steady fall in the quality of life.⁴⁸



38 Data for May – June 2014. See: Census and Statistics Department Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 2014 Report on Annual Earnings and Hours Survey, p. 5. <http://www.statistics.gov.hk/pub/B10500142014AN14B0100.pdf> accessed 29 June 2015.

39 Hong Kong now has one of the highest housing prices among the world's financial hubs. According to the Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey, the median housing price was HK \$4,024,000 (about \$520,000), almost 30% higher than that in New York (\$405,400) in 2013. The ratio of median home prices divided by median household income has reached 14.9, more than three times more than that in Tokyo, one of the most expensive cities in the world. See more: 11th Annual Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey: 2015 Ratings for Metropolitan Markets, <http://www.demographia.com/dhi.pdf> accessed 29 June 2015.

40 One of the HK developers recently angered many by offering flats of 180 square feet (16.72 square meters) for 1.47 million HK dollars (189,623 US dollars). Interestingly enough, the site is far away from prime locations and still most of the flats were sold pretty quickly. See more: A. Nip, Hong Kong's 'tiniest flats ever' go on sale for HK\$2 million, "South China Morning Post", Hong Kong and China, <http://www.scmp.com/property/hong-kong-china/article/1661820/modest-reception-tiny-new-flats?page=all> accessed 29 June 2015. To make it even more tragic, the law in HK allows developers to include parts of lobbies, stair cases, lifts and even balconies into declared leaving space. In reality therefore, depending on the developer and the building, one has to take into account the so-called 'efficiency ratio'. This usually being around eighty or sometimes even only 75 per cent, would reduce the declared 180 square feet flat (16.72 square meters) down to 135 square feet (12.54 square meters). Hence the phenomenon of subdivided flats, were one finds many families/individuals renting only a tiny space/part of the room and sharing basic necessities like bathrooms and kitchens. Latest government study of 2013 estimates the number of people living in such conditions at around 170,000. See more: Report on Survey on Subdivided Units in Hong Kong, p. 5, <http://www.thb.gov.hk/eng/policy/housing/policy/lths/sdurpt2013.pdf> accessed 30 June 2015.

41 Information Services Department, Census and Statistics Department Website: Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, Hong Kong: The Facts, April 2015, <http://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/population.pdf> accessed 30 June 2015.

42 Greenpeace East Asia, Live: Hong Kong Air Quality Levels at: <http://www.greenpeace.org/eastasia/campaigns/air-pollution/work/hong-kong-air-pollution-graph/> accessed 6 July 2015.

43 Especially poor standard of English. According to various studies the level of English of HK youth is the lowest in the region. See more: S. Zhao, Hong Kong's English language skills branded 'pathetic' as Chinese has 'negative influence', South China Morning Post, 9 November 2013, <http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1348626/hong-kongs-english-language-skills-branded-pathetic-chinese-has?page=all> accessed 30 June 2015.

44 As of writing of this paper, all international schools in HK are about to raise their tuition fees. Some by as much as by 30 per cent. This makes HK international schools one of the most expensive international schools in the world with and average annual tuition fee at secondary level at around 150,000 HK dollars (around 20,000 US dollars). See more: S. Zhao, International and private schools in Hong Kong seek to raise fees by up to 30pc, "South China Morning Post" 24 June 2015, <http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/education-community/article/1825446/international-and-private-schools-hong-kong-seek> accessed 30 June 2015. ON top of that many private and international schools demand a payment of 'debenture' – a one off fee that is returned to parents after the graduation of their kids (given the inflation one is bound to lose depending on the length of school attendance). Debentures are not regulated as such so it is not rare to hear that one has to pay 250,000 HK dollars (around 32,000 US dollars) up-front before their kids can even start attending a school.

45 Especially pressing seems to be the problem of social immobility linked to under-supported and underfunded higher education. See more at: Hong Kong's growing shortage of university places, Time Out Hong Kong, 27 August 2013, <http://www.timeout.com.hk/big-smog/features/60578/hong-kongs-growing-shortage-of-university-places.html> accessed 6 July 2015.

46 HK labour law does not specify minimum working hours per week. Reality is that HK people work one of the longest hours in the world. In 2011, the average median weekly total working hours for all employees were estimated at 47 hours. See more: Labour Department, The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Policy Study on Standard Working Hours, Executive Summary of the Report of the Policy on Standard Working Hours, p. 9, http://www.labour.gov.hk/eng/plan/pdf/swh/swh_executive_summary.pdf accessed 30 June 2015. Also, there is question of minimum salary. In 2011 HK government for the first time implemented its first minimum hourly wage of 28 HK dollars (3.61 US dollars) much to the criticism of business community. As of writing of this paper, the minimum hourly wage stands at 32.5 HK dollars (4.19 US dollars). See more at: Labour Department, The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Statutory Minimum Wage, <http://www.labour.gov.hk/eng/news/mwo.htm> accessed 2 July 2015.

47 This last feature of life in HK presents young people with particular challenge. It is widely expected of young people in HK to share their salaries with parents, regardless of their parents' economic conditions. Typically a young person, who earns around 15,000 HK dollars (around 2,000 US dollars) would be expected to part with around 30 per cent of that – 5,000 HK dollars (around 650 US dollars) to support other members of their families – parents, grand-parents or younger brothers and sisters.

48 See more at: Hong Kong Quality of Life Index 2013, The Chinese University Of Hong Kong, 13 August 2014, http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/hkiaps/qol/sources/PR_QOL_1213Aug_Eng.pdf accessed 2 July 2015.

Now, all this might seem pretty typical for our times, but one needs to realise the context. Generally speaking after WW II Hong Kong has been doing exceptionally well in economic terms. Its citizens have been enjoying rising standard of living from one generation to another. Focus on hard work accompanied by low-key position of government in economics allowed most people to prosper and meet their existential/developmental goals. An unspoken social contract seemed to have been based on the understanding that the citizens did not engage in politics. In return, the government did not regulate economic activity above the minimum but provided a level-playing field in the form of the rule-of-law. Sadly, recent years have shown that the contract is clearly not working, which would definitely provide the answers to first questions posed in this paper – the origins of the Occupy Central that led to massive sit-ins protests. The problems above also, at least partly, explain the reasons for massive ‘politicization’ of HK society. ‘Politicization’ which, it is worth noting, mirrors ‘western’ governance ideas of a social contract based not poorly on formal grounds but rather on the merit and contents. As one of the internet users commented: “All we need is a government who is accountable to the people and not to Beijing and who risks being voted out of office should they fail. Only under the current system can unqualified and self-interested people hold office and remain in power despite repeated failures as all aspects of Hong Kong degrade.”⁴⁹

As Brian C. H. Fong observes: “As a hybrid regime, Hong Kong has been governed by a state–business alliance since the colonial era. However, since the handover in 1997, the transformation of Hong Kong’s political and socio-economic environment has eroded the conditions that supported a viable state–business alliance. This state–business alliance, which was once a solution for Hong Kong’s governance, has now become a political burden – rather than a political asset”.⁵⁰ Much along the same lines he also asserts that there has been a crisis of governance in HK ever since 1997 and the handover. The post-colonial ‘state’ has been suffering from erosion of its role as

the arbitrator of class interests, which has been understood as one of the major sources of the legitimacy deficit thesis.⁵¹ Fong’s analysis resonates with popular sentiment. His research confirms that it seems to be the case that: “Unlike the colonial era, the business sector has become the major coalition partner of the sovereign state after 1997 and the local capitalists have gained privileged access to Beijing by virtue of their over-representation in the NPC [National People’s Congress – added K.S.] and CPPCC [Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference – added K.S.] delegations, close relationship with the Central Liaison Office and intricate business networks with Mainland authorities. (...) As a consequence of the close partnership between the Chinese government and the business sector, business elites have usually resorted to the sympathetic ears of the Mainland authorities when they see their interests affected by the postcolonial state”.⁵² It fits nicely with the central thesis of Joseph Stiglitz’s Book - *The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society Endangers our Future*, where he ascertains that: “while there may be underlying economic forces at play, politics have shaped the market, and shaped it in ways that advantage the top at the expense of the rest”.⁵³



Hong Kong Transition Project confirms these assertions and backs it up with quantitative data.⁵⁴ According to its latest report ‘Constitutional Reform: Confrontation looms as Hong Kong consults’ especially those under the age of 40 show very strong dissatisfaction with life quality in HK.⁵⁵ They also largely do not trust either HKSAR Government or Central

49 Commentary to S. Vines, Why Hong Kong’s latest No 1 ranking was greeted with silence, “South China Morning Post”, 1 April 2014, <http://www.scmp.com/business/money/wealth/article/1462317/why-hong-kongs-latest-no-1-ranking-was-greeted-silence?page=all> accessed 2 July 2015.

50 B.C.H.Fong, *Hong Kong’s Governance Under Chinese Sovereignty, The failure of the state–business alliance after 1997*, introduction, Routledge: London, 2015.

51 Ibidem, p. 41.

52 Ibidem, p. 223-225.

53 J.E. Stiglitz (2012). *The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society Endangers Our Future*. W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition. Loc. 620 of 9830.

54 See HKTP numerous reports at: <http://hktp.org/> accessed 6 July 2015.

55 Hong Kong Transition Project, ‘Constitutional Reform: Confrontation looms as Hong Kong consults’, <http://hktp.org/list/> accessed 6 July 2015.

Government. Crucially, of highest concern to the HK citizenry seem to be competence of CE, competence of civil servants, fair judiciary, autonomy of HK, freedom of press, demonstration and travel and political stability.⁵⁶

The above analysis has shown basic social problems that have been unsettling HK society. Together with the first chapter that describes HK political systems they allow us to answer initial research questions posed at the beginning of this paper. Now, that we have established the major causes of social unrest in HK known as occupy central let us turn our attention to the reaction of HKSAR Government and Central Government (Beijing).

Securitization of HK politics

This part of the paper will attempt to show how both HKSAR and Central Government tried to securitize Occupy Central. Specifically it will look at ‘facilitating conditions’ of securitization such as ‘speech acts’. It will also employ cultural context of which in case of Chinese politics is largely shaped by the philosophy of Confucianism.

Before we proceed however, it is vital to define the notion of securitization, which will serve as an analytical tool in this part of the paper. The concept of securitization of politics was first outlined by Ole Wæver in 1995. It refers to the discursive construction of threat.⁵⁷ According to Wæver, securitization can be defined as a process in which an actor declares a particular issue, dynamic or actor to be an ‘existential threat’ to a particular referent object. If accepted as such by relevant audience, this enables the suspension of normal politics and the use of emergency measures in responding to that perceived crisis.

Security in that sense is a site of negotiation between speakers and audiences, albeit one conditioned significantly by the extent to which the speaker enjoys a position of authority within particular group. As such securitization is context related so it involves articulation of the threat only from specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites.⁵⁸

57 O. Wæver, Politics, security, theory, "Security Dialog" 2011, 42 (4-5), 471.

58 Ibidem. 473

59 HK has had an overall rating of 3.5 since 2005. Between 2002 and 2004 it enjoyed a slightly higher overall rating of 4. See more at: Freedom House, Hong Kong, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/hong-kong#.VZ4ORPmqjRY> accessed 9 July 2015.

One of the basic concepts within the theorem of securitization, refers to ‘facilitating conditions’. Facilitating conditions are understood as particular context that enables the acceptance of a particular securitizing move by the relevant audience. This particular context includes a number of phenomena and naturally differs from case to case. Analysing Hong Kong politics from this perspective should take into account the structure of political system (explained at large in the first part of this paper), historical and cultural contexts as well as political dynamics in PRC.

Historically speaking, Hong Kong has never been free. It has been first, a British Crown Colony, then British Dependent Territory later British Overseas Territory and now Special Administrative Region of People’s Republic of China. Its citizens have always enjoyed certain rights the scope of which has usually been far greater than in Mainland China but much narrower than in the United Kingdom. According to Freedom House, Hong Kong rating stands as partly free for 2015⁵⁹ (overall 3.5 – civil liberties 2, political rights 5).



Consequently, many in HK believe that the situation is only getting worse. Especially in the realm of mass media, one sees examples of leading English speaking broadsheet newspaper – South China Morning Post and its staff being ‘let go’ or liberal Apple Daily being hacked and its reporters being physically abused. Television Broadcast Limited (TVB), first wireless commercial station in HK, has been perceived as pro-establishment since 2009 when it limited coverage of the 20th anniversary of 4 June

Incident.⁶⁰ During the 2012 CE election Central Government's Liaison Office interfered a number of times on media coverage of the candidates running for the office.⁶¹ Finally problems with extending licences for Commercial Radio Hong Kong due to its critical reporting on Chief Executive CY Leung and worst of all, a case of Kevin Lau, chief editor of the liberal Ming Pao, who was brutally stabbed on 26 February 2014. It is commonly believed that even though he was attacked by Triad members, this was orchestrated by political elites as an act of vengeance for Lau's contribution to International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) report on the offshore assets of PRC leaders.⁶²

Culturally speaking, Confucianism seems to be enjoying its revival in China. Even Chinese Communist Party has recently embarked on the revitalization of this ethical and philosophical system as a cornerstone of a post-Maoist normative basis. Daniel Bell of Tsinghua University even suggests that perhaps one day Chinese Communist Party might actually become Chinese Confucian Party.⁶³ Allegedly it goes back to 2005 when the then President Hu Jintao cited Confucius in his speech aimed at the cadres of the Communist Party whereby he urged the building of a 'harmonious society'.⁶⁴

Political culture as Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba have demonstrated is a potent variable influencing policy making and the governance systems of political communities.⁶⁵ Arguably, in both HK and China traditional Confucian values still hold eminent position within its respective societies, perhaps more so even in case of HK, which did not go through Cultural Revolution. There is a lot to be elaborated on Confucianism and its values, admittedly as many philosophical systems Confucianism is inherently

contradictory at times, but few features seem to stand out. Firstly, Confucianism tends to promote hierarchy. As Baogang He argues, Confucianism represents "a political order in which the rule of the gentleman prevails, where duty is central, political inequality taken for granted, moral concern overrides political bargaining process, and harmony prevails over conflict".⁶⁶ Consequently, this "conflicts with a democratic order in which the rule of law prevails, rights are central, political equality is taken for granted, the political bargaining overrides moral consensus, and conflict is seen as necessarily normal condition of political life".⁶⁷ Unlike PRC, HK political system does exhibit a mixture of these values. On the one hand, the rule of law does prevail and some rights are central. On the other hand, the catalogue of citizens' rights is limited, at least compared to fully democratic systems, there is no political equality and social harmony is highly regarded. The last point is especially relevant in the context of Occupy Central. In Confucian culture the government tends to proceed on the basis of an assumption that the lack of social harmony will automatically bring chaos (the Warring States' period is often invoked by Chinese as historical proof), an assumption similar to the one of Thomas Hobbes or Machiavelli. Logically therefore, for Chinese, suppression of dissidence seems to be the surest mode of providing social harmony.⁶⁸ Dissidence is seen as emanation of conflict and irresponsibility on the part of individuals who value themselves more than the community (which is more or less compatible with western civic-republican application of citizenship). This has two very important consequences: Firstly, most individuals very seldom oppose the rulers or the majority, simply 'going with the flow' in order not to disrupt the harmony. Secondly, any whistle-blowers are usually seen as troublemakers rather than responsible citizens who care

60 Every year Hong Kong people pay tribute to those who lost their lives during the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. Many stay overnight for the vigil in Victoria Park on HK Island. See more: J. Ng, S. Lau, J. Lam and T. Cheung, Victoria Park lit up at June 4 vigil as 'localist' groups stage alternative rallies, "South China Morning Post, June 4 2015, <http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/1816344/hong-kongs-candlelight-vigil-mark-tiananmen-crack-down-gets?page=all> accessed 14 July 2015.

61 K-c Ng, Article 'twisted by an invisible hand', "South China Morning Post", 24 March 2012, <http://www.scmp.com/article/996388/article-twisted-invisible-hand> accessed 14 July 2015.

62 Kevin Lau stabbing: Nine held over attack in Hong Kong, BBC World News, Asia, China, 12 March 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-26541648> accessed 14 July 2015.

63 D. Bell, *China's New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 3-18.

64 K-M. Chan, *Harmonious Society*, https://www.cuhk.edu.hk/centre/ccss/publications/km_chan/CKM_14.pdf accessed 14 June 2015. See also: CPC Central Committee on Major Issues on Constructing a harmonious socialist society, Sixteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Sixth Plenary Meeting, 11 October 2006, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/64162/64168/64569/72347/6347991.html> accessed 14 July 2015.

65 See more: G. Almond, S. Verba (1965), *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, Boston: Little Brown.

66 B. He, Four Models of the Relationship between Confucianism and Democracy, "Journal of Chinese Philosophy", 37:1, p. 20.

67 *Ibidem*, p. 21.

68 On that point see also: K.C.K. Cheung, *Appropriating Confucianism: Soft Power, Primordial Sentiment, and Authoritarianism*, in: *China's Rise to Power. Conceptions of State Governance*, J.T.H Lee, L.V. Nedilsky and S.K Cheung (Eds.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 31-47.

about the community. This was obvious during the 79 days of OC and long afterwards.

The concept of harmonious society is therefore a very useful tool in the hands of both CCP and HK SAR Government. For the sake of social harmony Occupy Central protesters were framed as peace disturbers, who were harming HK stability and prosperity.⁶⁹

Securitization scholars consider the position of the speaker as an important facilitating condition. Arguably it also played an important role during the OC. To start with, the protesters were not just any regular citizens. A large and most vocal amongst them were secondary school and university students. Their demands might have been unrealistic (so typical of the young to be rebellious) but they were treated by HK SAR Government and Central Government as just spoiled kids, not worthy even of a dialog.⁷⁰ The Government officials (both HK SAR and Central Government) continually played the cards of immaturity of protesters referring to their young age and inexperience in politics.

This is typical of HK political culture as in Confucianism political leaders are highly regarded and the subjects are intellectually and often morally inferior. This by itself guarantees that in Confucian societies the leaders automatically enjoy a position of authority. As Hall and Ames point out in Confucianism, good government must be paternalistic therefore “the relationship between the ruler and the masses is repeatedly cast as analogous to that of parents and their children”.⁷¹ This propensity can explain popular attachment to paternalism in both Mainland China and to some extent in HK especially among older generations.⁷² Police Commissioner Andy Tsang was

quoted widely by HK media when he commented on the behaviour of female police officers during the scuffles in Mong Kok on 3rd of October 2014 referring to them as “caring mothers protecting kids”.⁷³



National Security

Once that we have identified the facilitating conditions of securitization of Hong Kong Politics it is time to look at particular examples that validate the hypothesis put forward at the beginning of this paper, namely that major issues concerning public policy making in Hong Kong, and especially its political reform and the opposition of large part of citizenry towards it known as Occupy Central, have been framed by central government in Beijing as national security issue.

In August 2014, Zhang Xiaoming Director of the Liaison Office of the Central People's Government in Hong Kong SAR repeatedly asserted that “Hong Kong SAR is being exploited, under the pretext of democracy, as an anti-China base by foreign forces. Therefore universal suffrage in Hong Kong must be viewed with national security in mind”.⁷⁴

69 G. Cheung and J. Ng, Hong Kong businesses hurt by democracy protests to get relief in budget, “South China Morning Post”, 4 February 2015, <http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1701149/hong-kong-businesses-hurt-democracy-protests-get-relief-budget?page=all> accessed 16 July 2015. Also: K. Chu and J. Chiu, Hong Kong Protests May Hurt Retailers, “The Wall Street Journal”, 29 September 2014 <http://www.wsj.com/articles/hong-kong-protests-may-hurt-retailers-1411985286> accessed 16 July 2015.

70 Indeed, the HK SAR Government Chief Secretary for Administration Office Carrie Lam Yuet-ngor never treated the protesters seriously. After many days of protests amid a standoff between the Government and the protesters who demanded dialog, Carrie Lam offered to meet. There was only one meeting which proved meaningless. The next scheduled meeting did not take place however as the government called it off in the last moment. See more: Thousands return to streets in protest at government's decision to cancel talks with students, “South China Morning Post”, 11 October 2014, <http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1614085/thousands-return-streets-protest-governments-decision-cancel-talks?page=all> accessed 16 July 2015.

71 D.L. Hall, R.T. Ames (1987). *Thinking through Confucius*. Albany: State University of New York, p. 144.

72 D.S. Shin (2012). *Confucianism and Democratization in East Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 124-126.

73 Police officers like caring mothers protecting kids: Tsang, “ejinsight” 22 December 2014, <http://www.ejinsight.com/20141222-police-officers-like-caring-mothers-protecting-kids-says-tsang/> accessed 20 July 2015. One should also add that during OC social media were full references to PRC as ‘mother’ of all Chinese and OC participants as ‘ungrateful children’ or even ‘thugs’ and ‘gangsters’.

74 This was said during numerous occasions: Speech (8 Aug 2014), Meeting with Democratic Party (15 Aug 2014) and Meeting with Civic Party and Labour Party (19 Aug 2014). See more at: J. Li, Universal suffrage concerns national security: Zhang, “China Daily”, 8 August 2014, http://www.chinadailyasia.com/hknews/2014-08/08/content_15155434.html accessed 20 July 2014. Also: T. Cheung, Autonomy of Hong Kong is safe, says liaison office chief Zhang Xiaoming. Beijing to stick by one country, two systems ‘regardless of outcome of political reforms’, “South China Morning Post”, 8 August 2014, <http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1568673/autonomy-hong-kong-safe-says-liaison-office-chief-zhang-xiaoming> accessed 20 July 2015.

CY Leung, Chief Executive, in his first on-the-record joint interview with international media (The Financial Times, the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal) on 20 October 2014 was quoted as saying: “There is a thin line between what we do in Hong Kong and what Beijing think or might think they have to do. (...) I didn’t overhear it in a teahouse. It’s something that concerns us. It’s something we need to deal with [Leung made it clear that foreign intervention is a genuine worry for his administration – K.S.]”.⁷⁵

Ten days later, Michael Tien Puk-sun, Deputy Chairman of New People’s Party, Hong Kong delegate to the National People’s Congress (NPC) of PRC, had this to say on Occupy Central: “Because China has declared there are foreign forces and political influence behind Occupy Central, it has been elevated to a national security issue”.⁷⁶

Xi Jinping, President of PRC, during a joint press conference with US President Barack Obama in APEC Beijing on 12 November 2014 affirmed that: “Hong Kong is exclusively an internal matter for China and foreign countries should not interfere in any form or fashion”.⁷⁷

Finally, General Sun Jianguo, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of PRC on 2 nd of March 2015, during an interview with Oriental Outlook [A newsweekly magazine affiliated with Xinhua – K.S.] made these remarks: “Hostile forces have always attempted to make Hong Kong the bridgehead for subverting and infiltrating mainland China. The illegal Occupy Central activities in 2014 came as minority radical groups in Hong

Kong, under the instigation and support of external forces (...) orchestrated a Hong Kong version of a colour revolution”.⁷⁸

In his recent analysis, Gen. Qiao Liang, in charge of the education curriculum of the officers studying at the prestige University of Defence (PRC’s top military school) throws additional light on the Chinese official understanding of OC. Referring to US monetary strategy Gen. Liang puts forward an idea that united States created the Ukrainian Crisis, territorial disputes between PRC and Japan as well as PRC and the Philippines along with OC crisis in its approach to challenge the rising power of China and undermine its national security.⁷⁹

Last but not least one cannot but notice the most recent iteration of Chinese National Security Strategy, adopted by the Politburo of the Communist Party of China on 23 rd of January 2015. The new strategy is vast enough to include all “unpredictable” and “unprecedented” dangers facing China at home and abroad and sees further consolidation of power under the unified command of Xi Jinping.⁸⁰ According to Chinese media, around the same time National People’s Congress deputy Stanley Ng asserted that the Mainland’s state security legislation should be applied to Hong Kong, in the absence of local national security legislation.⁸¹ As Alvin Y.H. Cheung rightly observes: “(...) Ng’s proposal may represent merely the opening gambit in Beijing’s continuing crackdown on dissent in Hong Kong following the Umbrella Movement. Pro-Beijing politicians and pundits are now advocating a revival of Article 23 national security legislation, pitching it as preferable to the imposition of Mainland legislation”.⁸²

75 J. Noble, J. Zhu, Hong Kong ‘lucky’ China has not stopped protests, says CY Leung, “Ft.com”, world, asia-pacific, China, 20 October 2014, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3f6f1c74-584b-11e4-a31b-00144feab7de.html#axzz3gPmS21ig> accessed 20 July 2015.

76 The comment came a day after his brother James Tien Pei-chun was expelled from the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) after he urged CY Leung to step down as CE. See more: C. Baldwin, Hong Kong protests a ‘national security issue’ for China, “Reuters”, World, 30 October 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/30/us-hongkong-china-brother-idUSKBN0I1AD20141030> accessed 20 July 2015.

77 This was Xi’s first public comment on the Occupy Central after the clearance. See more at: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping in Joint Press Conference, Great Hall of the People, Beijing, China, 12:17 P.M. CST, 12 November 2014, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/12/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-jinping-joint-press-conference> accessed 20 July 2015.

78 Admiral Sun Jianguo: China has been invaded by dangerous struggle to seek win-win China – US, “Oriental Outlook”, 2 March 2015, http://news.ifeng.com/a/20150302/43248982_1.shtml accessed 20 July 2015. Also: n. Gan, S. Lau, Hong Kong’s Occupy protest ‘was an attempt at colour revolution’: PLA general, “South China Morning Post”, 3 March 2015, <http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1728027/occupy-central-was-attempt-colour-revolution-pla-general?page=all> accessed 20 July 2015.

79 Q. Liang, One belt, one road, heartland. “Eurasian Review of Geopolitics”, <http://temi.repubblica.it/limes-heartland/one-belt-one-road/2070> accessed 20 July 2015.

80 S. Tiezzi, China’s National Security Strategy, “The Diplomat”, 24 January 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/chinas-national-security-strategy/> accessed 20 July 2015.

81 NPC deputy backs state security provision in Basic Law, “ejinsight”, 20 January 2015, <http://www.ejinsight.com/20150120-npc-deputy-backs-state-security-provision-in-basic-law/> accessed 20 July 2015.

82 Alvin Y.H. Cheung, A Spectre Resurfaces: Chinese National Security Legislation and Hong Kong, “I-CONNECT. Blog of the International Journal of Constitutional Law and ConstitutionMaking.org”, 12 February 2015, <http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/02/a-spectre-resurfaces-chinese-national-security-legislation-and-hong-kong/> accessed 20 July 2015.

Conclusion

The theoretical framework applied in this paper has been the one of securitization. As Copenhagen school of security studies posits, firstly, once issues are moved to security realm, there tends to be suspension of the normal rules of the game and enabling of the emergency measures. This consequently brings, quite unfortunate from a democratic standpoint, tendency to deal with perceived threats to security in urgency and secrecy, with few actors being able to contribute to political debate. Secondly, securitization requires that the referent objects of such accept the moving of certain issues to the security realm and also consequent suspension of normal rules of the game.

In case of Occupy Central both conditions have not been fully met. As OC and its aftermath have demonstrated a large part of the HK citizenry have not accepted the notion forced by Beijing that HK politics and its institutions are ultimately to be shaped by Beijing, neither have they accepted the securitization narrative as regards OC.

Certainly, as this paper has proved, there has been a considerable effort on the part of Central government and HKSAR government to frame HK politics in general and OC in particular in terms of national security. It remains to be seen however how much these attempts have been successful. Further survey-based research is needed to establish whether Beijing and HKSAR governments have been successful in their attempts and if so, to what extent.

In the meantime, the immediate effects of the OC have been rather negative: one could definitely see that the prestige of Hong Kong Police Force (traditionally perceived as very professional and impartial) has suffered since the Force is no longer seen a trustworthy and neutral guardian of the rule of law. Secondly, both Beijing and HKSAR governments have been paying special attention to education sec-

tor. One can definitely expect the continuation of the national education debate, amid worsening academic freedoms⁸³ and more control over liberal arts curriculum, in secondary schools.⁸⁴ Thirdly, students have been polarizing as regards the future actions, which has resulted in the split and demise of Hong Kong University Student's Union. Fourthly, there has been a considerable decrease in trust and support to HK democrats who proved totally unable to use the momentum created by the OC participants and missed the opportunity amid internal quarrels that manifested usually with filibustering in Legco, much to the irritation of most HK citizens, including those who supported OC. Finally, one can observe the polarization of political views among HK citizens, with a considerable increase of Chinese nationalism (pro-Beijing and consequently against the so-called 'localists').⁸⁵

It seems to be the case that Beijing, and especially, Xi Jinping could not afford the OC to spin out of control for a number of reasons. Predominantly, one could actually make the case for power analysis. As matters stand nowadays, there is an ongoing power struggle within CCP standing committee. Xi has embarked on a new and adventurous path referred to as "Chinese Dream".⁸⁶ As a multifaceted program, Chinese dream involves numerous ambitious initiatives among which some seem to stand out in particular from the perspective of this paper: tackling corruption in the state's apparatus and the party and demonstration of Chinese assertiveness in the region. In both cases Xi has to be seen as a 'strongman' if he wants to succeed, let alone remain in power. Ultimately therefore, OC proved a particular challenge to him and the rest of the Chinese leadership, which had to be won for their cause. At stake is in fact the stability and 'social harmony' of the whole Chinese society and preservation of the legitimacy of CCP.⁸⁷

83 J. Ng, Occupy Central founder Benny Tai 'not ruling out' legal challenge to HKU's decision to punish him over handling of donations, "South China Morning Post", 10 September 2015, <http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/1856805/occupy-central-founder-benny-tai-not-ruling-out-legal>, accessed 14 September 2015. Also: T. Cheung, 'Academic freedom is under threat': 300 Hong Kong academics petition over delay in HKU's pro-democracy appointment, "South China Morning Post", 24 August 2015 <http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/education-community/article/1852149/300-hong-kong-academics-feel-obliged-speak-out?page=all>, accessed 14 September 2015.

84 R. Ip, Fake liberal studies will do Hong Kong more harm than good, "South China Morning Post", 1 February 2015, <http://www.scmp.com/news/article/1695523/fake-liberal-studies-will-do-hong-kong-more-harm-good?page=all> accessed 14 September 2015.

85 Especially that the ethnic and cultural essence of HK population is changing rapidly. Every day 150 Chinese from the mainland are granted a right to enter and stay in HK on family reunification grounds. See more: http://www.clic.org.hk/en/topics/immigration/for_non_residents/q1.shtml accessed 14 September 2015.

86 See more at: Chinese Dream, "Xinhua", <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/chinesedream/> accessed 14 September 2015.

87 On governance of China's political system see more at: B. Zhiyue, *China's Elite Politics. Governance and Democratization*, London: World Scientific, 2010.



Political Opportunities and Alliance-Making: A Case of Environmental Mobilization in China

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Introduction

In the twenty-first century, we continue to witness, within both liberal democracies and authoritarian states, the participation of a large number of people in street protests across the globe. There are many reasons why people mobilize themselves, ranging from toppling governments (e.g. Arab Spring) to making their grievances heard (e.g. Yellow Jackets Movement, France). Due to the advancement of global media coverage, such events are readily covered and instantly consumed by people everywhere. The use of new media, including social media and email, among mobilization participants has changed the speed through which social mobilization spreads as well as the nature of popular protests (Liu 2018; Wang, Madnick, Li, Alstott, and Velu 2015; Yang 2009). Social mobilization has become a routine tactic in socio-political activism.

Greater China¹ is not immune to these changes. In

recent decades, the Chinese central government's eagerness to strengthen its relationship with Hong Kong and Taiwan has sometimes triggered citizen protests in these regions among people who perceive such a move as a threat to their autonomy. Protesters less often directly attack Beijing than they show frustration toward their own pro-Beijing leadership. In 2014, Taiwan's Sunflower movement began with the student occupation of Taiwan's national legislature to protest against the ruling party of Taiwan (KMT: Kuomintang) at that time, charging that the government had not followed parliamentary due process in reviewing the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA), a free trade pact with China (Rowen 2015; Ho 2015). In recent months, Hong Kong has been experiencing one of the largest extended protests since the 2014 Umbrella protests, involving millions of citizens.² A proposed Chinese extradition bill initially prompted the protests. In response, the government suspended the bill on June 18, 2019. Yet, the protest demands have now expanded to include the

¹ Greater China is a geographic area, which includes mainland China, Macau, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.

² For a comparative study of the Sunflower movement and the Umbrella movement, see Ming Sho Ho (2019).

resignation of the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, full suffrage, etc. These events may suggest that the role of civil society as watchdogs in both Hong Kong and Taiwan functions well and that the citizens are comfortable in mobilizing despite some serious potential costs. (For example, the key activists of the 2014 Umbrella protest, which included professors, a minister, lawmakers, and students, were sentenced to imprisonment in a Hong Kong court in April 2019.)

In this article, I focus on social mobilization in mainland China, where the social costs of participating in mobilization are much higher than in other parts of Greater China. While massive street protests by people are key elements of social mobilization, I would like to bring our attention to a case of mobilization that was initially led by state elites. While it is theorized that the presence of elite allies provides movements with opportunities, the existence of such alliances in mobilization deserve more systematic analysis in authoritarian contexts, in particular.

I discuss a case of environmental activism in China that was highly publicized in the last decades. Anti-dam activism against the planned Nu River hydro-power project in Yunnan constituted a new level of environmental activism in mainland China as it was against national and provincial policies/plans (the Western Development strategies). The case included novel forms of transnational mobilization, involving transnational actors (e.g., international nongovernmental or governmental organizations) (Matsuzawa 2011). This article, however, focuses on the first stage of the activism in which state elites formed alliances with non-state actors and mobilized themselves.

State elites may facilitate mobilization not only when they are sympathetic to the cause of social mobilization but also when they have something to gain from it. In the case of Nu River anti-dam activism, the SEPA (State Environmental Protection Administration), which is equivalent to an environmental ministry, aimed to expand its jurisdictional power to enforce an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA).

A case study such as this one promises to widen our understanding of the various processes of social mobilization in Greater China. In addition, the case should help us to understand the ways in which social mobilization may unfold even in a strong authoritar-

ian context.

In the sections below, I first describe the concept of political opportunity structures (POSs) (McAdam, 1992, 1996), one of the key social movement theories, to lay a foundation for the relationship between movement outcomes and elite allies. Secondly, I discuss environmental movements/activism in the context of social movements in China. Thirdly, I identify the elite allies in environmental activism. Lastly, I introduce the case of Nu River anti-dam activism, highlighting the alliances between state and non-state actors before the proposed dam project was (officially) temporarily suspended in 2004.



Political Opportunity Structures

The concept of political opportunity structures (POS) describes the ways through which political alignments within the political environment create opportunities and affect movement outcomes in the context of domestic social movements. Although the explanatory precision of political opportunity structures has been challenged from time to time, the theory provides an important analytical framework for examining the emergence, strategic repertoires, trajectories and outcomes of social movements.

McAdam (1996: 27) specifies four key dimensions of political opportunity structures: (1) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; (2) the stability or instability of elite political alignments; (3) the presence or absence of elite allies; and (4) the state's capacity and propensity for repression. Among these four dimensions, the second and third dimensions are most relevant to the case presented in this article.

An alliance is more likely to emerge if elite politi-

cal alignments are unstable (the second dimension). While political elites (e.g., state officials) in non-democracies are less likely to consider issues of accountability in comparison to their counterparts in liberal democracies, they may ally with non-state actors to benefit their own power struggles. The “presence or absence of elite allies (the third dimension)” is perhaps the key dimension within an authoritarian context. The presence of elite allies may compensate for the people’s limited political access under authoritarian governance (the first dimension) if it helps to connect the people with the government. This was observed in earlier environmental campaigns to protect endangered species in China. The connections between the people and the government may also reduce the likelihood of state repression (the fourth dimension).



The case of the Nu River anti-hydropower dam project was the first case of mobilization based on state and non-state alliances in regard to China’s environmental campaigns. Alliances were formed among scientists, environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), environmental ministry officials, and the media. Prior to this case, China’s environmental campaigns had been NGO driven. The benefits of the alliances were mutual. The alliances provided opportunities for not only non-state actors to voice their concerns about the proposed project and to create a controversy, but also for state actors to advocate for a strict EIA.

When the Nu River hydropower dam project was proposed in 2003, the SEPA, under deputy environmental minister, Pan Yue, was eager to enforce the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) law that had gone into effect the same year. The SEPA’s attempt to enforce a strict EIA was sometimes at odds with other high-ranking governmental policy-making bodies. The SEPA’s aim created an instability within

the elite political alignments, which added complications to the policy-making processes at the central government. Thus, the instability of the elite political alignments created opportunities for non-state actors.

China’s Environmental Activism in the context of Social Movements

In the late twentieth century, the seriousness of pollution was documented by a World Bank study (World Bank 1997) and attested to by riots and protests in rural China (Economy 2004; Jing 2003), incurring economic and political costs to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Bernstein 2000). By the mid-1990s, environmental activism among citizens had become organized in the form of NGOs. This type of environmental activism quickly gained legitimacy as the Chinese central government began to pay more attention to environmental protection by upgrading environmental agencies and offices, passing environmental laws and regulations, and actively participating in the international environmental arena. While political and heterodox religious activism was sanctioned in the post-Tiananmen era, environmental activism often worked to echo national environmental policies. Environmental activism began to provide citizens with relatively safe opportunities to claim their rights and to participate in activism within the Chinese authoritarian context (Matsuzawa 2012).

In the twenty-first century, environmental activism has tackled issues involving large scale national and/or provincial policies and plans, affecting a much larger constituency than in the previous era of environmental activism (Steinhardt and Wu 2015). Thousands of people signed petitions against the construction of a hydropower dam with the hope of protecting China’s last pristine river. During Anti-PX (para-xylene) movements between 2007 and 2015 in different cities in China, thousands of people participated in street protests (Bondes and Johnson 2017; Huang and Yip 2012; Hung 2013; Steinhardt and Wu 2016; Sun, Huang & Yip 2017; Sun and Huang 2018; Wong 2015, 2016; Zhang 2018; Zhu 2017). These cases of environmental activism suggest that people are willing to act more than before concerning their immediate or imagined environments. The Chinese regime was not amused by the occurrence of mass-scale citizen protests, such as Anti-PX move-

ments, and later tightened its control over social organizations, including environmental NGOs.

Elite Allies in Environmental Activism

China Scholars have identified both state and non-state actors who contribute to China's environmental activism. State actors include environmental ministries and local environmental protection bureaus (at the provincial and municipal levels). Non-state actors include environmental NGOs, the media, and other socially concerned elites (e.g., scientists and lawyers) (Lei 2018; Mertha 2008; Stern 2017, 2011; Wu 2013; Xie 2009; Zhang 2018). These actors not only work independently, but also sometimes collaborate and form alliances. It is particularly important to study why such alliances are formed because it helps us to understand the intricate relationships between state and non-state actors in an authoritarian context.

Since the mid-1990s, environmental NGOs in China function as an important vehicle for environmental activism and campaigns and help to raise environmental awareness (Economy 2005; Litzinger 2004; nationally and/or transnationally. However, transnational collaboration now faces more scrutiny from the Ministry of Public Security under the 2017 Law on the Management of Overseas NGOs' Activities (Matsuzawa 2019).



Despite the pioneer status of environmental NGOs in domestic environmental activism, their gradual professionalization and the increasing governmental control of the NGO field in China have contributed to the NGOs' self-censorship in order to sustain and protect their own organizations (Hildebrandt 2013; Hildebrandt and Turner 2009; Spires 2011). Thus, they are sometimes unable to effectively participate in mobilization involving street protests (Ho and Edmonds 2008; Sun, Huang, and Yip 2018;

Zhang 2018). At the same time, their rising professionalization has helped some environmental NGOs to become influential in the policy arena and in the legislative process (Mertha 2008; Saich 2000). By rendering their expertise to the state, environmental NGOs have become "insiders in the law-making process" (Froissart 2019).

The media is another key actor in environmental activism. Although freedom of the press is generally limited in mainland China, investigative journalism began to emerge in the 1990s and exposed many social ills throughout the 2000s. The state supported such exposure during this period (Tong 2007). In particular, the media's framing of environmental problems and its criticism of governmental policies that prioritize economic growth over the environment aided the emergence of critical discourse (Tong 2014) or what Yang and Calhoun (2007) call a "green public sphere," involving other civil society actors and various types of media.

From the earliest days in China's environmental activism, the media and environmental NGOs have collaborated at various levels. This is perhaps due to not only the existence of media-savvy environmental entrepreneurs, but also the proximity between them and the media. Friends of Nature (FON), a pioneer NGO in Beijing, used the media to advocate for their environmental campaigns to protect endangered animals in other provinces. Global Village Beijing (GVB), another pioneer environmental NGO, once had an environmental education program, including recycling, with CCTV (China Central Television). For more than a decade, Green Earth Volunteers (GEV), whose leader is a journalist, has organized regular environmental salons for journalists for educational purposes (Ho and Edmonds 2008; Yang and Calhoun 2007). The salons provide environmental entrepreneurs and investigative journalists with a venue to meet. Participants have included environmental experts, foreign expatriates, and environmental NGO leaders from many provinces. The salon participants often go on to network with each other (Lei 2018). In addition to the conventional media, the new media has significantly contributed to the ways in which people engage in social mobilization (e.g., Della Porta and Mosca 2005; Wasserman 2007). In the era of the internet, "netizens" communicate and expand their networks through social media. Anyone may partic-

ipate in online discussions and post their messages and visuals online (e.g., YouTube) to expose environmental problems and to advocate for the environment. In China, critical environmental discourse in cyber space has sometimes led to actual mobilization (Lei 2016; Yang 2009; 2016). Online or cyber activism, therefore, has provided Chinese citizens with a new mechanism for public participation (Yang 2009). Online, socially concerned citizens engage in “citizen journalism” (Hung 2013) that offers counter narratives to the official media. In the Anti-PX movement in Xiamen, for example, Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) were used to not only mobilize a large number of citizens to participate in the movement, but also challenge the local government’s policy agendas and pressure the government to be more responsive and transparent (Hung 2013).

Among socially concerned elites, scientists and lawyers have emerged as key allies for environmental activism. Both professions are able to offer their expertise in the areas of science or law when an environmental problem arises. These professionals may work for environmental NGOs (e.g., the Environmental Defense Fund and the Nature Conservancy). In China, for example, the Center of Legal Aid for Pollution Victims (CLAPV), a Beijing-based environmental NGO, has worked with environmental experts (scientists), journalists, and lawyers to assist pollution victims in bringing civil environmental lawsuits (Lei 2018). Some lawyers not only provide their expertise, but also engage in activism (Stern 2017).

In terms of state actors, governmental institutions, such as environmental ministries and local environmental protection bureaus (at the provincial and municipal levels), play important roles in aiding environmental activism. These institutions may reach out to other environmental actors if they need public involvement to effectively enforce national environmental laws and policies or to strengthen their jurisdictional power with public support. As mentioned earlier, the Chinese environmental ministry (originally the SEPA, but renamed the Ministry of Environmental Protection, or MEP), under Pan Yue’s leadership as deputy environmental minister, collaborated with non-state actors.

Local Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs)

are also key actors in environmental activism (Mertha and Lowry 2006; Wu 2013). However, EPBs are sometimes forced to defect from alliances due to the pressure from local governments (e.g., Zhang 2018). Under China’s administrative system, an EPB is simply one of the functional agencies of a local government and it needs to implement national environmental policies at the local level through negotiations with other functional agencies. If other functional agencies are unwilling to support an EPB’s position, an EPB may not be able to fully exercise its administrative powers (Economy 2005; Ma and Ortolano 2000; Zusman and Turner 2005).

In the next section, I will describe the roles that the environmental ministry played in forming alliances with other key actors during the pre-suspension period of Nu River anti-dam activism (2003-2004), helping to produce favorable outcomes in the controversial environmental case.



Environmental Alliances in Nu River Anti-dam Mobilization

Over the course of mobilization (2003-2006), the case of Nu River anti-dam activism showed that key actors collaborated at the various levels, domestically and transnationally. State actors, such as the SEPA and Yunnan EPB, were especially active during the pre-suspension period (from the initiation of the planned dam project in 2003 to its “temporary” suspension of the project in 2004). While the Yunnan EPB defected early in the process, the SEPA not only stood on the front lines of mobilization, but also provided its allies (scientists, the media, and environmental NGOs) with opportunities.

When the Nu River hydropower dam project was proposed in 2003, the elite political alignments in China’s policy-making in the field of hydropower

development were no longer stable enough to maintain a traditional top-down approach. A pair of reasons for the instability include the decentralization of China's hydropower industry (Magee and McDonald 2006: 42) and the SEPA's willingness to enforce a strict EIA on large-scale infrastructure projects, such as dams.

The SEPA's discord with the NDRC (National Development and Reform Commission) became clear even before the enactment of the EIA law on September 1st, 2003. The SEPA was not pleased that the NDRC, which was in charge of EIA for the planned Nu River dam project, had approved the proposed project and passed it on to the State Council for a final decision without adopting the SEPA's request to apply a strict EIA for the project (Xie and Mol 2006). Despite the NDRC's approval—which, in the past, had typically ended further official policy discussions—the SEPA held “The Expert Forum on Protection of the Ecological Environment in the Hydroelectric Development on the Nu River Basin” in Beijing on September the 3rd, 2003, or two days after the enactment of the EIA law. The participants were not limited to various experts and representatives from the NDRC and water electricity-related bureaucracies. Both the media and environmental NGOs, for the first time, attended a government-organized forum on river development. Wang Yongchen of Green Earth Volunteers (GEV) brought a group of journalists to the forum (Science News 2009). The participation of these unusual guests at the forum signified the SEPA's connections with Wang Yongchen and her NGO (Mertha 2008; Xie 2009).

After the expert forum, several newspaper articles opposing the proposed project were published, often echoing the views that the majority of experts had expressed at the forum. The SEPA published the first article, entitled, “The Pristine Environment of the Nu River Should Be Preserved,” in China Environmental News, the SEPA's official newspaper. The article appeared under the headline: “Based on the Law, Carry out Environmental Impact Assessment. Secure National Ecological Safety.” Less than a week later, in the same venue, the SEPA published its second article, entitled, “Experts Call for Preserving the Nu River.” Both articles emphasized the linkage be-

tween Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and science. China Youth Daily, the official newspaper of the Communist Youth League of China, and the People's Daily, a state-run newspaper, also published articles opposing the dam project.

The SEPA continued to mobilize scientists and environmental NGOs by offering them venues to voice their concerns. One intention was to enhance its status as the EIA enforcer. In late October, 2003, the SEPA invited experts from Beijing to attend another expert meeting held in Kunming, Yunnan.³ The Beijing experts engaged in a heated discussion with local dam supporters, including representatives from the Nu River prefectural government and the Yunnan Provincial Government, as well as local experts (China Water Transport Newspaper 2003). Before and after the expert meeting, the SEPA also conducted fieldwork in the Nu River Lisu Autonomous Prefecture (Lisu ethnic minority prefecture) to fend off criticism of not having visited the area and not understanding local needs. The Beijing experts also joined the SEPA in conducting fieldwork. The following year, journalists, researchers, and environmentalists from Beijing and Yunnan followed the SEPA's lead and visited the prefecture.

In Beijing, the SEPA organized China's first “Green Forum” where Wang Yongchen, the founder and leader of the Green Earth Volunteers (GEVs), collected signatures on a petition letter, which called for the enforcement of the EIA law. She later circulated the petition letter via email. By February 2004, the environmental allies successfully created a controversy over the proposed Nu River hydropower dam project. Their mobilization influenced the highest political levels and induced Premier Wen Jiabao to temporarily suspend the project due to a lack of scientific justifications (Science News 2009).



³ This was the fourth expert forum. The first and second expert forums were held in Kunming in June, 2003. The third forum was held in Beijing in September, 2003.

Conclusion

This case shows that the opportunities for mobilization arose when the elite political alignments in regard to China's hydropower development became unstable and when elite allies emerged. The SEPA was willing to enforce a strict and unbiased Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) on the planned Nu River hydropower dam project, despite the NDRC's opposition to the SEPA. The SEPA needed allies outside the policy arena who could help to strengthen the SEPA's jurisdictional position so that it could influence the State Council. The SEPA systematically provided scientists, the media, and environmental NGOs with opportunities to voice their concerns, to collect information, or to act. Combined, these actors placed the proposed project into critical discourse. The SEPA's collaboration with these actors helped the SEPA to justify its position and to demand a stricter EIA of the dam project. Therefore, it is argued, the provision of opportunities was mutual.

In addition to its structural dimensions, the case also highlights the importance of agency because it describes the impacts of charismatic leaders (e.g., Pan Yue and Wang Yongchen). As is the case for past environmental activism in China, charismatic environmental leaders helped state and non-state actors to connect to each other.

More scholarly works on uncovering the existence of various cases of alliance-making in mobilization (e.g., Zhang 2018) would help us to understand the ways through which opportunities may shape the emergence, strategic repertoires, trajectories and outcomes of mobilization in authoritarian contexts.

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The State as the Mobilizer and De-mobilizer in China's Nationalist Protests

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During 1999-2012, China witnessed several waves of large scale popular nationalist protests, targeting primarily at the perceived anti-China forces in the US and Japan. The first nationalist protest was against the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999. It was followed by an anti-American protest after the mid-air collision between a Chinese fighter jet and the US Surveillance airplane in 2001. Then the Anti-Japanese protest took place in 2005 and was followed by the anti-Western protests prior to the Beijing Olympic Game in 2008. Chinese people took to the street again to protest the purchase of the disputed Tiaoyu/Sankaku islands by the Japanese government in 2012. The communist state was normally quick to stop even very small protests, but tolerated and even encouraged these nationalist protests until protestors not only became violent but also turned to blame the Chinese government for its seemingly soft stances toward the US and Japan. This article conducts case studies of the two anti-American protests in 1999 and 2001, the anti-West protests

prior to the Beijing Olympic in 2008, and the two anti-Japanese protests in 2005 and 2012. It reveals how the communist state, facing a nationalist dilemma, took a two pronged strategy to mobilize popular expression of nationalism in response to the rising popular nationalist sentiments against the perceived anti-China forces after the end of the Cold War while acting in a calculated manner to rein and eventually de-mobilize the protests to make sure that they would not go out of control and create chaos to threaten the political and social stability and that Chinese foreign policy was not dictated by the emotional voices of popular nationalism on the streets.

This double role of mobilizer and de-mobilizer was a result of peculiar political developments during the 1990s and the 2000s. The Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao administrations made use of the popular nationalist sentiments to compensate the decline of communist ideology for political legitimacy but were not willing to confront the US and Japan at the expenses of Chi-

na's modernization programs. Coming to office in 2012, President Xi Jinping has launched the largest campaign in post-Mao China to champion an official ideology with the mixture of communism, nationalism, and Leninism to strengthen his China dream of great national rejuvenation. Confident in China's increasing power and capacities, President Xi, however, become increasingly concerned about domestic and external security and, therefore, has simply banned all popular protests, including nationalist protests. The state has stopped to play the role of neither mobilizer or de-mobilizer of nationalist protests.



The Communist State versus Nationalist Dilemma

The rise of Chinese nationalism in post-Mao years was driven mostly by two forces from opposite directions: the state from top-down and the populist societal forces from bottom-up. The top-down driven nationalism is known as state nationalism, which was more pragmatic than emotional popular nationalism driven from bottom-up. The communist state played the role of mobilizer and de-mobilizer in the nationalist protests because it faced a nationalist dilemma. State nationalism was instrumental for regime legitimacy and certain foreign objectives but popular nationalism could threaten political stability and damaging to China foreign relations without constraints. Because of the nationalist dilemma, “the Chinese leadership was constrained to deploy nationalism as a means of legitimizing the regime or to mobilize the population in support of their policies.”¹

The state became a primary driver to the reemergence of nationalism in post-Mao because nationalism was instrumental to compensate to the widespread demise

of communist ideology after Deng Xiaoping began to “reassess” (criticize) Maoism to pave the way for market-oriented economic reform in the 1980s. The near-total collapse of public faith in communism led to the “three confidence crises” (三信危機): i.e., the crises of confidence in socialism (信心危機), Marxism (信仰危機), and the party (信任危機). The demise of communist ideology, therefore, threatened an eroding basis of state legitimacy and gave opportunity for the advancement of alternative visions when some intellectuals turned to Western liberal ideas and called for Western-style democracy. Starting from the Democracy Wall Movement in 1979, the authoritarian rule of the CCP was challenged in several waves of popular protests and demonstrations, including the large-scale anti-government demonstrations on Tiananmen Square in the spring of 1989. Although the demonstrations were suppressed, how to restore legitimacy of the communist regime and build a broadly based national support became the most serious challenge to the post-Tiananmen leadership. Coming to the realization that the political indoctrination of the younger generation had become an urgent need as the “Tiananmen Incident” showed the fatal consequence of losing “spiritual pillars” (jingshen Zhizhu), the party leadership rediscovered the instrumentality of nationalism.

The communist state exploited nationalism because of its utility as the most reliable claim to the Chinese people's loyalty and the only important value shared by both the regime and its critics to compensate for the declining communist ideology. Even pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square equated promoting democracy with patriotism. Indeed, a historical sense of injustice at the hands of foreign powers is deeply rooted in the national psyche and the dream of a strong China (強國夢) is shared among all Chinese people. As a result of a volatile mix of rising pride and lingering insecurity in response to profound transformations in the post-Cold War era, Chinese nationalism represents an aggregation of various political forces to override China's weakness and find its rightful place in the world. A shared objective of holding the nation together during the turbulent transition reinvigorated the loyalty of the Chinese people to the state. Reinforcing Chinese national confidence and turning past humiliation and current weakness into a driving force for China's moderniza-

1 Ian Seckington, “Nationalism, Ideology and China's ‘Fourth Generation’ Leadership,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, 14(42), (2005), p. 28.

tion, nationalism became an effective instrument to enhance the legitimacy of the communist state.

The top-down driven nationalism is known as state nationalism, which identifies the Chinese nation closely with the Communist state. Nationalist sentiment is officially expressed as loving the state (愛國) or patriotism (愛國主義), which is love and support of China indistinguishable from the state.² The state claims it represents the whole nation and advances the nation's interests rather than just the interests of the state and, therefore, speaks in the name of the nation and demands citizens to subordinate their individual interests to those of the state. The state, as the center of nationalist aspirations and the embodiment of the nation's will, seeks the loyalty and support of the people that are granted the nation itself. "This conceptual manipulation is coupled with political control of nationalist sentiments and expressions, thus making Chinese nationalism subordinate to party-state interests."³



For this purpose, the communist state launched an extensive patriotic education campaign in the 1990s to ensure loyalty in a population that was otherwise subject to many domestic discontents. The core of the patriotic education campaign was education in national conditions (國情教育), which unambiguously held that China's national conditions was unique and not ready for adopting Western-style democracy. Instead, the current one-party rule should continue because it would help maintain political stability, a pre-condition for rapid economic development. The campaign, therefore, redefined the legitimacy of the

communist regime on the basis of providing political stability and economic prosperity in a protracted process of building power sufficient to protect China's national interests. When communist leaders called upon the Chinese people to work hard to build a prosperous and strong China and said that China was bullied and humiliated by foreign powers, they indicated that China's economic under-development should share some of the blame.⁴

The nationalist card was particularly effective when China was faced with pressures from foreign forces. As a Chinese official said, if Chinese people felt threatened by external forces, the solidarity among them would be strengthened and nationalism would be a useful tool for the regime to justify its leadership role.⁵ It was revealing to see that although corruption and some other social and economic problems undermined the legitimacy of the Communist regime, many Chinese people sided with the communist government under sanctions by Western countries, which were said to be hostile to China rather than the Communist Party. No matter how corrupt the government was, foreigners had no right to make unwarranted remarks about China. Many Chinese people were upset by US pressure on issues of human rights, intellectual property rights, trade deficits, weapons proliferation, and Taiwan because they believed that the US used these issues to demonize China in an effort to prevent it from rising as a great power. Positioning itself as the defender of China's national pride and interests in the fighting against Western sanctions after the Tiananmen Square crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations and for China's entry into the WTO, stopping Taiwan independence, and hosting the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, the communist state certainly bolstered its nationalist credentials.

State nationalism, for quite a while, however, was more reactive than proactive in response to perceived foreign pressure that was said to erode, corrode, or endanger the national interest of China. Setting peace and development as China's major foreign policy objectives, the state emphasized political stability at home as the necessary condition for the at-

2 Michael Hunt, "Chinese National Identity and the Strong State: The Late Qing-Republican Crisis," in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, *China's Quest for National Identity*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 63.

3 Jonathan Walton, "An Interview with Yingjie guo: Chinese Nationalism and its Future Prospect, Policy Q & A, The National Bureau of Asian Research, June 27, 2012, <http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=258>

4 Suisheng Zhao, "A State-led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China," *Communist and Post-communist Studies*, 31(3), (1998).

5 Liu Ji, "Making the Right Choices in Twenty-first Century Sino-American Relations," *Journal of Contemporary China*, 7(17), (1998), p. 92.

tainment of economic prosperity, the pathway for the communist party to stay in power and the foundation for China's rising nationalist aspirations. Making use of nationalism to rally support, Chinese leaders had to make sure that popular expression of nationalist sentiments would not jeopardize the overarching objectives of political stability and economic modernization upon which their legitimacy was ultimately based. Seeking to defend China's national interests by making efforts to develop cooperative relations with the United States and other Western powers that held the key for China's modernization, state nationalism was flexible in tactics, subtle in strategy, and avoided appearing confrontational, although it remained uncompromising on issues that involved China's vital interests or triggered historical sensitivities. State-led and largely reactive, state nationalism does not have a fixed, objectified, and eternally defined content, nor is it driven by any ideology, religious beliefs, or other abstract ideas. It was an instrument of the communist state to bolster the faith of the Chinese people in a political system in trouble and hold the country together during the period of rapid and turbulent transformation.

Chinese nationalism, however, was not the sole province of the state propaganda. Populist sentiments at the societal level were also part of the nationalist orchestra. Bottom-up driven nationalism, known as popular nationalism, defines the Chinese nation as composed of citizens who have the duty of supporting their own state in defending national rights in the world of nation-states while also pursuing individual rights of participation in the government, popular nationalists have a split personality. Identifying with the Chinese state against foreign powers, they push for political participation against the authoritarian state. Sharing with the government the dream of making China a strong and powerful country that could stand up against the bullies of the Western powers, popular nationalism is particularly suspicious about a Western conspiracy and hidden agenda to slow down or even stop China's rise and, therefore, more vocal and emotional than the state in criticism of Western evil intentions. Although many in the US claim that the main point of friction with China is due to China's authoritarianism and therefore press China on issues of human rights and democracy, Chinese nationalists have wondered whether or not the conflict

will remain and perhaps grow starker even if China becomes democratic because they don't believe that the US wants to see China, even a democratic China, become richer and stronger than America. "After a century slowly fomenting among Chinese intellectuals, national sentiment has captured and redefined the consciousness of the Chinese people during the last two decades of China's economic boom. This mass national consciousness launched the Chinese colossus into global competition to achieve an international status commensurate with the country's vast capacities and the Chinese people's conception of their country's rightful place in the world."⁶



Popular nationalism began to emerge in the 1990s, expressing powerfully in the instant best sellers of a series of "say no" books, such as *The China That Can Say No*, *The China that Still Can Say No*, and *How China Can Say No*. With a quick and automatic conviction that the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 was deliberate, popular nationalists were the leading force in the anti-American demonstrations. Because most popular nationalists are young, they are also known as "feng qing" (angry youths). Connected mostly by new information technology, particularly the internet, the youth popular nationalist movement gained momentum in the 2000s. They led the dramatic signature campaign that gathered more than 20 million people on the internet in 2005 to oppose Japan's bid to join the United Nations Security Council, the massive anti-Japanese demonstrations in major Chinese cities, protesting Japan's approval of history textbooks which they said whitewashed Japanese wartime atrocities, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's contentious visits to the war-tainted Yasukuni Shrine, and Japan's pledge to help the US defend Taiwan in the event of

6 Liah Greenfeld, "Roots of Japan-China rivalry," *Japan Times*, September 27, 2012, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/print/ee20120927a1.html>

an attack by Beijing. Showing their strong sense of wounded national pride, popular nationalists gathered in many Chinese cities and all over the world in an act of solidarity against what they believed to be an “anti-China” bias of the Western media during the Olympic torch relay and to show their support to the Chinese government for hosting the Olympic Games in 2008. It was the massive worldwide protests in 2008 that gave rise to the world’s concern for Chinese youths’ nationalistic sentiment.⁷

Popular nationalism was powered by a narrative of China’s century of shame and humiliation in the hands of imperialist powers and the conviction that “China has been treated unjustly and its territory and related sovereign rights have been exploited by other powers.” The nationalistic discourse thus not only led to a sense of “victimization” but also “involves a unique and strong sense of morality and righteousness in foreign affairs.” As a result, Chinese people saw any problems China faces with Western powers and neighbors over sensitive issues of sovereignty and security as caused by them and certainly not by China and had little patience with the complaints and calls for China to compromise on these issues.⁸ Holding high expectations for the government to fulfill its promise of safeguarding China’s national interests, the boiling popular nationalist rhetoric was suffused with a sense of China-as-victim and a yearning for redress while calling for the opening of the foreign policy-making, an arena that was long a monopolized domain of the state. Seeking status, acceptance, and respect on the world stage, popular nationalists routinely charged the communist state as neither confident enough nor competent enough in safeguarding China’s vital national interests and too chummy with Japan and soft in dealing with the United States.

The emotional nature of popular nationalism posed a daunting challenge to the state that tried not only to maintain its monopoly over foreign policy making but also follow 韬光养晦 policy-- hiding its capabilities, focusing on national strength-building, and biding its time--set by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1990s.⁹ Although popular nationalists called on the government to take a hard line against what they perceived

provocations from the United States and Japan, Chinese leaders, from the position of relative vulnerability, knew that China’s circumscribed national strength did not allow it to exert enough clout to confront Western powers and that its economic success depended heavily upon opening to the outside world and, particularly, upon the cooperative relations with advanced Western countries.

In this case, it is not difficult for Chinese leaders to realize that nationalism is a double-edged sword: both a means to legitimate the CCP rule and a means for the Chinese people to judge the performance of the state. “All this makes nationalism a particularly interesting force in China, given its potential not just for conferring legitimacy on the government but also for taking it away.”¹⁰ Without constraints, nationalism could become a dangerous Pandora’s Box and release tremendous forces with unexpected consequences. If Chinese leaders could not deliver on their nationalist promise, they would become vulnerable to nationalistic criticism. It is very possible that if the Chinese people should repudiate the communist government, it could be for nationalist reasons after a conspicuous failure in the government’s foreign policy or program of economic development.



The State and the Anti-American Protests in 1999 and 2001

To balance the positive and the negative aspects, Chinese leaders adopted a two-pronged strategy to deal with popular expression of nationalism. On the one hand, they tolerated and even encouraged the expression of popular sentiments in defending China’s

7 Lijun Yang and Yongnian Zheng, “Fen Qings (Angry Youth) in Contemporary China,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, 21(76), (2012), p. 638.

8 Robert Sutter, “China’s Self-Absorbed Nationalism,” *The Diplomat*, August 31, 2012, <http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/31/chinas-self-absorbed-nationalism/>

9 Deng Qirong, *Gaige kaifang yilai de zhongguo waijiao* (Chinese Diplomacy since the Reform and Opening Up), (Beijing, China: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2009), p. 18.

10 Nicolas D. Kristof, “Guess Who’s a Chinese Nationalist Now?” *New York Times*, April, 22, 2001.

vital national interest, such as the preservation of national sovereignty and the reunification of China. On the other hand, the Chinese government has tried to “channel” popular nationalist expression and took repeated action to restrain or even ban anti-foreign demonstrations. The two pronged strategy required the communist state to play the role of mobilizer as well as de-mobilizer of nationalist protests. The state learned in hard way how to play the dual role during the first large scale nationalist protest in 1999 and was determined to maintain control of the popular expression of nationalism after the mid-air collision in 2001.

On May 7, 1999, during the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, five US guided bombs hit the Chinese embassy in the Belgrade, killing three Chinese journalists. NATO said at first that they didn't target the Chinese embassy building but another building next to the Chinese Embassy. Later, NATO changed its explanation and said that the Chinese Embassy was in fact targeted mistakenly as a Yugoslavian arms agency due to an outdated map. Both the Chinese government officials and average Chinese people simply could not take any “accident” explanations because they found it impossible to comprehend how the high-tech NATO forces led by the United States could have bombed the Chinese embassy by mistake. After the incident, the Chinese official media carried blanket coverage of the bombing and highly emotive stories on the Chinese victims in virulent anti-US language, giving rise to a highly emotional nationalism burst out. As soon as the bombing was reported, university students, spontaneously as well as organized by the university authorities, poured into the front of the US embassy in Beijing and consulates in other cities, throwing eggs and stones to express their anger at US-led NATO actions. Sympathetic to the students, the police units guarding the embassy did not make any move to stop the demonstrations.

Encouraged by the Chinese government, the protests quickly spiraled out of control, not only threatening damage to China's crucially important relationship with the US but also provoking domestic criticism that the leadership was unwilling to confront the United States. The Chinese leadership apparently did not anticipate the vehemence of the student protests. The physical damage to the US embassy and

consulates spoke of the dangers of playing with nationalist fire. Encouraging or even simply tolerating popular expression of virulent nationalism could be dangerous in China because, whether or not brain-washed by the Communist state, the Chinese people had a strong sense of being victimized by Western powers. Such an emotion could boil over easily. If the explosion of nationalist sentiment among the public went out of control, Chinese leaders could be forced to take a confrontational position against the US, the unwieldy superpower holding the key to China's future of economic modernization at the time. The price would be China's reform and economic growth. This situation was obviously not in China's interest when the leadership sought to maintain stability at home and retain a cooperative relationship with the US as the foreign policy priority.

As a result, Chinese leaders had to assume the difficult task of cooling down nationalist fury by calling for a reasoned response. Two days after the bombing incident, China's then Vice-President Hu Jintao made a televised speech in which, while extending government support to students patriotism, he appealed for calm and warned against extreme and destabilizing behavior. Frenzied demonstrations quickly ran out of steam. A tight police cordon was put up around the embassy where US Ambassador James Sasser and his staff had been under virtual siege for almost four days. Only small groups of protestors allowed enter under escort, “the police made them leave their stones behind and wouldn't allow them to throw them, and they were only allowed to stop at the gates of the embassy for one or two minutes.”¹¹



¹¹ “PRC Moves to Cool Nationalist Fury on Bombing,” AFP, May 11, 1999.

When an increased police presence outside the U.S. Embassy showed that the Chinese government was determined to prevent protest from agitating the US, the Chinese media stopped showing pictures of demonstrations on the streets and instead featured organized protests in schools and workplaces. In the meantime, the People's Daily reported that various Western countries had issued advisories against traveling to China, hurting tourism and foreign investment. In this case, although the government continued to demand that the US engage a thorough investigation, promptly publish the results and punish those responsible, official Xinhua Agency promptly listed apologies by US President Bill Clinton and other NATO leaders, and state television carried Clinton's public apology. The state media also mentioned a trip made by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to the Chinese embassy in Washington to apologize. Finally, meeting with the visiting Russian envoy on the Kosovo crisis, Viktor Chernomyrdin, on May 11, President Jiang Zemin stated that life in China should now return to normal and it was time to turn a new page in the name of economic necessity.¹² Premier Zhu Rongji, who was criticized for making excessive concessions to the US over Chinese accession to the WTO in his trip to Washington about one week earlier, also came out to echo Jiang's statement that China would adhere to its reform and opening-up policy and "continue to develop its friendly and cooperative ties with all nations around the world."¹³



It was against this background that less than one month after the bombing, Beijing restrained from vetoing the G8 proposal, which had to gain approval from the UN Security Council, to end the Kosovo

crisis when Yugoslav leaders announced their decision to accept its conditions.¹⁴ This was striking to some observers because, after the bombing, Beijing threatened all kinds of restrictions on UN Security Council activity but now did nothing. To express goodwill to US leaders, President Jiang sent his congratulations to the US women's soccer team after its July 10 victory over the Chinese team in the Women's World Cup final. This congratulation was reported prominently in the Chinese media and was said to be a signal that Beijing was ready to move past the incident.¹⁵ Beijing's pragmatic policy paid off. Six months after the incident, China and the US reached a historical agreement on the terms of China's accession to the WTO.

The crisis caused by the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy by the US was a wake-up call for the danger of falling victim to uncontrolled popular expression of nationalism. When the mid-air collision between a US Navy EP-3 plane and a Chinese jetfighter in the South China Sea took place on April 1, 2001, Chinese leaders were determined to avoid a repeat of the anti-American demonstrations one year earlier while orchestrating an official show of strong protest. While the collision took place in international airspace about 50 miles outside China's territorial waters, China claimed an exclusive economic zone that extends 230 miles out to sea, and asserted that the plane had no right to conduct surveillance there. China held the 24 US crewmembers at PLA military facilities on Hainan Island for 11 days and accused the pilot of breaking the law by making an emergency landing at a Chinese air base without permission. Beijing sought an apology from Washington but the White House declined to apologize, saying the collision was an accident.

The surveillance plane incident reinforced many Chinese people's suspicion of the United States as a careless bully that threw around its weight without considering the views or feelings of people from other nations. Many Chinese people became angry over American spying, saddened by the death of a pilot, and frustrated by President Bush's unwillingness to apologize. At the root of their complaints was a sense of wounded national pride. China had suffered at

12 Xinhua, May 11, 1999.

13 Xinhua, May 11, 1999.

14 Liu Weijun, Yin De An, "China did not threaten to veto the G-8 proposal," China News Digest, June 3, 1999.

15 In a conversation with prominent Chinese scholar in late July 1999, he called for my attention to this subtle message sent by the pragmatic Chinese leadership.

the hands of foreigners before and was not prepared to suffer again. Many university students threatened that there would be larger demonstrations if the government released the crewmembers before the United States made an apology.¹⁶

In response to rising nationalist sentiments, while all Chinese leaders had to talk tough in their standoff with Washington, they followed a two-pronged policy, as they did not want to see a repeat of the anti-American demonstrations one year earlier. It was reported that President Jiang Zemin very quickly laid down several tough principles on how to handle the standoff at a Politburo emergency meeting moments after the collision, including demanding a formal apology, stopping military spying and provocative activities along China's coast from the US side. In the meantime, the meeting also emphasized that "the leadership must protect itself from criticism by ordinary Chinese by not appearing weak before the 'hawkish' new Bush administration. Yet, at the same time, there should be no repeat of the anti-U.S. demonstrations after the 1999 NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade."¹⁷

Subsequent events proved that this emphasis was crucial in guiding the actions of Beijing's leaders during the crisis. On the one hand, Beijing's public stand was particularly uncompromising on the demand that the spy plane crew would only be released after a formal apology by the US government to the Chinese people and that the US promise to stop its provocative activities along China's coast. Commentaries in major media attacked U.S. "neo-hegemonism" and extolled the patriotism of the Chinese people. On the other hand, Chinese leadership ensured that the government rather than the public set the tone in determining how to deal with the United States. Refraining from high-profile actions that might provoke a military confrontation with the U.S., the leadership moved to censor vocal anti-American sentiment that had been pouring in on the Internet and, to some extent, in the state-run media. In Beijing and other major cities, while people's anti-American emotions ran high, the government allowed no demonstrations

outside U.S. missions and no intimidation of foreign communities. To show his confidence in resolving this incident, President Jiang Zemin did not cancel an earlier scheduled foreign trip and left for a state visit to Latin America on April 4, four days after the collision. Vice President Hu Jintao was put in charge of an emergency team to handle the crisis.

Following this two-pronged policy, Chinese leaders were eager to find a face-saving solution to get out of the crisis. For this purpose, they took a flexible position under the veneer of toughness and eventually hammered out a so-called "diplomacy of apology." Frustrated by Bush's lack of flexibility in his initial responses, Chinese officials sent signals to the US side for an alternative expression to circumvent a full-fledged apology. In an interview with CNN, Chinese ambassador to the US Yang Jiechi hinted that the U.S. should at least say "sorry" after doing harm to China. When US Secretary of State Colin Powell expressed "regrets" over the loss of the Chinese pilot for the first time on April 4, the Chinese Foreign Ministry promptly responded by saying this was a "step in the right direction." The next, at a press conference in Chile, President Jiang provided a further hint by saying that it was normal for two people who had bumped into each other to say "excuse me." Switching to a pragmatic position, President Bush expressed his regrets on the same day and Powell on April 9 used the word "sorry" for the missing Chinese pilot and aircraft. Beijing squeezed again for something stronger than "sorry" in the next two days. When Washington said "very sorry" and indicated that it could not go any further, certainly not to the level of a full apology, Beijing accepted the "very sorry" as a close equivalent to an apology and released the crew on April 11.

Chinese leaders trumpeted the success largely for a domestic audience as they did not want to let nationalism get out of hand and hurt both the communist state and the Sino-US relationship. They declared that "China had won a victory at the stage (jieduan xing chengguo)" in a People's Daily Editorial on the day when Beijing released the US crew. The editorial

16 Graig, S. Smith, "Students' Unease over Weakness Could Threaten Beijing's leaders," New York Times, April 6, 2001.

17 There were different reports about this Politburo meeting. Most Chinese reports said the meeting set five principles but a CNN report said three principles. For the Chinese reports, see, for example, Wen Ren: "Hu Jintao Shicha Jiefangjun Sizongbu he guofangbu tingqu yijian" (Hu Jintao Visits Four General Headquarters of PLA and Defense Ministry to Solicit Opinions), Taiyangbao (The Sun Daily), April 6, 2001. "Beijing Shiyao Meiguo Daoqian (Beijing is determined to ask the US for an Apology), Duowei Xinwen She, April 6. For the CNN report, see Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Analysis: Behind the scenes in Beijing's corridors of power," cnn.com, May 9, 2001.

told the Chinese people that “Our persistent struggle forced the US government to change its tough and unreasonable attitudes at the beginning of the incident and finally apologized to the Chinese people.”¹⁸ It was a testimony to pragmatic leaders’ tactical flexibility that the Chinese official media was instructed to translate Powell’s expression of “very sorry” as “抱歉,” which is one word different from but has almost identical meaning as “道歉,” the Chinese expression of “apology” that Beijing demanded initially. Although the US did not make a full apology to China, Chinese leaders interpreted the expression of being “very sorry” as a full apology and the American expressions of “regrets” and “sorry” that meant in most instances only for the loss of the pilot and aircraft as meant for the whole incident.¹⁹ As a Western journalist suggested, “China stressed that it had forced the United States to admit its faults, as it was implicit in the usage of the character ‘qian’, which is both in daoqian, the apology demanded by Chinese leaders, and in baoqian, or deep excuses, the word used in the American statement to the Chinese.” This was a face-saving solution not only for China but also for the US. As the journalist indicated, President Bush “underscored that it did not give China the precise apology Beijing had demanded, had brought its people home, and thus was no longer subject to either possible Chinese blackmail or internal pressures over its difficulties in handling a difficult situation.”²⁰ As a face-saving solution, while Chinese leaders did not alter their tough rhetoric for domestic reasons, they did almost everything they could from their perspective to avoid confrontation and maintain the framework of long-term cooperation with the United States.

The State and the Anti-West Protests prior to the Beijing Olympics in 2008

Although learning in the hard way, the Chinese state had to play almost the identical role in the nationalist protest before the Summer Olympics of 2008 as it did earlier. The Chinese government as well as Chinese people expected the game as the symbol of their national reemergence from a dark cocoon of decline and isolation into the light of international recognition, marking the country’s debut as a global power,

with a booming economy and rapidly modernizing society. Elevating the Olympics to an official source of national pride and making extreme demands on its citizens and on the world, China spent billions of dollars to stage a grand Olympics since winning the bid. Athletes would compete in world-class stadiums. New highways and train lines crisscrossed Beijing. China built the world’s largest airport terminal to welcome foreign visitors. Thousands of newly planted trees and dozens of colorful “One World, One Dream” billboards line the main roads of a spruced-up capital.

Investing so much in the successful execution of the Games, the Chinese government and Chinese people looked forward to the Olympics as a demonstration of their newfound modernity and as a chance to reinforce their engagement with the wider world. In this case, when the Western media portrayed China in their Olympic reports as a showcase for violent repression, censorship and political persecution by a regime that failed to rise above the level of police state, the Chinese people became frustrated as much as the government at what they believed the apparent failure of foreigners to understand them, and of a fear of being robbed of the hoped-for harmonious tone of the Games. Portraying the Western attempt to spoil the Beijing Olympics with political and human rights issues, the Chinese media made the full coverage of the nine Nobel Peace Prize laureates signing a letter to President Hu, urging China to uphold Olympic ideals by pressing Sudan to stop atrocities in Darfur, and the announcement of Hollywood director Steven Spielberg to quit as an artistic consultant to the Games because of Beijing’s Sudan policy as well as the international protests during the Olympic torch relay in Paris, London, San Francisco and other major cities worldwide against China’s crackdown on Tibetan unrest in Lhasa.

In response, an anti-foreign nationalist heat was generated first in cyberspace and then quickly spilled over into many Chinese city streets during March-April 2008. Huge crowds gathered outside some of the more than 100 stores of the French supermarket chain, Carrefour, to protest the rough treatments of a handicapped young Chinese female athlete who

18 Editorial, “Ba Aiguo Reqing huawei qianguo liliang” (Transform the warm emotion of patriotism into the power of strengthening the nation), Renmin Ribao, April 11, p. 1.

19 Peter Hay Gries and Kaiping Feng, “Culture Clash? Apologies East and West,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, 11 (30), 2002, pp. 173-178.

20 Francesco Sisci, “Reading the tea leaves,” *Asia Times Online*, April, 18, 2001.

grimly clung to the Olympic torch on her wheelchair as a pro-Tibetan protester tried to snatch it from her in Paris. The French company was singled out as a target because the Chinese government media televised the scene and an internet rumor accused it of supporting the Dalai Lama and seeking to undermine Chinese rule in Tibet. Overseas Chinese students also demonstrated in many European and US cities against what they believed as the “anti-China” bias of the Western media. CNN was singled out in these protests because of its “unfair” coverage of the unrest in Tibet and particularly CNN anchor Jack Cafferty’s criticism of China as full of “goons and thugs.”



As the Olympic torch relay’s “Journey of Harmony” became a tortuous road of angst pointing to a chasm between China and the Western world, many Chinese people took a defensive position toward the Western criticism of the Chinese government for suppressing Tibetan protests, limiting press freedom, harassing and jailing dissidents and insufficient efforts to curb air pollution. The outpouring of patriotic emotions was a propaganda bonanza that helped reinforce the Communist Party’s nationalist credentials. But the increasing the violence of nationalist protests also posed a daunting challenge to the state that tried to maintain its monopoly of power and political stability for economic development.

When the chauvinistic outpourings on the internet became visible to the whole world and the emotional and often violent crowd gathered outside of Carrefour stores, China’s leaders confronted a familiar dilemma. While the government enjoyed the moment of unstinting support from the nationalists, it was concerned about the impact of such protests on for-

ign attendance at the Olympics and the long-term consequences on China’s economic relations. The government hoped to show the world how China had changed in the three decades since Deng Xiaoping launched economic reforms. But it would be difficult to present a friendly, progressive face to the world if Chinese people were indulging in anti-foreign antics. Fearing of losing control over the outpouring of patriotic emotion, Chinese leaders moved to dampen the anti-French zealotry when the call for boycott of Carrefour began circulating widely on the web. Signaling that the outburst by Chinese bloggers outraged over anti-Chinese protests that dogged the path of the Olympic torch must be wound down, the official media walked a fine line in praising the patriotism of the Chinese people but cautioning them not to place obstacles in the way of China’s opening up. The Chinese people were called to express their patriotic enthusiasm calmly and rationally and in an orderly and legal manner. The front pages of state-run newspapers carried stories urging Chinese people to heartily embrace foreign friends who will be arriving in Beijing for the Olympics and saying the best way for citizens to defend their country’s honor is to build the economy and warning that, in today’s world of globalization, boycotts usually backfire.

In response specifically to the anti-French sentiment, an official from the Ministry of Commerce went on the state television reminding people that fully 99 percent of Carrefour’s 40,000 employees in China were Chinese and 95 percent of the products it sold were made in China. The official Xinhua News Agency released a timely exclusive interview with the embattled French supermarket group Carrefour Chairman Jose Luis Duran who denied reports that his company supported Tibetan separatists. The Carrefour Chairman also said that “calls for boycott of Beijing Olympics were acts with ulterior motives, and Carrefour would make its utmost efforts to support the Olympics.” In this context, the Chinese government commended the way Carrefour runs its Chinese business and thanking it for supporting the Beijing Olympics.²¹ In the meantime, posts calling for consumer action against Carrefour and videos of protests were blocked on the internet, where nationalist sentiment were once free flowing and nearly millions of Chinese and their brethren abroad were connect to take collective actions. For a while, typing Carrefour into

21 No author, “Carrefour chairman: Carrefour supports Beijing Olympics,” Xinhua, April 22, 2008..

Chinese-language search engines returned blank pages explaining that such results “do not conform to relevant law and policy.”



The Anti-Japanese Protests in 2005 and 2012

While the state played the role of mobilizer and de-mobilizer successfully during the anti-American protests, it found itself in an awkward position to play the similar role during the anti-Japanese protests in 2005 and 2012.

For historical and geopolitical reasons, Japan has always occupied a central place in China's nationalist sentiments. Historically, Japan was China's most cruel and destructive enemy for a half century (1895-1945). China's humiliating defeat in the War of 1894-95 by Japan, a tiny country that the Chinese dismissively called *dwafts* (倭人) or little Japan (小日本), was fundamental to the rise of the first generation of Chinese nationalists that lay behind the 1911 revolution. Japanese expansion in China after the Versailles Peace Treaty triggered the May Fourth Movement of 1919. This anti-Japanese sentiment was reinforced by Japanese invasion of China in the 1930s-40s. The Chinese people today are still resentful about Japan for both its whitewashing of the aggression history and its lack of sincere efforts of restitution. Geopolitically, China and Japan belonged to two hostile camps in the Cold War divide. China regarded Japan as a security threat because of geographic proximity and its position in the US-led anti-China containment strategy in East Asia. Beijing's leaders were extremely alert for any signs of Japan's remilitarization. After the end of the Cold War, maritime territorial disputes in the East China Sea have

been recurring and become the focal point of geopolitical rivalry in the early 21st century.

Although the two governments essentially agreed to put off the issue of territorial claims during their negotiations of diplomatic recognition in 1972 and signed the Sino-Japan peace treaty in 1978, this formally friendly relationship was largely superficial. The superficial friendship continued in the 1980s when Deng Xiaoping devised a good neighboring policy (睦鄰政策) to create a favorable peripheral environment for China's economic modernization. After the end of the Cold War, the relationship with Japan remained beneficial to Chinese economic growth in the 1990s. As a result, Beijing was very calculated in response to the incident in July 1996 when ethnic Chinese people in Taiwan and Hong Kong protested angrily against the right-wing Japanese group going to the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands to renovate the lighthouse they constructed earlier. The year of 1996 was the 65th anniversary of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, known as the September 18 Incident, an anniversary very sensitive in Sino-Japanese relations. Leaders in Beijing feared that the Islands dispute would fan popular anti-Japanese sentiment that in turn would force the government to take proactive action to jeopardize the Sino-Japanese economic relations and the overall economic development strategy that relied heavily on foreign trade and foreign investment when China was still badly in need of Japanese economic assistance, technology, and investments.²² As a result, the incident was not reported at all in the Chinese media until tensions subsided overseas.

But the state-sponsored patriotic education campaign to reclaim the nationalist legitimacy after the collapse of communist ideology in the 1990s changed the dynamic. During the campaign, state-run museums were full of Japanese atrocities. The vast number of museums, such as the “Memorial Hall of the Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders” and the museum memorializing the victims of Japan's infamous Unit 731 that conducted germ warfare and chemical experiments on live humans, forcefully reminded the Chinese public about the country's “Century of Humiliation” in the hands of Japan and other imperialist powers. In addition, anti-Japanese

22 Suisheng Zhao, *In Search of a Right Place: Chinese Nationalism in the Post-Cold War World*, Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 1997, 17-18.

content is prevalent in Chinese media, which portrayed a stereotype of the Japanese “devils” as cruel and stupid warriors. Japanese soldiers run amok on Chinese screens. The violence and anti-Japanese tone in many Chinese television dramas sent a clear message that killing “Japanese devils” was easy and glorious. The anti-Japan virulence was also in full display online. Websites popular among young Chinese nationalists were riddled with slogans such as “Destroy Japanese dogs” or “Annihilate the Japanese people.”

The decade-long patriotic education campaign created a fertile soul for anti-Japanese nationalism. With the rise of China as a great power in the 21st century, the Chinese people began to push the Chinese government to take a hardline position in territorial disputes with Japan. The state began to tolerate and even encourage its popular expression. The turning point came when the Chinese government did nothing to stop seven Chinese activists setting sail from a Chinese port to land on one of the disputed islands in March 2004. After they were taken into custody by Japanese police and coast guards, the Chinese foreign ministry made official protests. When they finally returned to Shanghai from Okinawa, they were hailed as national heroes. Then, more than 20 million Chinese signatures gathered on the Internet in early 2005 to oppose Japan’s bid to join the United Nations Security Council. It was followed by thousands of Chinese protesters marched through major Chinese cities, shouting slogans and throwing rocks, bottles and eggs at the Japanese consulates, protesting Japan’s approval of history textbooks, which they say whitewashed Japanese wartime atrocities, and Japan’s pledge to help the U.S. defend Taiwan in the event of an attack by Beijing.

While the protests became violent, the popular nationalists turned the passions against the government and criticized it too chummy with Japan that allegedly failed to provide more compensation for wartime injuries, laid claim to Tiaoyutai islands, and waged economic imperialism by flooding China with Japanese products. Calling the government to take a hard line against what they perceived provocations from Japan, the popular nationalist discourse that gained momentum in the mid-1990s contained a strong ele-

ment of criticism over the government policy toward Japan. The authors of a nationalistic best seller, *The China That Can Say No*, criticized the Chinese leaders for giving up the war reparation for Sino-Japanese normalization of relations in the 1970s. They argued that this was proved a mistake because “Japan has always turned its back on China. In recent years, some senior officials in Japan have always tried to distort historical facts in its history books. They have interpreted invasion as ‘entering’ and ‘helping’ China. Did they enter China by commercial airlines? They have repeated nonsense, exported third grade products to China... and strengthened the US-Japan security system, which is aimed at China. Japan has not made any effort to narrow the historical gap with Asian countries.”²³



The CCP rose to power to a large extent because of the nationalistic credentials based popular perceptions that its forces had taken a strong lead in fighting Japan during the war while other groups had colluded with or retreated from the Japanese advance. Now being widely, the party suffered from losing some of its dwindling legitimacy. Being criticized by popular nationalists as incompetent toward Japan, the party suffered from losing some of its dwindling legitimacy. A New York Time reporter observed that “China’s leaders are no doubt mindful of how popular dissatisfaction with weak governments developed into rebellious movements in the past. In 1919, student protests against the government’s frailty in negotiations at the Versailles peace conference after World War I led to the May 4 Movement, from which the Communist Party eventually emerged.”²⁴ The Chinese leadership also had to worry about the massive nationalist sentiment against Japan that might evolve into a protest

23 Song Qiang, Zhang Zangzang, Qiangbian, *Zhongguo Keyi Shuobu (China Can Say No)*, Beijing” Zhonghua Gongshang Lianhe Chubanshe, 1996, pp. 112-113.

24 Graig, S. Smith, “Students’ Unease over Weakness Could Threaten Beijing’s leaders,” *New York Times*, April 6, 2001.

movement against the Chinese government itself by those people who were jobless or angry about the corruption in the government.

Cautious to prevent the nationalist sentiment of Chinese people from turning into a criticism of Chinese foreign policy, Chinese leaders returned to the two pronged policy and ordered a stop to the demonstration in late-April when leaders discovered an internet call for even larger scale demonstrations on May 4th, an anniversary of The May Fourth Movement triggered by anger over the Versailles Treaty giving Japan control of parts of China's Shandong Province in 1919 and a symbol of social reform, individual emancipation and resistance to foreign aggression in China—almost a Chinese equivalent of the Boston Tea Party. To stop the demonstrations, the government sent a blizzard of text messages to mobile phone users in major cities warning against “spreading rumors, believing rumors or joining illegal demonstrations.” Several organizers of online petition drives and popular protests were detained. In Shanghai, one major state-run newspaper published a viciously worded editorial warning that anti-Japan protests were cover for an “evil conspiracy” to undermine the government. Police in main cities throughout the nation went on full alert to prevent a recurrence of anti-Japan protests on the sensitive May Fourth anniversary. Busloads of riot police were stationed outside the Japanese embassy in Beijing, while scores of police patrolled nearby streets. Tiananmen Square was closed to the public for a government-organized coming-of-age ceremony for 18-year-olds, in another apparent attempt to thwart any protests. Shanghai authorities closed the area around the Japanese consulate to traffic, using metal shipping containers to create a barrier. Hundreds of police stood guard around the building.

Walking on a tightrope, the Chinese state stopped the popular anti-Japanese protests it initiated but went out of control but tolerated and encouraged again the biggest flare-up in anti-Japan protests in 2012, targeting Japanese businesses and shops and leading to violence and destruction against Japanese property and interests. Popular nationalist sentiment ran particularly high after the global financial crisis be-

gan in 2009. Claiming that the crisis could result in an envious West doing whatever it can to keep China down, a popular nationalist book, *China is Not Happy*, tapped into what the authors believed to be a widespread public feeling of disgruntlement with the West and urged China to assert itself militarily, diplomatically and in every other way to grasp its great power place in history.²⁵

Partially due to the popular nationalist pressure, Beijing's foreign policy, including its Japan policy, took a strident turn. For many years, Chinese foreign policy was designed to serve domestic economic modernization (外交服務於國內經濟建設) by creating and maintaining a peaceful international environment. China now began to reverse the order and use its rising economic power to serve its expanded foreign policy objectives. Facing rumblings of discontent from the popular nationalists who saw the global downturn as a chance for China to reclaim its great power status, Chinese leaders become more willing to play to the nationalist gallery in defending China's core national interests, defined as “the bottom-line of national survival,” which “are essentially nonnegotiable in nature.”²⁶ Obviously chosen with intent to signal the resolve in China's rising power aspirations, Chinese leaders steadily included more controversial issues in the expanding list of China's core interests of state sovereignty and territorial integrity and reoriented foreign policy in a more assertive direction, reacting stridently to all perceived slights to its national pride and interests.²⁷

The territorial dispute over the Tiaoyu/Senkaku islands was firmly included in the list of core national interests. Stepping up naval activities around the dispute islands to challenge the status quo, i.e., China accepted Japan's de facto control of the islands but rejecting its sovereignty claim and keeping its own claim alive, the Chinese government actively looked for a pretext to exercise its effective control of disputed islands. The pretext came in April 2012 when vocal nationalistic governor of metropolitan the Japanese Government began announced the purchase (“nationalization”) of three of the five Islands from a private Japanese owner on September 10, 2012. China interpreted the nationalization as a direct vio-

25 Song Xiaojun, Wang Xiaodong, Huang Jisu, Song Qiang, etc, *Zhongguo Bugaoxing (China is Not Happy)*, (Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 2009).

26 Michael Swain, “China's Assertive Behavior—Part One: On “Core Interests,” *China Leadership Monitor*, 2011, No. 34, February 22, 2011, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/7216>

27 Suisheng Zhao, “Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: The Strident Turn,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, 22:82, July 2013, p. 535.

lation of the already fragile status quo. From the Chinese perspective, it was a game-changer and an imaginative act to strengthen Japan's claim through direct government control, for Japan could now claim that it had applied domestic law to the transaction of the Islands. Therefore, Beijing had to demonstrate its strength and resolve. A People's Daily commentary stated that "on the issue of Diaoyu islands, the will of the Chinese government and people to defend territorial sovereignty is firm. Long gone are the days when the Chinese nation was subject to bullying and humiliation from others. China has the complete ability and will continue to take whatever it takes to firmly defend territorial sovereignty" (中華民族任人欺凌的時代早已一去不復返).²⁸ Demonstrating its resolve, the Chinese government displayed a seemed well-coordinated response by lodging angry protests, ratcheting up state media coverage of the nationalization, featuring bellicose commentary, threatening economic sanctions, and dispatching patrol ships to the disputed waters.



Encouraged by the state, the largest anti-Japanese protests took place, unprecedented since 1972 when the two nations normalized diplomatic relationships. Starting on September 15, a large number of Chinese demonstrators took to the streets in over 100 Chinese cities to condemn the Japanese government's planned purchase of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. In Beijing, protesters gathered and swarmed the road in front of Japanese embassy. Rows of paramilitary police lined the perimeter of the embassy and allowed protesters in groups of up to 100 to take turns standing in front of the embassy. Carrying portraits of revolutionary leader Mao Ze-

dong, waving anti-Japanese banners and the Chinese national flag, singing the national anthem and shouting slogans, "Down with Japanese imperialism! Get the hell out of the Diaoyu Islands! Boycott Japanese goods! Declare war on Japan!" some of demonstrators tossed water bottles, rocks, bananas, tomatoes, and eggs over the gates and into the compound. In Shanghai, hundreds of protesters across from the main gate of the Japanese Consulate chanted and waved banners. Paramilitary police officers wearing helmets and carrying shields stood outside and cordoned off the street, allowing people to protest in groups of 50 for about 5-10 minutes before escorting them away. While Protests in Beijing and Shanghai turned violent at times, the protests in other cities were marked by violent acts, such as looting Japanese shops and restaurants, smashing Japanese-made cars, burning buildings of some Japanese companies and ransacking some Japanese supermarkets. Protestors broke into a dozen Japanese-run factories in Qingdao, setting a Panasonic factory and a Toyota dealership on fire. While the security presence is reportedly very heavy around the protests, observers noted that security officers were not preventing the protests.²⁹

While the Chinese government initiated the protests and allowed the protests to go further than it would normally do, it became unnerved by the extent of the violence as the anti-Japanese protests threatened to spin out of control, coming right before the sensitive anniversary of the Japanese invasion of China 82 years ago on September 18 and in the midst of an already chaotic political transition. Attacking private as well as government cars made in Japan, many protesters were angry at the police for defending Japanese companies and accused police and government representatives for not being patriotic enough, preferring to defend Japanese economic interests rather than Chinese national sovereignty. Many protesters carried portraits of Mao Tse-tung and some chanted in support of Bo Xilai, the purged Communist Party chairman of Chongqing and a rival of President Xi Jinping. One banner in Chengdu read that "Diaoyu island belongs to China; Bo Xilai belongs to the people." In Beijing, a small scuffle broke out between protesters when Han, the left-wing professor, slapped an older man who witnesses said had dispar-

28 钟声 (zhongsheng), "日本，不要自讨没趣，" 人民日报, July 18, 2013, <http://world.people.com.cn/n/2013/0718/c14549-22232913.html>

29 "Anti-Japan Protests Escalate, Turn Violent," South China Morning Post, September 17, 2012, www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1038664/anti-japan-prot

aged the Mao slogans. There were a lot of political risks to the government in allowing these kinds of anti-Japan protests. Not only were there pro-democracy demands, you had extreme leftists out demonstrating and those people are even more dangerous to the current government.³⁰ According to one account, the original organisers of the first protests came mainly from the so-called “New Left” or neo-Maoists and other radical left groups in China critical of the restoration of capitalism and the liberalisation policy of Deng Xiaoping and his followers. Not only did new left groups take over the organisation of many of the protests from a very early point, but many other regime critical groups began to join the protests. Left-wing supporters of Bo Xilai became a common sight at many protests, as did banners against corruption, inequality and in favour of food security.³¹



After signs that some of the demonstrators' anger was being directed towards their own government over the weekend, the Chinese government sent signals on Monday September 17 that they were looking to taper the demonstrations and took steps to dampen the fervor of the protests. Editorials by most major state-run media in China called for restraint, “sensible patriotism” and “levelheadedness.” Authorities also significantly bulked up the police presence in Beijing and threatened the arrest of “unlawful” protesters in certain regions.³² The police in Xi'an banned large protests and forbidden the use of phone and online messages to organise protests. In Shanghai paramil-

itary troops provided round-the-clock protection to the Japanese consulate for the duration of the week, stripping demonstrators of projectiles, warning them through megaphones against violence and limiting protests in front of the consulate to a few minutes. In Guangdong local governments warned citizens against assembling in large crowds. On the 19th September the limit had been overstepped. National authorities sent in riot police to suppress existing protests and prevent the recurrence of new ones and arrested many organisers of the protests. In Beijing the local authorities closed down all train stations close to protest sites; roads were reopened to traffic in order to make marches impossible and Beijing-wide text messages warned citizens against further demonstrations. Police stations across the country vowed retribution against rioters and China's Commerce Ministry urged foreign companies to report damage to the authorities. This showed clearly that the regime didn't want the protests to continue, and with good reason.³³

In the meantime, Chinese media stopped coverage of the protests while calling to express patriotism in a rational manner. Except for a few left-wing media in Beijing, most of the traditional media in China were prohibited from reporting on the protests. Searches for “anti-Japan protests” on the website of Nandu Daily, the most influential daily newspaper in southern China known for independent-minded reporting, up to September 22 yielded only two news stories. One had been published on November 7, 2007, covering soldiers in the Second World War against Japan, while the other was published on May 12, 2008, and reported on a lecture about patriotism. The same search on the website of the Dongfang Daily, a major Shanghai-based major newspaper, yielded eight stories, none of which covered the protests directly. Five of them covered the reactions of Japanese people, Japanese embassy and Japanese car companies to the protests. One article from Xinhua News, China's government-controlled wire service, called for “rational patriotism” in the face of tensions.³⁴

30 Barbara Demick and Julie Makinen, “China government's hand seen in anti-Japan protests,” Los Angeles Times, September 20, 2012, <http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/20/world/la-fg-china-japan-protests-20120921>

31 Niklas Zenius Jespersen, “China: Protests against Japan reveal much deeper social malaise,” In Defense of Marxism, November 13, 2012, <http://www.marxist.com/anti-japan-protest-reveal-social-malaise-in-china.htm>

32 William Wan, “Beijing both encourages and reins in anti-Japan protests, analysts say,” Washington Post, September 17, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinese-government-both-encourages-and-reins-in-anti-japan-protests-analysts-say/2012/09/17/53144ff0-00d8-11e2-b260-32f4a8db9b7e_story.html

33 Niklas Zenius Jespersen, “China: Protests against Japan reveal much deeper social malaise,” In Defense of Marxism, November 13, 2012, <http://www.marxist.com/anti-japan-protest-reveal-social-malaise-in-china.htm>

34 Sandra Huang, “How China's Mainstream Media Ignored the Anti-Japanese Riots,” The Atlantic, September 26, 2012, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/how-chinas-mainstream-media-ignored-the-anti-japanese-riots/262879/>

Conclusion: Explaining the role of the State as mobilizer and de-mobilizer

The following three momentous developments explain the role of the Chinese state as both mobilizer and de-mobilizer in the popular nationalist protests during the late 1990s and the early 2010s.

One was the increasing influence of the so-called “public opinion” in the making of China’s foreign policy. Although China’s authoritarian system gave the state immense power to drive foreign policy, Presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were not charismatic leaders such as Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping who had the authority to arbitrate disputes in the leadership or personally set the country’s course. They must cater to a range of constituencies. The power of the Jiang and Hu administrations became conditional on their ability to defend China’s national interests as Communist ideology sputtered and social controls loosened by market-oriented economic reform and nationalist appeals of prosperity and power became the new base of the regime legitimacy. As the strong-man politics gave way to a collective leadership that was more sensitive to popular views on issues involving China’s vital interests, political leaders understood that mishandling these sensitive issues could not only lead to social instability but also provide political competitors an avenue by which to undermine their political standing. This created a vague sense of “boundary of permissible,”³⁵ which led to the match of who was tougher on the issues that defined the game for political gains or at least not to lose any ground. As a result, they became more responsive to popular nationalist sentiments on sensitive foreign policy issues.

Second, thanks to the commercialization of a large portion of Chinese media as the government limited or withdrew funding and pushed newspapers to make money from subscriptions and advertising during the Jiang and Hu eras, some of China’s leading national newspapers found nationalistic expression as one powerful approach to attract readers’ attention and

help raise profile and revenues. As popular nationalism was expressed vocally in a growing number of media outlets, Chinese foreign policy makers had to occasionally, but increasingly, refer to the constraints that the surging popular nationalism placed upon them to resist foreign entreaties and make their own policy positions more credible.³⁶ “Apparently gone are the days when Chinese elites could ignore these voices. Therefore, nationalist pundits and bloggers in China find allies in high places, as top government officials are nervous about countering this trend directly. The result has been the creation of a dangerously stunted version of a free press, in which a Chinese commentator may more safely criticize government policy from a hawkish, nationalist direction than from a moderate, internationalist one.”³⁷ Under the pressure of vocal popular nationalism, the Jiang and particularly the Hu leaderships found themselves with less room to operate on sensitive issues such as Taiwan, Tibet, and the South China Sea, as levels of foreign policy debate increased through society, magnified by a more commercially driven press and a vibrant internet.

Third, with a deeply rooted suspicion of the Western powers, however, “Chinese leaders are in essence realists. Their making of Chinese foreign policy often starts from a careful assessment of China’s relative power in the world.”³⁸ Making a point of tolerating and encouraging popular nationalist expression of nationalism to a degree, the Chinese leadership had to play the role of de-mobilizer because, facing chronic economic problems and acute political crisis at home and from a relatively weak geo-political position abroad after the end of the Cold War, China could not afford to directly confront the US and Japan. The Chinese government, therefore, made every effort to prevent popular nationalist protests from getting out of control. As one Chinese scholar indicated, for the Jiang and Hu administrations, the best way to reclaim the political legitimacy at home and regain the pre-eminent position in the world was not to fan an excessive and hostile nationalism towards foreign powers. It had to monopolize the official na-

35 David M. Lampton, “China’s Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Process: Is It Changing and does It Matter?” in David M. Lampton, *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 14.

36 Joseph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen, “The Domestic Context of Chinese Foreign Policy: Does Public Opinion Matter?” in David M. Lampton, *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 151-190.

37 Thomas J. Christensen, “The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing’s Abrasive Diplomacy,” *Foreign Affairs*, 90(2), (2011), <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67477/thomas-j-christensen/the-advantages-of-an-assertive-china>

38 Suisheng Zhao, “Shaping the Regional Context of China’s Rise: How the Obama Administration brought back Hedge in its Engagement with China,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, 21(75), (2012), p. 377.

tionalism discourse “so that popular nationalism could not have undue influence in the actual foreign policy making process.”³⁹

These momentous developments have come disappearing or been revised since President Xi Jinping took the helm of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership in 2012. Rising as the most powerful leader after Mao Zedong, President Xi has centralized state power to the center and to himself and tightened ideological control over the society and media to intensify the stability preservation system (維穩體制) based on the principle that “stability overrides everything” to “nib every element of instability in the bud (將一切不穩定因素消滅在萌芽狀態). The Xi administration has banned popular nationalist protests because political stability has become the top concern of the state due to the deeply-seated discontent and resentment against the party and government on staggering pollution, massive corruption, growing income inequality, ethnic tensions and invidious social discriminations. The state is a victim of its successes as well as failures. No country can modernize as rapidly as China without suffering the enormous social consequences. Those who are left behind by China’s rapidly economic growth in the past decades have carried placards bearing quotes from Mao in mass protests, becoming the biggest threat to the regime legitimacy. As Mao admonished, a single spark can start a prairie fire in China. Coming into office when the predatory of state toward ordinary citizens caused deep discontents and resentments over their worsening environment and massive corruption and the growing inequality, Xi is determined to ensure that, there is no single spark there, including nationalist protest, to start a prairie fire.

Banning popular protests, including nationalist protests, from taking place, the Xi leadership has developed a big security concept by linking domestic security with external security. Tightening political security at home, the Xi administration has become more willing to proactively shape the external environment rather than passively react to it and forcefully safeguard China’s national interests rather than compromise them. With China’s growing economic, diplomatic, and military muscle, the Xi leadership has adopted tougher approaches than his predecessors to forcefully pursuing core interests and to deal

with the US and settle territorial disputes on its own terms with Japan. With a convergence of state nationalism and popular nationalism catalyzed as increasing number of people in the powerful places of the state found them sharing the views of popular nationalism that the global balance of power was tilting in its favor and China had gained ground to say no to the US and Japan, the Chinese state has come to the forefront without the need to mobilized or demobilize popular nationalists in protesting the battered West and Japan.



39 Chen Zimin, “Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, 14(42), (2005), pp. 51-52.

COMMENTARY

評——監警會的權利與認可

The Impact of Education on Social Mobility of Young
People in Hong Kong



評—— 監警會的權利與認可

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2019年6月12日，是警方於反送中運動中首次使用催淚彈，更加是回歸而來第一次以槍械對付本地示威者。這次的行動引起強烈爭議，其後隨著警暴情況增加，警民關係亦急劇惡化，民間提出成立獨立調查委員會的聲音日漸強烈，多名政界、法律界的人士都表示現時的監警會未能符合市民期望，做到監察警察的效果。可惜香港經歷了7個月的抗爭，以777票被選出特首林鄭月娥依然保持「只對北京問責，不對港人負責」的態度，不肯成立獨立調查委員會。

監警會 ≠ 監察警察

監警會的全名是「獨立監察警察處理投訴委員會」(IPCC)，顧名思義，監警會的工作並不是監察警方使用職權，而是監察警察處理投訴。市民要投訴警察，都是由投訴警察課處理和調查，但偏偏投訴警察課隸屬於香港警務處，在「自己人查自己人」的情況下，多年來被分類為「獲證明屬實」的個案多年來只佔全面調查的指控中10%，如涉及毆打、捏造證據等嚴重違紀行為的

指控，投訴成立的機率更低，幾乎不到2%。¹反送中運動中警方屢被批評使用過份武力制服示威者和毆打被捕人士，但在投訴警察課主導的投訴警察機制下，即使市民能夠在警察長期蒙面及拒絕出示委任證的情況下辨認涉事警員，他們很可能只會換來一句「無法證實」。

投訴警察課在完成調查及把案件分類後會提交報告給監警會，監警會的確可以不接納調查結果，並要求投訴警察課澄清或重新調查。但調查、搜證權畢竟在於投訴課手中，警方大可以拒絕重新審視案件，監警會亦無力推翻裁決。事實上投訴課亦曾將前警司朱經緯毆打途人的指控分類為不成立，雖然監警會不接納報告，但投訴課堅持報告結果。拖延了兩年多，並諮詢過律政司意見，才確定毆打指控屬實。可惜在這漫長的纏擾間，朱經緯已順利退休，不需接受紀律處分。²

監警會缺少調查、定案和處分權，素被稱為「無牙老虎」。而其成員更加全數由行政長官委任，時任的三位副主席陳健波、張華峰和謝偉銓全部屬建制陣營，他們對於警察違規的立場恐怕不難

1 香港01【朱經緯案·01倡議】防止警察濫權 監警會要做有牙老虎

2 香港01【逃犯條例】政府：對警察不滿可投訴 現實：處理投訴的也是警察

估計。因此，港人要求成立獨立調查委員會心切，而現實中亦有很多地方跟香港一樣走過警方濫權的路，從而建立有效的機構監察警隊。



英國(只限英格蘭和威爾士) -- 監警會(IOPC)

英國的監警會名叫Independent Office for Police Conduct，擁有獨立調查權。大部分關於警察的投訴都會由警方自行調查或者在IOPC監察下調查，但當投訴性質嚴重，例如警察行動導致有人嚴重受傷甚至死亡或者公眾非常關注，IOPC可以選擇自行調查。這種個案轉介制度確保了警方面對嚴重指控時不能設法迴避擺弄，而需由不屬於警隊或政府的IOPC作獨立調查。雖然英國現在依然會有警察濫權的情況，但市民有中立的渠道申訴，如投訴查明屬實，被投訴的警察會受到處罰、解職甚至被控告。

然而這樣的監察制度絕非一開始並存在，在1969年，當時警察依然使用自我監察系統，有兩名英國警察毆打黑人流浪漢歐魯瓦，導致他傷重死亡。及後，警局在調查期間極力掩蓋事實真相，引起公憤，民眾強烈要求另設機構監督警方。在民間壓力下，《警察法》在1976年通過，內容包含設立獨立的「警察投訴委員會」。³但從1990年起計，依然有超過1500宗在警察局內的死亡個案，其中包括大量有色人種。其後委員會的權力逐步增加，Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC)於2004年成立，並於2018年被自主權更高的IOPC取代。

紐約 -- 公民申訴審核部(CCRB)

CCRB的全名是Civilian Complaint Review Board，它是一個由13個人組成的部門，其中5人由市議會(city council)選出，另外5人由市

長委任，剩下3人是警察「一哥」揀選、有執法經驗的市民(如退休警員)。這樣沒有任何一邊勢力可以完全決定部門的最終裁決，這一點和香港的監警會成員全數由特首委任非常不同。而且CCRB會主動負責調查所有關於紐約警察的投訴，而非只是被動地監察警方作內部調查。最重要的是，所有的投訴，不論結果如何，都會記錄在該警員的個人資料上，所以對於警員來說很有阻嚇性。

CCRB在1950年開始有了雛形，但就如香港的情形，紐約警察開始的時候對這樣的組織極度反感，並舉行聯署反對普通市民加入這個部門，認為會阻礙警察辦公。但在1988年處理湯普金斯廣場公園騷亂時，警察亂棍毆打在場的旁觀者、用腳踢瑟縮在地的人、又用盾牌遮掩面部隱藏身份，行為與香港警方在多次警民衝突中所做的非常相似。相片和影片曝光後，輿論一面倒地支持以第三方監察警察紀律，CCRB才受到更多人的認同。

時至今日，限制警員權力以保障人權和公義已是全球的大勢所趨，但反觀本地，港共政權依然漠視百萬人上街的訴求，拒絕成立獨立調查委員會，反而成立獨立檢討委員會意圖掩人耳目。即使警察經常挑釁市民、阻礙記者工作、甚至只為發洩而毆打市民後不拘捕，特首林鄭月娥和中央政府依然表示支持警察的所作所為，並聲言現時的警察投訴機制「行之有效」，對警謊、警暴視而不見。特首林鄭月娥9月初宣布邀請海外專家，協助監警會審視反修例風波期間的警方行動與投訴，但5名專家在11月已經發聲明表示認為監警會的權力及獨立調查能力，不足以應付近期的事件，建議由獨立機構進行調查，於12月更加集體退出抗議。雖然筆者撮寫本文章時，監警會首階段報告仍未公布，但已經可以預計報告的將會缺乏公信力，而港共政府亦只會繼續重複支持警察止暴制亂，將香港對入警察城市(police state)的深淵。





The Impact of Education on Social Mobility of Young People in Hong Kong

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BSS II*

It is a social perception that the expansion of education can promote social mobility. It may be true, theoretically. As Vere (2010) argues that education is the determinant of whether ones can achieve upward mobility, it is said that Hong Kong would become more and more social mobile stems from the government's efforts in promoting universal education and the massification of tertiary education. This essay, however, will point out that the reality may not be as good as what anticipated. In fact, the education in Hong Kong can only promote social mobility to a very small extent. This article will evaluate the impacts education has on earning mobility, educational mobility and occupational mobility in the Hong Kong society from two perspectives — the intra-generational perspective and the inter-generational perspective.

Promotion of Social Mobility

Pfeffer and Hertel (2015) define social mobility to be the movement of individuals and groups of people

in the social stratification that changes one's linkages with certain socioeconomic status. Generally speaking, as a knowledge based-economy of meritocracy, Hong Kong's social mobility would be high when young people have the opportunities to be educated to achieve qualifications conducive to their upward mobility. Since 1971, the young people in Hong Kong can enjoy 6-year free education in primary school (Government Secretariat of the Hong Kong Government, 1981). Ample school places have been rendered by the government starting from the 1970s, meaning that young people in Hong Kong need not to compete for studying in primary school. All students must undergo compulsory education starting from 1980 (Education Bureau of the Hong Kong SAR Government, 1997). Up to 2007, the free education policy has been extended to 12 years (Tsang, 2007). These all exemplify that education in Hong Kong has become more universal over the past three decades that one's financial situation and family background would not deprive their opportunities to be educated. Meanwhile, more and more young people enjoy tertiary education as there have been

more University Grant Committee-funded universities since the 1990s. More new universities have been established. Therefore, the average annual growth rate of young people enjoying tertiary education is 1.8%, and more students are studying postgraduate degree and undergraduate degree, with an annual growth rate of 4.5% and 3.6% respectively (Census and Statistics Department, 2014). These are all manifestations of the promotion of education over the past few decades. This essay will now go on to evaluate the effectiveness of adopting this approach to promote the social mobility in Hong Kong.

First of all, in terms of the earning mobility, education in Hong Kong can only promote the intra-generational earning mobility of a very small group of people but not the majority. Only the social mobility of the degree holders, which only account for 18% of the people in the society, can be increased stems from their tertiary education, most of the young people, despite receiving post-secondary education such as joining the sub-degree programme, remain highly social immobile. In fact, the 10-year mobility ratio of the degree holders has increased from 2.942 for who born in 1966-1970 to 7.425 for who born in 1976-1980 (Huang, Ho & Wei, 2013). The mobility ratio has soared up for more than 2 times, exemplifying that the degree holders can indeed move from one social layer to another more easily within their lifetime. However, the 10-year mobility ratio of the non-degree holders born in 1966-1970 is 4.784, and that of non-degree holders born in 1976-1980 is only 5.030, slightly increased by 0.2 only (Huang, Ho & Wei, 2013). This shows that the social mobility of the non-degree holders is not significantly promoted through education. Such statistics also illustrate that despite the massification of tertiary education, non-degree holders cannot benefit from their post-secondary learning for increasing their social mobilities. Moreover, research revealed that 54% of the bottom quintile group in 1998 stuck in the bottom after 20 years, but for the top quintile group of 1998, 75% of them can remain in their top position after 20 years in 2008 (Vere, 2010). It elucidates that even after the implementation of new educational policies, social mobility in Hong Kong is only promoted to a very little extent.

From an inter-generational perspective, the earning mobility remains immensely low even after the pro-

motion of education in Hong Kong. The inter-generational mobility in Hong Kong in 2010, which is 2 decades after the massification of tertiary education, was still 0.42 (Vere, 2010). This figure means that 42% of the income advantage of the parents would be passed on to their sons or daughters (Legislative Council Secretariat of HKSAR, 2015). When the income of their parents are 100% higher than their counterparts, it is very likely that their sons and daughters income would be 42% higher than their peers and this advantage is contributed by the high earnings of their parents (Vere, 2010). It illustrates that even a long period of time after the implementation of universal education, family background still play a singularly important role in determining how much one can earn, exemplifying that inter-generational earning mobility is still very low in Hong Kong.



Educational Mobility

Educational mobility refers to the relationship between the educational attainment of the parents and the educational attainment of their next generations. The financial capacities of the parents and the educational attainment of the parents would both have impacts on the educational attainment of their children, suggesting the educational mobility in Hong Kong is low.

To begin with, there is a direct correlation between the family income and the educational attainment of their sons and daughters. Research found that adolescents born in the top 10% richest family have their university enrollment rate 3.7 times higher than their counterparts whose families are under the poverty line (Hong Kong Institute of Education, 2013). Although more support has been given to the poor by the government over the past few decades including

the provision of 12-year free education, the difference in university enrollment rates between the richest family and the families living under the poverty line has still been greatly enlarged from 1.2 times in 1991 to 3.7 times in 2013 (Hong Kong Institute of Education, 2013). It exemplifies that the provision of free education and the massification of tertiary education are malfunctioning ways to promote the educational mobility of the poor in Hong Kong. As children born in rich families have more opportunities to participate in various activities that can broaden their horizons, they are also more financially capable to go to well-known schools under the Direct Subsidy Scheme or even go to the private schools, they would have a higher chance of achieving good results in the Hong Kong Diploma of Secondary Education Examination, which is the determining factor of whether one can study undergraduate programme in Hong Kong. Family income are directly related to the resources that can be provided to their kids, and the amount of resources their kids can enjoy are very likely to be positively related to their examination results, which, in a meritocratic society, is the determinant to their success.

Apart from the income of the families, the educational attainment of their parents also, to some extent, define the educational attainment of their children. Vere (2010) found that in Hong Kong, if a father obtained a degree, the probability for his sons to obtain a degree is 74%. However, the probability for his sons to obtain a degree will drop to 20% if their fathers have only attained primary education or below (Vere, 2010). This is a very strong exemplification of the immobility on educational attainment in Hong Kong. Lam and Liu (2015) echo this argument with their research revealing that the marginal effect of schooling of a father to his sons increased from 0.0069 in 1991 to 0.0291 in 2011 despite the large-scale educational reform by the government in these two decades. Lam and Liu (2015) further pointed out that the average difference of the school year attained is around 1.24 to 1.42 years between the sons whose fathers are university graduates and the sons whose fathers are primary school leavers. The reason is that the well-educated parents know how to best invest the resources they have on their children to ensure their success and for them to have a higher return of human capital (Breen & Jonsson, 2005). They also know which parental style would be conducive to their chil-

dren's learning and thus their children's academic results. Even with the same resources, children born with less well-educated parents may not know how to utilize the resources they have. This explains why the educational attainment can be passed on from one generation to another.



Connecting with Occupational Mobility

Educational attainment of the young people in Hong Kong is likely to be defined by their parents' wealth and their parents' educational attainment. On top of the low educational mobility, the occupational mobility in Hong Kong does not seem to be increased by education either. Although more opportunities of education and training are provided to young people in these decades, the occupations of the young people are more or less affected by the occupations of their parents.

Firstly, young people whose parents are professionals have a higher chance of going to the professional occupations in the future. It has been proven that when the father is a professional, the possibility for his sons to be professionals is up to 43% and the possibility for his daughters to be professionals is up to 35% (Vere, 2010). The occupations of mothers also affect those of children, although it does so to a smaller extent compared to that of fathers. The sons will be 42% likely to go into the professional occupations and the daughters will be 13% likely to go into the professional occupations if their mothers are professionals (Vere, 2010). It manifests that the professional occupations of the parents would be conducive to their children's pursuit of being a professional. Another research echoes this point by revealing that if the father had a professional occupation, his son is 42.8% more likely to be a professional as well (The University of Hong Kong, as cited by the Legislative Council Secretariat, 2015). It elucidates that the inter-generational mobility is immensely low in Hong Kong despite

the fact that more and more educational opportunities are provided. One's occupations are, to a great extent, defined by that of their parents.

Furthermore, the occupational mobility is unable to be promoted by education as the job market in Hong Kong cannot digest the multitude of new graduates. The government in Hong Kong has been formulating new educational policies to lend a hand to the poor. More and more people have become graduates from the tertiary education institutions. However, the graduates cannot benefit from their higher qualifications in achieving upward mobility if the labour demand for professionals is not high enough. Wu (2010) found that although the number of job opportunities in Hong Kong has been growing, the pace it grows is slower than the pace the number of college graduates grows, implying that the new graduates would have more difficulties in finding "good jobs" even with their outstanding qualifications. Wu (2010) further suggested that albeit the significant increase in the percentage of professional jobs for young people from 5.34 in 1981 to 15.94 in 2006, the growth after the late 1990s is very limited. The major increase in the number of professional jobs is from the early 1980s to the early 1990s (Wu, 2010). Therefore, graduates graduated in the late 1990s are not likely to be benefited from their higher qualifications as the market and the economy are not ready to take up these graduates. It exemplifies that education itself cannot promote social mobility to a great extent. The upward mobility of the young people can be significantly promoted only when the economy has sufficient demand on well-educated workers.

As argued above, education itself can only promote occupational mobility to a very limited extent. The Hong Kong Government has indeed put a lot of efforts in equalizing opportunities, but the perception of the Hong Kong young people is that these policies are malfunctioning in upholding social equality. The social perception will be discussed below to illustrate that the education policies in Hong Kong do not seem to promote the social equality in Hong Kong.

A research shown that more than 60% of the Hongkongers find it harder and harder to upgrade their living standards compared to 10 years ago (The Chinese University of Hong Kong, as cited by Ng in South China Morning Post, 2013). Despite a lot of

new educational policies that help the poor in their primary learning and secondary learning, as well as the massification of tertiary education, climbing up social ladder remains unattainable to many. Another survey echoes this argument by revealing that 52% of the respondents said that the chance for Hong Kong young people to achieve upward mobility is even worse now compared to 10 years ago (The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2015). Not only do they think that the situation has become worse, they even think it will become worse in the future. 38.3% of them predicted that it would be even more difficult for the young people to achieve upward mobility in the future (The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2015). This implies that people in Hong Kong does not believe in education as a mean to promote social mobility. The reason why Hongkongers have no confidence in these policies in promoting social mobility is that the history has proven that education has been failed to achieve social equality and the failure of the education policies in the past has disappointed many youngsters. Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that the impacts and contribution of education is not as significant as theories suggest in mobilizing the society.



In fact, statistics show that the starting point of salaries of the university graduates has decreased over the past few years. For university graduates who born in 1970-1974, they can earn \$17000 after they are newly graduated, but the starting point of salaries for graduates who born in 1990-1994, the income they can earn after graduation is \$14900, which is 12% lower than their predecessors (Half-year Economic Report 2016, 2016). It is evident that the massification of university education in Hong Kong leads to inflation in university qualifications. Most of the degree-holders can no longer enjoy the advantages and

privileges that their predecessors enjoyed. When university graduates are no longer in an advantageous position, it will be even more difficult for the poor to climb up the social ladder because they may remain stuck in poverty and remain to have low socio-economic status even they are well-educated. Social mobility thus cannot be promoted by education.

Conclusively speaking, although education is theoretically an effective way for the poor to achieve upward mobility, statistics show that both the inter-generational and intra-generational mobility have decreased even the government has proposed lots of new educational policies in these two decades. A multitude of non-degree holders cannot change their earnings within their lifetime despite receiving tertiary education. At the same time, the income advantage of the rich can be passed on to their children. The efforts and capabilities of the young people themselves are relatively insignificant compared to the factor of the income level of their parents. Another problem is that the possibility for the children to pursue educational attainment is not equal. Only when every adolescent has an equal chance to achieve qualification by their own efforts, education can be adopted as a mean to increase social mobility. The reality in Hong Kong is that young people born in rich families have more resources conducive to their academic success and the poor would be less likely able to pursue their educational attainment. Their parents educational background is also a factor contributing to the success of the young people in middle-class families. In this case, education is not a fair race for young people to run, it is just a system for the privileged to retain its social status. As far as the occupational mobility is concerned, the labour market in Hong Kong may not be able to digest so many university graduates and there maybe an inflation in qualifications nowadays. A lot of research also suggest that there is correlation between the occupations of the parents and the occupations of the children, exemplifying that social mobility is neither high even it is measured by occupations but not earnings. Not only the figures show that social mobility has not been significantly increased in Hong Kong, people even do not feel any changes education has made to improve social equality. It is therefore argued that education only brings very little impact to the social mobility in Hong Kong.

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PAST ARTICLES

Seeds of a Global Conflict? The Russian-Ukrainian Naval Clash:
A Compact Analysis

Que Sera, Sera, What May be, Maybe: The Implications of the
Brexit vote on Britain and Beyond

Britain's Westminster System through Brexit

Understanding the Presidential System of the United States
through the Federal Government Shutdown 2018-2019



Seeds of a Global Conflict? The Russian-Ukrainian Naval Clash: A Compact Analysis

Tam So Yin, Dilys

First published on 1st December 2018

I. Basic Facts

Last Sunday - 25 November 2018 - Russian Coast Guard fired on and seized an Ukrainian naval tugboat and two other Gurza-class gunboats, which were sailing from Odessa to Mariupol, on Black Sea international waters.

The Russians then boarded the Ukrainian vessels with force, injuring six Ukrainian sailors, and seized the Ukrainian vessels, sending them to Kerch, Crimea; Crimea being governed by Russia since 2014 notwithstanding the lack of international recognition. The Ukrainian sailors were put under Russian custody.

On the next day, the Parliament of Ukraine resolved to impose martial law in ten of its provinces to combat “Russia’s rising aggression”.

Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko condemned Russia’s expansionist ambitions and called for Germany and the rest of North Atlantic Treaty Orga-

nization (NATO) to provide security to Ukraine by sending naval ships to the Sea of Azov.

Germany’s Foreign Minister Heiko Maas proposed that France and Germany could mediate this major regional crisis between Moscow and Kiev on 26 November.

On 29 November 2018, President of the United States Donald Trump announced cancellation of his scheduled meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Group of 20 (G20) summit in Argentina because of this incident. President Putin dismissed the naval clash as nothing but a minor border issue, nonetheless.

II. Seeds of a Global Conflict?

This naval clash immediately prompted fears of a regional conflict escalating into an international conflict of a much larger scale. Not so simple.

It is highly arguable that the realist logic of international relations would be manifestly defied should the current regional tensions actually escalate into any genuine international-level conflict, let alone the Third World War.

One possible reason for the swift decision of the Ukrainian Parliament to declare martial law against Russia stems from the fact that an upcoming presidential election is about to happen. President Poroshenko, who came into power in the aftermath of the Ukrainian Revolution of 2014 and the Russian annexation of Crimea, has not been domestically successful in terms of reviving the Ukrainian economy and countering the allegedly Russia-backed separatists in the Eastern region of Donbass and Donetsk.

These failures have largely undermined his political legitimacy and it is quite possible that his faction is in desperate need of a crisis to signify his willingness to stand up to the Russians so as to consolidate popular nationalistic support behind him.

If this is true, then it naturally follows that this naval clash would end up as a short-lived military crisis as President Poroshenko is unlikely to get his country embroiled in a full blown armed conflict with a major power just to win a presidential election at an embarrassing moment, not to mention the very high expected cost that would accompany it.

The primary supporter of Ukraine in her resistance against Russian aggression is the European Union (EU) and other members of the NATO. Main EU players, including Germany, France or Italy, however, are more preoccupied with settling on a deal with the United Kingdom on BREXIT in Brussels.

The internal turmoil within transnational institutions is likely to divert attention away from the Ukrainian crisis. After all, Theresa May, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, one of the five veto-players on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), is busy whipping Conservative Party MPs to support her deal, lest she might lose her premiership.

The time available to Western powers to liaise with Putin, head of state of another UNSC veto-player, appears to be severely limited. Without any positive and committed backing from the EU and/or NATO,

any hypothesis supporting the notion of the inevitability of war is more likely than not, an unfounded proposition, and nothing more.

III. What if?

Let's assume for the sake of argument that Ukraine and Russia do enter into a full blown armed conflict. The prospects of a Ukrainian victory are dim. Lessons from Georgia's earlier conflict with Russia a decade ago indicated that war against Russia by former Soviet constituent states, in the absence of backing of Western allies, would most likely result in severe humiliation.

On the basis of all available evidence, it can be safely argued that no EU country and even the United States are willing to put up a real military fight with Russia, especially under such short notice.

Besides, the Ukrainian regions dominated by separatists would likely seize the opportunity of the entrance of Russian troops and create more Crimeas here and there. All of these factors point to a gloomy scenario for Ukraine.

Of course, it is not in the interests of Russia to go into war either. Recently, Putin has pledged a number of economic promises in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Singapore. It was in many ways a genuine effort on the part of Russia to attract allies and partners from the developing countries. Being a military aggressor just a few weeks after this summit will severely call into question Russia's sincerity with ASEAN, and its credibility in concluding economic agreements and protecting the interests of foreign investors.

IV. Take Away Point

Regional military tensions between Ukraine and Russia have deep historical, ideological, and economic roots. They are unlikely to fade away in the decades to come. Similar incidents would almost certainly continue to occur. That said, an actual military conflict between the two countries, that might escalate into global warfare, is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future.



Que Sera, Sera, What May be, Maybe: The Implications of the Brexit vote on Britain and Beyond

Tam So Yin, Dilys

First published on 25th January 2019

I asked the Prime Minister, what will we be?

Prime Minister Theresa May's humiliating defeat over her plan to withdraw Britain from the European Union on Tuesday plunged the country further into political chaos, with only less than 10 weeks to go before it is set to leave the EU. As the biggest defeat in the House of Commons in modern British history, the 432-to-202 vote accurately delineated how Mrs. May has failed to reach a consensus on a united vision of how a exit from the European Union is to be carried out.

While factions in Parliament continue to bring new proposals to the table, the uncertainty that brews in the stage of Brexit will begin with the process of withdrawal from the bloc. But with this aside, one must shift their focus on the implications on Mrs. May's political career. Ever since the negotiations of withdrawal began, supported in a referendum back in 2016, Theresa May and her government has focused solely on the issue of Brexit, displacing many social problems like health care, education, and housing.

Prime Minister Theresa May had referred to the vote as "a historical decision that will set the future of our country (Britain's) for generations". One does not doubt that opinion- despite and long and strenuous negotiations, the Britain and the European Union remain in a stalemate upon the key issues of discussion. Inside the country, Mrs. May's failure to present a coherent vision of a Britain outside of the European Union has also deepened the rifts between the existent divisions.

In the words of John Springford, deputy director of the Centre for European Reform, a London-based research institute, perhaps Mrs. May has truly "lost control of the process, and her version of Brexit must now be dead."

The future's not ours to see

Having created a risk that Britain will exit the European Union with no sure deal, analysts have warned

that the aftereffects would entail much for Britain and her trade partners. From degrading into economic recessions to potential shortages of energy, food and other imports, the effects of trade restrictions would certainly be far-reaching.

Mrs. May's current plans could have given Britain's government power over immigration from Europe, and would, theoretically, keep Britain in the European Union's customs and trade system until at least the end of 2020 while a long-term pact is negotiated. But with the turning of the cards, her proposal was voted down, and a vote of no confidence followed shortly after. Labour Party leader, Jeremy Corbyn accounted this to the "sheer incompetence of (this) government" as he called for his vote.

In a purely theoretical sense, a general election follows, but it is quite improbable that Corbyn could gather enough support to muster the necessary votes. The confusion within the country was all very well, but the officials of the European Union, who have been long waiting for Britain to follow through with its plan are now silenced into reticence.

The frustration is apparent in the words of Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the European Commission, "I urge the U.K. to clarify its intentions as soon as possible. Time is almost up."

Parliament intervention, a No-deal exit, a quick negotiation with European Union- The possibilities are diverse, yet equally (un)likely.

The future's not ours to see.

Whatever will be will be

Mrs. May had emerged from two years of negotiations with an agreement that satisfied no one.

Dominic Raab, Mrs. May's former Brexit secretary, added in a pinch of salt- "For sure, (the agreement) is wracked with self-doubt, defeatism and fear."

Prior to the vote, Theresa May and her followers were convincing legislators in both the Labour and Conservative parties to support her plan, purporting that a vote in favour would resolve the stalemate. With an

admirable determination, Mrs. May stressed on the importance of the vote. "The responsibility on each and every one of us at this moment is profound," she said, "for this is a historic decision that will set the future of our country for generations."

Mrs. May had expected to lose Tuesday's critical vote, having lost the support of many of her own lawmakers. But her surrogates scrambled up to the moment of the vote to rally lawmakers to her side in hopes of keeping the margin of loss narrow enough. That would have allowed her to try again for parliamentary approval.

Yet, like many others the prime minister had no concrete plans about the way forward. While she had called for the European Union in Brussels to make more concessions and strived to win parliamentary approval, the European bloc is unlikely to concede further unless she brings a convincing plan to the table.

Members of Parliament now debate on the various Brexit plans being bandied about, and if Parliament (ever) coalesced around a structured plan, Mrs. May could try to negotiate such a result with the European Union.

But to garner the support of the Labour Party, new proposals would likely be 'soft' Brexit plans that would preserve close economic ties to the Union. With no consensus behind any one path, and a vanishing window for further negotiation, more radical solutions are rising to the fore.

"This deal before us can't end the grinding process — it can only prolong it," Mr. Raab said. "It would torment us and our European neighbors for the foreseeable future."

Generally, a British prime minister would resign after losing a vote on such an important policy. But the entire issue of Brexit has so shaken the old order and unsettled political conventions that Mrs. May could perhaps stay long enough to introduce a new deal once more.

While we all dwell in the midst of this chaos of Brexit, perhaps this, is the only trace of certainty.



Understanding Britain's Westminster System through Brexit

Tam So Yin, Dilys

First published on 25th January 2019

1. What is the Westminster System?

The Westminster system or the Westminster parliamentary system, is one of the great political traditions of the world. It is the oldest member of the still wider parliamentary tradition of government, which can be found in all stable liberal democracies in the world, with a few exceptions such as the United States, home of the presidential tradition of government, and France, which practices a semi-presidential system. As its name suggests, the Westminster originated from the Parliament at Westminster, which in turn is located in England's and the United Kingdom's (UK) capital, London. Today, variations of the Westminster system can be found all over the Commonwealth, in countries such as Australia, Canada, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and so on. Certain non-Commonwealth countries such as Ireland and Japan have also adopted political systems very similar to the Westminster tradition.

2. What are the classical features of the Westminster system?

A classical Westminster system possesses the following features: the sovereignty or supremacy of Parliament, a government formed by and accountable to Parliament, strong party discipline inside Parliament, and popular elections of Members of Parliament using the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) system. The head of state, usually the Queen of the United Kingdom or her Governor-General (e.g. Canada) or another monarch (e.g. the King of Malaysia) or a civilian president (e.g. the President of Singapore) remains more or less a ceremonial or symbolic figure in the political process, unlike the Presidents of the French Republic and of the United States.

3. How does the Westminster system contrast with other political systems?

The United States' presidential system, which separates Congressional and Presidential elections, and

Executive personnel from Congress, often results in the Presidency and Congress being controlled by different political parties, and a higher frequency of Presidential-Congressional conflicts, as seen in the recent partial shutdown of President Donald Trump's federal government due to the House Democrats' refusal to approve his plan to build a wall on the Mexican border.

In Britain, the Government of the day not only is made up of Members of Parliament (e.g., the Prime Minister remains a full, voting, Member of Parliament), it also enjoys strong party discipline typical of any Westminster system, enabling it to exercise substantial control over Parliament, such as dictating and effectively enforcing the legislative agenda. Executive-legislative conflicts, and defeats of Government-initiated motions therefore rarely happen.

4. What is parliamentary sovereignty?

Traditionally, parliamentary sovereignty, as stated by the famous British constitutional theorist AV Dicey, entails "that Parliament has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament."

Contemporarily, parliamentary sovereignty usually mean that Parliament officially retains the last word on all constitutional and legislative matters, notwithstanding the rise of supranational organisations like the European Union (EU), and the adoption of human rights instruments such as the Human Rights Act 1998 in the UK.

5. Is the Brexit referendum of 2016 binding on the British Parliament?

On 24 June 2016, 51.9% of the 72.1% of voters who turned out in the United Kingdom European Union Membership Referendum (the Brexit Referendum), voted for the UK to leave the EU. The legal basis for organising this referendum can be found in the European Union Referendum Act 2015 and the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. Neither legislation, however, provided for referendum results to be legally binding on the British Parliament.

Indeed this must be the case under parliamentary sovereignty: it is Parliament, not the referendum participants, that holds the last word in the Westminster system.

6. Would a second Brexit referendum be binding on the British Parliament?

Given the continued existence of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, a second referendum would also not be legally binding on the British Parliament either.

7. How significant was the historic defeat of Theresa May's Brexit plan in January 2019?

The UK is set to leave the EU on 29 March 2019. On 15 January 2019, the House of Commons defeated Prime Minister Theresa May's Brexit deal by 432 against 202 votes. The deal, negotiated between May and the EU authorities, attempted to avoid a hard border between Northern Ireland and Ireland; to ensure that Northern Ireland would comply with EU single market arrangements until a free-trade agreement between the UK and the EU can be reached; that the UK should settle its financial commitments with the EU at £39 billion; and that the UK would guarantee the rights of citizens of EU who arrive in the UK before a transition period. May's Government was given three working days, after this defeat, to work out a new action plan, agreeable to the EU, and presented to the House of Commons on 21 January 2019.

The historical significance of May's defeat cannot be overstated. The rejection of May's Brexit deal by 230 votes, including 118 votes from defecting Conservative Members of Parliament, was the largest single Parliamentary defeat for the Government of the day in British history. Between 1919 and 2019, only 4 Government motions had been defeated by over 100 votes in Parliament, but none except May's defeat exceeded 200 votes.

8. How did Theresa May's Government remain in office in spite of its above-mentioned historic defeat?

Ordinarily, such a crushing defeat of the Government of the day in the House of Commons would result in

the former's collapse. And yet, presumably to avoid further chaos, some of the defected Conservative Members of Parliament and Members of Parliament from the Northern Irish Democratic Unionist Party decided to shield Prime Minister Theresa May's Government from a vote of no-confidence raised by Labour Leader Jeremy Corbyn, who had criticised May's Minority Government as a "zombie" that had lost its right to rule. On 16 January, in a dramatic turn of events, May survived a vote of no-confidence in the Commons by 325 versus 306 votes.

9. What is a Minority Government?

Under the first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system, the candidate who wins more votes than all other candidates, or the plurality of votes, wins the contested seat, even if she does not receive a majority of votes in that election.

On a larger scale, FPTP enables political parties that gained only a relatively small number of votes to command disproportionate majorities in Parliament. For instance, in the 2015 General Election, the Conservatives, who managed to acquire just 36.9% of all votes, won 330 out of 650 seats in the House of Commons, thus being able to form a Majority Government; by contrast, Labour's 30.4% share of the votes translated into only 232 seats.

As expected, Non-Majority Governments such as Minority Governments or Coalition Governments can be said to be rarities in the traditional Westminster system. The incumbent Theresa May Government is a Minority Government, because it commands only 317 out of 650 seats in the House of Commons following the 2017 General Election.

The fact that it has not yet collapsed is due to the fact that the Democratic Unionist Party, which won 10 seats in that General Election, has agreed to offer its votes and hence a simple majority to May's Government in the Commons, on major issues such as Votes of Confidence and the Budget, leaving other matters to be decided on a case-by-case basis. This is not a Coalition Government, in which two parties jointly form a Government, as with the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government between 2010 and 2015.

10. How did Brexit impact on Britain's Westminster system?

It remains too early to conclude on the impact of Brexit on Britain's Westminster system. But a few trends can nonetheless be noticed.

Firstly, there is a fragmented movement that seeks to eliminate or reduce EU political influence over the UK, but this movement is so fragmented that its members cannot agree with each other on how to "take back" the UK.

Secondly, Theresa May's repeated emphasis on the need to implement the results of the 2016 referendum, in spite of the facts that sovereignty has always been located in Parliament and that referendums have never been binding in the UK, constituted a challenge to some of the most important foundations of the Westminster system from within.

Thirdly, the spectacular defeat of May's Brexit deal in the House of Commons can be seen as an indicator of the exponential growth of political polarisation in Britain, which if not stopped, would likely alter the Westminster political landscape in unpredictable ways.



Understanding the Presidential System of the United States through the Federal Government Shutdown 2018-2019

Leung Ho Hei, Frederick

First published on 7th February 2019

1. What is the presidential system?

The presidential system is one of the great political traditions of the world. It first came into existence with the founding of the United States (US) in the late eighteenth century. Today, the presidential system, in one form or another, is commonplace in Latin America, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia.

As one of the great political traditions of the world, the presidential system differs from the Westminster parliamentary system adopted by the United Kingdom (UK) and many Commonwealth countries, other versions of the parliamentary system that can be found in continental European countries and their former colonies, and the semi-presidential system in countries like France and South Korea. In 2018, Turkey became the latest member of the world of presidential systems by replacing its parliamentary system with a presidential one under the auspices of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

2. What are the classical features of the presidential system?

A classical presidential system, as with that of the US, possesses the following features:

- (a) A president who is both head of state and head of government, who is not assisted by any official carrying the title of “prime minister” or “premier” (the US Secretary of State is the equivalent of a foreign affairs minister, not prime minister);
- (b) Ministers of the government hold office on the basis of the president’s confidence, instead of the confidence of the legislature;
- (c) presidential elections and legislative elections are separate from each other; and
- (d) ministers of the government are not members of the legislature.

3. How does the presidential system contrast with other political systems?

In a classical presidential system, the president is not a member of the legislature (unlike prime ministers in parliamentary systems) and legislators do not concurrently serve as ministers of the government (unlike legislators in parliamentary systems who serve as government ministers). Because the president and the legislature are elected on separate occasions, the president is not elected by the legislature, and government ministers cannot vote in the legislature – all unlike the classical parliamentary system – the president and the legislature will typically act independently of each other, responding to the demands and interests of their own constituencies separately.

4. What is gridlock?

Gridlock, in essence, means disagreement between the president and the legislature, and is a serious example of executive-legislative conflict. When Congress wishes to make a law which the President is prepared to veto, or when the President wishes to propose a law which Congress is ready to vote down, it can be said that they are trapped in a gridlock. In the US's presidential system, which separates Congressional and Presidential elections, and which separates Executive officers from Congress, the Presidency and the Houses of Congress are often under the control of different parties (i.e. the Republicans and the Democrats), leading to a higher frequency of Presidential-Congressional conflicts than in parliamentary systems. Gridlocks are not always bad things, as they showcase the separation of powers and checks and balances in a highly visible way.

One extreme example of gridlocks in presidential systems can be found in the ongoing constitutional crisis in Venezuela. Following the 2015 legislative election, President Nicolás Maduro's United Socialist Party government lost the majority of seats in the National Assembly to the opposition. The President took active steps to sideline the National Assembly to whom he no longer controlled, and instead established a new body known as the "Constituent National Assembly", dominated by his political allies, to replace the functions of the National Assembly. The President and the National Assembly have therefore

entered into a persistent gridlock. The gridlock entered a chaotic stage when the National Assembly refused to recognise the constitutionality of Maduro's new term in January 2019, and instead sworn in its Speaker, Juan Guaidó, as Interim President, creating an unprecedented situation with two Venezuelan Presidents, one supported by the executive and countries like Russia and China, and the other supported by the legislature and countries like the US and Canada. This crisis has not yet been resolved as at the time of writing.

5. What is a federal government shutdown?

In the US, a federal government shutdown results from a gridlock in the public budgetary process when Congress is unable to appropriate funds for the federal government, such that non-essential federal government programmes have to close down.

A federal government shutdown in reality does not refer to the complete shutdown of the federal government, but only part of it, though those departments that might be forced to shutdown are by no means unimportant; for instance, over 90% of NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) employees were granted leave without payment during the most recent shutdown of 2018-2019, to be discussed below.

6. What caused the shutdown of the American federal government from December 2018 to January 2019?

This shutdown of the US federal government occurred from 21 December 2018 to 25 January 2019. It stemmed from the disagreement on how to strengthen border controls between President Donald Trump and the Democrats who are in control of the House of Representatives, the lower House of the American Congress, since the November 2018 House of Representatives election.

In relation to his election promise, Republican President Trump asserted that he would not approve a budget that does not include a 5.7 billion US dollars wall on the Mexican border, which he believed to be necessary to terminate the rising number of migrants

applying for asylum at that border. House Democrats were unwilling to approve funding for the wall, though they were prepared to concede funding that supports other forms of border control such as the use of advanced technology in drug scanning, well-equipped immigration checkpoints, etc.

On January 25 2019, President Trump resolved to support a three-week funding proposal that would reopen the government until February 15, and offer federal civil servants back pay. Both the Senate and House of Representatives unanimously endorsed this measure, thus temporarily ending the shutdown.

7. How significant was this shutdown?

This shutdown, which lasted 35 days, was the longest shutdown in the history of the US, superseding the 21-day shutdown that took place between 1995 and 1996, which resulted from a gridlock between the Democrat-controlled Presidency, and the Republican-controlled Congress. Some 380,000 employees in nine key agencies had been sent home in the absence of salaries; 50,000 of whom were summoned back to work by President Trump's Administration in mid-January, without pay however. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the shutdown had lowered gross domestic product by 11 billion US dollars. Delays can be found in areas ranging from federal court cases to airport transportation. There is no evidence that the shutdown had triggered a nation-wide economic crisis, nevertheless.

8. Will the shutdown occur again in the near future?

On 27 January 2019, Trump's Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney hinted that the President has not ruled out the possibility of a shutdown in the near future. Indeed, the President has disappointed some of his constituencies by ending the shutdown first, before the Democrats actually back down. And it is unlikely that the 17 members of Congress selected to negotiate a border security compromise would be able to produce a plan that is agreeable to both parties: the Democrats are unlikely to agree with Trump's plan to build a wall. These factors seem to point to a shutdown again in the near future. One

controversial method for President Trump to preempt the shutdown exists though: the declaration of a state of national emergency.

9. Would Trump declare a state of emergency?

On 1 February 2019, President Trump suggested the possibility of declaring a state of emergency, which would activate over 100 legal provisions that confer extraordinary powers on the President, including power to allocate funds to building the wall on the Mexican border without risking another government shutdown. A presidential state of emergency declaration is however subject to legal challenges in the courts under US constitutional law, and can be invalidated as unconstitutional by judges.

10. What does the shutdown tell us about the separation of powers in the American presidential system?

The federal government shutdown 2018-2019 once again reveals the seriousness of gridlocks in the US political system. On the one hand, it demonstrates the vibrancy of checks and balances in American politics. On the other hand, it implies how fundamental ideological political disagreement between the Democrats and the Republicans can constrain and slow down government operations at astounding rates. During the shutdown, Democrat House Speaker Nancy Pelosi on 16 January 2019 cancelled Republican President Trump's scheduled annual State of the Union Address to both Houses of Congress on 29 January 2019; on the next day, President Trump cancelled Speaker Pelosi's official trip to Afghanistan, except she was willing to "fly commercial". These conflicts symbolise how political polarisation continues to deepen in US politics, which in turn is going to generate even more gridlocks in the future.

FUNCTIONS REVIEW

Welfare Week & Mega Sale

The Welfare Week and Mega Sale has been together held from 12th to 15th February 2019. The event serves as a platform to promote PPAA as new Association products will be sold. It has successfully raise funds for the Association so as to support the Associations' operation and hosting of future events. On the other hand, welfare week has given us an opportunity to thank our members for supporting us by providing them with welfare products such as coupons and sponsored items.



Politics and Public Administration Exposition

A multifaceted Perspective on Populism in Hong Kong (我城民粹多面睇)

Populism and populist democracy are not merely foreign phenomena, these exotic subjects are also common, if not ubiquitous in Hong Kong. In light of it, the Forum 'A multifaceted Perspective on Populism in Hong Kong' (我城民粹多面睇) was held on 12th March 2019 in Sun Yat-sen Place. We had honorably invited Dr. Hon Cheng Chung-tai, an incumbent Legislative Council member and the Chairman of Civic Passion, Mr. Lee Cheuk-yan, the General Secretary of the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions and Mr. Leung Kwok-hung, the Founder of the League of Social Democrats to form the panelist cohort. The forum was successfully held, which we probe into subjects including but not limited to populist democracy. Other than looking at social movements featuring populist democracy or populist characters, we would also look at some "populist" policies implemented by the government so far.


Populism: Genesis and the Future Exhibition

An exhibition has been set in Centennial Campus outside the Bank of East Asia from 11th to 14th March 2019. The exhibition displays information of both populism and populist democracy, showcasing the past, the present, and the speculated future of populism and populist democracy.



Emergence of Populism in the Continent- Implications for Asia and Beyond

With widespread public dissatisfaction over immigration and globalisation policies, the European continent has seen the rise of populism and right-wing nationalism over the past few years. Yet, Europe has displayed admirable solidarity in meeting these challenges. By delineating the causes and factors of this trend, the panel discussion explored the immediate and long-term implications of European populism on Asian societies by encouraging intellectual exchange between the academic and practitioner communities. The panel discussion has been successfully held on 13th Marth. We are glad to have Mr. Reto Renggli, Consul General of Switzerland in Hong Kong, Professor Kenneth Chan, D.Phil. in Politics (Oxon), Associate Professor of the Department of Government & International Studies of Hong Kong Baptist University, and Miss Desiree Ho of Sage Gateshead (London), awardee of the Hong Kong Arts Development Council’s Cultural Bursary and leading international performance art manager of Malvern College and Hong Kong Academy for sharing with us their view on the topic.





Movie Night -- Chung Ying Street

The movie Chung Ying Street compares the two political movements that are very different in nature, the 1967 riot, and the umbrella movement. We are glad to have the director Mr. Derek Chiu to discuss with the audience after watching the movie. The theme of the movie and the process of directing a film in Hong Kong with a political theme has been discussed, and a thoughtful discussion has been made.



Extradition Law Legislation Forum

Regarding the Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019 put forth by the Hong Kong SAR Government, the Extradition Law Legislation Forum has been organised on 15 April 2019 to promote members' understandings on this proposal. We are glad to invite Mr. Alan Leong, SC and His Honorable Mr. Eddie Chu to share their opinions and how they interpret the rendition proposal at the forum. Four key issues concerning the government's rendition proposal, including the initial legislative intent of the two ordinances, the positive and negative effects that the legislation would likely bring, the urgency of the amendment of the two ordinances, and whether the judiciary has adequate power to review each extradition case after the amendment has been discussed.



Examprep: Superpass 2019

The Examprep: Superpass 2019 has been held on 24th April 2019 to relieve students' stress brought by upcoming examinations. The event included traditional HKU Examprep practices like roasted pig cutting and Fai Chun writing. Light refreshment was also served in the event. The event has not only helped students to relieve stress, but also provided them with an opportunity to make new friends that studies in the same field.



Orientation Series

Registration Day

The Registration Day, held on 20th August 2019, marked the commencement of the Orientation Series 2019. The event was comprised of series of inter- and intra-group ice-breaking games, academic talk regarding to the curriculum structure and major requirements, Common Core and course registration tips, so as the HKU-Orientation (HKUO), in which freshmen were given a sheet of riddles that hinted at different spots in HKU. Freshmen were given the opportunity to learn about the Association, register as members and sign up for Orientation Series events.




Orientation Camp

The 3-day orientation camp was held from 27 to 29 August 2019 at Kadoorie Centre of The University of Hong Kong. The camp started with an ice-breaking session at HKU and a talk concerning the anti-Extradition Bill Movement. The first night concluded with the much-anticipated Detective Game. Dance practice sessions were held on the second day so as to allow freshmen to familiarize themselves with the campfire choreography. Water games were held after lunch. The campfire was held successfully after dinner. Mass games were played on the third day, followed by a general debriefing session. The camp enable freshmen to meet friends and marks the start of their future years in HKU.



Implications of the Greater Bay Area

‘Under the Shadow of Mainland Hong Kong Tensions: Implication of the Greater Bay Area’ is a panel discussion co-organised with the Oxford University Hong Kong Public Affairs and Social Services Society held on 9th September, 2019. We are honoured to have Mr. Lau Ming-wai, GBS, JP, Deputy Chairman of the Youth Development Commission, Mr. Alan Leong Kah-kit SC, former member of the Hong Kong Legislative Council, and Mr. Michael Frank, Senior Analyst of the Economist Central Intelligence Unit in our distinguished panel. The panel discussions “deep-dive” into the socio-political impacts of GBA, explores the relationship between the GBA project and Hong Kong’s current problems, as well as the role of youth under the GBA.



Career Talk

The participants have the chance to interact with alumni or guests working in their selected fields. They have the chance to listen to the guests’ sharings, ask them questions and have in depth discussions on their interested aspects in small groups. We have honourably invited 6 guests, 3 from the political field and 3 from the legal field, to share upon their experience.

EXECUTIVE REMARKS

梁顯熹
主席

這是最好的時代，也是最壞的時代；
是智慧的時代，也是愚蠢的時代；
是信仰的時代，也是懷疑的時代；
是光明的季節，也是黑暗的季節；
是充滿希望的春天，也是令人絕望的冬天；
我們的前途擁有一切，我們的前途一無所有；
我們正走向天堂，我們也正直下地獄。

摘錄自《雙城記》的這一段正正是現今香港政治氣候的寫照，同時，它或多或少亦反映筆者這一年的心路歷程。

上莊初期，鑑於種種原因，我們莊並沒有一個亮麗的開頭。確實，我們在處理某些問題的細節上未能做到盡善盡美，而大家亦正值磨合期，亦不時出現意見分歧等情況。但我慶幸真理愈辯愈明，而大家在磨合中亦建立到默契，莊務亦漸入佳景。

直至19年6月，香港迎來了這個時代的轉捩點。一宗台灣兇殺案經過發酵，竟成為送中修例的鋪墊，繼而引發史無前例地大規模的社會運動，相信大家亦始料不及。特區政府這一著，將香港拖入萬丈深淵，為香港人帶來前所未有的寒冬。但這場浩劫同時亦喚醒無數香港人。有一部分人，曾經因為政治無力感，又或是政治冷感，選擇逃避政治。但在大是大非之下，沉默的大多數不再虛作無聲，展示出對於自由的珍視。當然，這八個月抗爭非常，社會狀況非常，一切也異常，以致莊期原定計劃亦出現變掛。作為主席，對於計劃未能如期進行，或多或少亦會有點遺憾；但作為一個香港人，當大家已在這場運動付出了那麼多，甚至賭上自由，以至生命，相信沒有任何人願意就此退場。

《雙城記》以其中一位男主角頂替另一位男主角被處死悲劇收場，但我相信香港人終於這黑暗對峙中支撐過來，正如《雙城記》中另一句名言，「世界有陰影，但亮光在對比下顯得更強」，捱過了黑夜，便迎來了黎明；捱過了冬季，便迎來了春天。



陳令瑜
內務副主席

這年於我而言，是豐富且難忘的。

還依稀記得去年考慮應否上莊時，我掙扎了很久。常言道大學是人生新階段，難得升上大學，難免會想多接觸新人事。雖然如此，我卻擔心未能應付繁重學業。有感應接不暇，我一開始只打算專注學業，其他一概不管；唯經過一番思量，我還是決定把握機會試一試，畢竟機會只得一個；我也不希望長大以後才後悔。現在回想起來，雖然這未必是我人生中最正確的決定，卻是我做過最精彩的決定之一。不論是準備周年會員大會還是之後的活動，對我而言都是無可取替的回憶。以迎新日和迎新營為例，這是我首次擔任領導角色，指派不同工作給幹事會成員。過程雖然艱辛，但看到大家都樂在其中，盡興而歸，我便知道一切辛苦都是值得的。慶幸有社會學學會的負責人和一眾幹事會成員替我分擔重擔，迎新營才得以順利進行。

努力未必會成功，可放棄一定會失敗。或許我不是一名優秀的幹事會成員，但捫心自問，我已盡力做好自己本分，努力做好每一個活動，至臻至善。如果時間能重來，我想我還是會成為政治及公共行政學會的幹事會會員的。

光陰荏苒，歲月如梭，從前的我未能讀懂此話含意，現在我總算瞭解了。一年的時間說長不長，但說短也不短；回想那時候的決定以及這一年間的點點滴滴，雖不至於恍如隔世，倒也有種昭朝花夕拾的慨嘆。從最初的崎嶇難行，到後來的平坦舒暢，中間所歷經的高低跌宕均成了這趟旅程的憑藉。或許旅程終究會有完結的一天，但這些回憶，我會珍存在心。



譚懷媽
外務副主席

時光來也匆匆，去也匆匆，這樣就過了一年。

頓憶當日站在十字街頭的迷惘不曾因歲月而淡忘，卻只遺下那怯人的空虛。但見政萃的行行黑字，頓憶當日莘莘學子之寒窗挑燈；象牙塔中的朗朗乾坤，夕陽斜照之時，只知我城烽煙四起。

我輕拂那垂鬢的水，彷彿聽到殷紅之血在脈絡裡湍流的磅礴，還有在那浩淼長河中奔流的英氣-

回眸我城之斑斑星火，再放眼無盡蒼穹之漫漫長夜，孤獨的星光反沒徒添萬分的無奈，更多的竟是一股莫名的勇氣-

「投出一塊石頭，很難才投中湖心。許多人聽而不聞，有幸投中湖心，也不見得能泛起漣漪。真理需要聆聽者的心夠柔軟，漣漪才能化為波浪。春風終於能在湖面留痕，雨水終於能住滿湖泊。扔出石頭，有幸擊中悠軟的人心，而心主又能忠於內心的呼喚，這世界就少了一個營營役役，卻睜眼如盲的人--」

筆尖徒然斷跡。

世界果然是分是非黑白。
但，世事也無分對錯。

古來執筆者皆為史；留下的，是那令人肅然起敬的真理。

徐珀灝
常務秘書

在過去一年，我有幸擔任學會常務秘書一職，如今卸任在即，我要感謝對我予以信任的各位會員和同學。上莊對我來說是難能可貴的經驗，除了令我初嘗成為學生組織代表的滋味，每一次舉辦活動都是很重要的經驗，令我成為一個更成熟穩重的人。

還記得當初絲毫沒有上莊的意欲，但是在上莊（兼室友）的鼓勵下，還是硬著頭皮決定競選。競選工作並不容易，記熟密密麻麻的憲章和複雜的學生會架構對我來說是一大挑戰，再加上排山倒海的課業，壓力實在是把我壓得透不過氣來，甚至萌生了提早卸任的想法。還好最後堅持了下來，令我在大學的第一年生色不少。

然而天下無不散之筵席，一年任期即將迎來終結，在此我不得不在這莊期陪伴我的莊友致謝，他們的無私的付出令學會的活動得以順利舉行。我亦想藉此機會祝福下莊，希望他們也能擁有一個充實且難忘的莊期，帶領學會繼續為同學服務。



馬筠婷
財務秘書及署理學術秘書

還記得當初機緣巧合下上了莊，我像隻沒頭蒼蠅般亂衝亂撞，幸得上莊們的指導和分享，我們才得以尚且平安的度過這年莊期。眨眼間一年過去，竟到了自己寫落莊感言的時候，感覺都有點難以言喻。

身為莊內的財務秘書，我一直認為自己擔任著輔助的角色：看似幾乎所有活動的負責人都不會落在我身上，但不少活動中也有我的用武之地；這也許把一個經常胡亂花錢的人變得會謹慎理財。

衷心感謝莊友們一直以來的付出，及對我的信任和包容；每人在準備迎新營時的努力依然記憶猶新，感謝他們給了我美好、最熱血青春的三日兩夜。

無論我們日後能否再聚首一堂，盼望以後大家能一切安好。

葉曉明
宣傳秘書 及 署理出版秘書

一年莊期，來之匆匆，去亦匆匆。感謝會員們的信任，亦感謝各莊友的厚愛。這年面對種種難關，有些事的处理上不盡成熟，面對多重壓力下莊務工作上或有所缺漏，感謝莊友們的包涵。回想一年點滴，萬般滋味在心頭，不盡言表。

這是最好的時代，也是最壞的時代。容我再次引用雙城記中的引子。一個夏天，一場運動捲嘯全港，昨天的日常眨眼間變得不再平常。面對這前所未見的挑戰，一次又一次無常的變故，我的心中只有惴惴不安。幸有各莊友陪伴，是屆莊期稱不上完滿，但總算平安落幕。回首向來蕭瑟處，心之所向，自尚有情。

感謝大家，感謝一年來收穫的回憶、情誼、挫折、得著。路漫漫矣，願大家一切平安。



伍浚鉸
時事秘書

本屆「莊期」正值香港主權移交以來社會局勢最為風雨飄搖的歷史時刻。由於本年度社會局勢不斷變化，社會上充斥大量不同的資訊，使本年度時事秘書的工作更具挑戰性。我有幸能在這個關鍵時刻擔任政治及公共行政學會時事秘書一職實與有榮焉！

我藉此衷心感謝所有會員對我的信任及支持，並衷心感謝各「莊友」對我提供的協助，使我在任期內成功舉辦「逃犯條例修例研討會」及「大灣區發展研討會」！在此我謹祝願下任時事秘書處理來年「莊務」一切順利，並期盼他能青出於藍勝於藍！



余曉晴
市場主任 及 署理福利秘書

出席招莊茶聚那天，是2018年9月28日，剛好是佔領中環揭幕的四週年，白煙在手無寸鐵的人群中冒起的一幕依然歷歷在目。我想上莊是因為我希望我的聲音能夠被聽見，我希望引領同學追求香港人應得的公義。

只是現實與理想之間總是隔著一條鴻溝，上莊後才發現不似預期。和莊友的爭執耗盡了精力和時間，不管怎樣溝通都無法改變雙方理念完全不同的事實，只覺得做什麼都束手縛腳。有一段很長的時間，我不斷詢問自己當初上莊的初衷，亦有了辭職的念頭。

慶幸最後還是有堅持過來，內部矛盾漸漸緩和，外來的挑戰卻一浪接一浪，處理了被評議會罰款接近一萬元，又迎來反送中的浪潮。舉辦迎新營與否充滿著不確定性、在遊行日趨「勇武」的情況下以學會代表的身份出現亦變得敏感、甚至校園的停課、無法舉行質詢和會員大會也使我们非常煩惱。

而我最無奈的是即使作為幹事會成員，在面對香港前所未有的社會運動時，我們可以做的還是非常有限。在提倡「沒有大台」、「靜靜雞贏」的社會氛圍下，我們脫離現任幹事的身份，變回一個個戴著面罩、身份隱藏的個體。

在這個港人訴求仍未達到、運動似乎陷入僵局的一月，我們終於可以落莊了。回想這一年多的莊期，也似乎是苦多於甜。1819幹事會的我們走了一條上莊們沒有走過的路，也期盼下莊們不必經歷同樣的處境。一路走來，我還是很感激莊友們的不離不棄，願意接納固執又經常犯錯的我。我也非常感恩在這多事之秋依然願意接棒走下去的下莊，祝你們一路順風！



曾展鋒
公共關係主任

莊期將近完結，落莊在即，沒有太多感人肺腑的感言，卻有大大小小的慶幸。

香港大學貴為一間政治氣氛濃厚的大學，我慶幸讀電腦科學的我也能夠成為政治及公共行政學會的一位幹事，參與及舉辦各種政治相關的活動，增添一份學科以外的額外經歷。

身為公共關係主任，我慶幸今年莊期即使在面對複雜政治環境的情況下和處理附屬委員會問題時，我莊都能妥善應對，未見有嚴重公關災難的出現。

我慶幸能認識到一班特別的莊友，他們各有過人和特別之處，令我在相處中有着難忘和獨特的經歷。9位莊友裏面，有人熱衷於校園學生公職，有人有着過人的藝術才能，有人擁有着雄辯滔滔的說話技巧，也有人有着精打細算的理財能力。他們特別的每一位為我的大學生活增添了不只一絲的精彩。

電腦伺服器異常最常見的是404 not found異常，其實還有一個不是很多人知道的204 no content異常。感謝各位莊友伴我渡過一個說長不長，說短不短的莊期，各位令到我的year 2和year 3過得充實，未曾出現Ulife 204。大家落左莊後要多點約，唔可以404啊！



ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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SPECIAL THANKS

The Executive Committee, Session 2018-2019, would also like to take this opportunity to express our deepest gratitude to all guest and members who have given us invaluable and immense support towards our activities throughout the year.



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